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ABSTRACT 
 
Much of the existing literature describes a successful peace process as the 
embellishment of an agreement. In fact, signing a peace agreement does not 
necessarily mean a lasting peace. The peace process between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM) or the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia (GoI), or the 
central government, provides a unique and remarkable example of the dynamics of a 
peace process. This thesis presents a comprehensive analysis of the peace process in 
Aceh. Institutional, structural and historical elements of the process are thoroughly 
reviewed to capture its dynamics. This thesis indicates that the failure and success of 
a peace agreement substantially depend on the perception of the two conflicting 
parties of the existing conditions that shape their motivation and optimism 
concerning the peace process. Hence, certain conditions that can shape mutual 
motivation of both conflicting parties are instrumental in resolving dispute and 
building peace. The present thesis offers a useful lesson and a significant 
contribution for policy makers, scholars, and peace practitioners in conflict 
resolution, peace-building and peace implementation efforts in Aceh and beyond.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The Aceh conflict was one of the longest conflicts in Indonesia and in Asia. The dispute 
started approximately over five decades ago when some religious leaders in Aceh 
declared the Darul Islam (DI) in 1953, a movement aimed to establish an Islamic State 
in Aceh. This movement was a reaction against the Indonesian government‘s policy to 
eliminate Aceh‘s status as a province of Indonesia and merge it with North Sumatra in 
December 1949. This frustrating state of affairs resulted in a long dispute between DI 
and the GoI and marked the beginning of the clash between Aceh and the GoI.  
The conflict between DI and the GoI lasted for four years before the latter 
initiated a peace talk with DI in an attempt to end the dispute. The result of this talk was 
the establishment of Daerah Istimewa Aceh or Special Province of Aceh on 16 May 
1959, a status that gave Aceh the privilege of relative autonomy in education, religious 
affairs, and customary law. Alas, this special status was never entirely implemented. As 
a result, the frustration and resentment of the Acehnese people towards the GoI only 
grew deeper and more intense.  
On 4 December 1976, Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro, better known as 
Hasan Tiro, who came from a charismatic family of heroes in Aceh, declared a 
resistance movement known as the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(GAM) as a reaction to the many instances of inequity and injustice that the Acehnese 
had had to endure due to the exploitation of their natural resources by the GoI, 
exacerbated by the latter‘s empty promise concerning the special autonomy status of 
Aceh that had never been implemented. To counteract this movement, the GoI deployed 
its military forces to Aceh and subsequently, for nearly three decades, Aceh was 
plunged into the darkest period in its history.  
Only in early 2000, almost 25 years since GAM had been instituted, did the first 
talk between GAM and the GoI begin. This first contact was mediated by the Henry 
Dunant Center (HDC) after the democratic reform in Indonesia. The negotiation process 
between GAM and the GoI took nearly three years before both parties eventually agreed 
to sign the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. However, 
the agreement only survived for six months. In May 2003, a military operation was 
declared once again to eliminate the existence of GAM in Aceh. 
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After one and a half years of military operation, both parties agreed to return to 
the negotiating table. In early 2005, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an 
organization that focuses on international mediation and conflict resolution led by the 
former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, opened the new mediation process 
between GAM and the GoI to end the conflict in Aceh. The five-round peace talks were 
conducted within eight months, starting in January 2005. On 15 August 2005, the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between GAM and the GoI was signed in 
Helsinki. Since the start of the long conflict between Aceh and the GoI, four peace 
agreements were held, first with the Lamteh Pledge (Ikrar Lamteh) on 8 April 1957, 
then the Blang Padang Pledge (Ikrar Blang Padang) on 22 December 1962, the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 9 December 2002 (Hamzah, 2014: 355), and the 
Helsinki MoU in 2005 that finally marked the end of the long conflict in Aceh. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
Peace is notoriously hard to achieve and to maintain, particularly between the two 
enemies involved. Efforts to end disputes between two conflicting parties can involve 
mediations and negotiations expected to yield a long and sustainable peace. However, 
not all peace agreements are lasting and durable.  
The dynamics of the peace process in Aceh represent a unique and remarkable 
example of a successful conflict resolution. However, there has been no systematic and 
comprehensive analysis of how the peace settlement in Aceh was made consensual, 
relevant on the ground, and sustainable. Therefore, this thesis aims to integrate the 
analysis of the peace process in Aceh with the general peace theories to arrive at a 
comprehensive understanding of the key success of a peace agreement.  
This thesis systematically explains the relationship between the peace process 
modalities and success by using the existing theories and empirical tracing of the 
processes. In addition, it presents a comparison between the Helsinki MoU and the 
CoHA by exploring and examining the influential factors determining the success and 
failure of the two agreements. Furthermore, the present thesis reveals the relations 
between the domestic political setting, international context and internal dynamics of 
the conflicting parties through their own perspectives. One of the interesting elements of 
the two agreements is the perception of GAM concerning the right to special autonomy 
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proposed by the GoI. This thesis indicates that although the right to autonomy is a 
formula to alleviate the grief and end the oppression, it cannot be directly implemented 
without some preconditions. This strategy, indeed, requires the genuine support and 
involvement of GAM. Finally, the present study describes how the right to autonomy 
and self-determination was accepted as a political solution in 2005, which was then 
translated into the Law on the Governing of Aceh (LoGA).  
Aceh‘s autonomy is a model that can be adopted to settle other separatist 
insurgences in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and beyond. The author expects that this thesis 
will contribute to expanding the existing peace process theories, and provide a useful 
reference for peace activists, practitioners, policymakers, analysts and other peace 
movements in conflict resolution, peace building and peace implementation efforts. 
 
1.3 Research Plan 
This thesis aims to explain the factors behind the success of the peace process in Aceh 
and the durability of a peace agreement. It addresses the following research questions: 
1. Which factors made both parties agree to negotiate? 
2. Which factors prevented both parties from reaching a full agreement in the CoHA 
and made both parties agree to sign a full settlement agreement in the Helsinki 
MoU?  
3. Why did the CoHA fail and why did the Helsinki MoU yield a successful outcome 
and create a durable peace? 
To answer these questions, various general hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between the peace process modalities and their relation to success are 
examined. The qualitative research design is used to answer the aforementioned 
research questions. Specifically, the author utilizes the theory-guided process-tracing 
method (Falleti, 2006), which is based on alternative theories in addition to the 
historical analysis of events and the methods of comparative studies.  
The present thesis aims at a grand theory that may address the three phases of 
the peace process in a single explanation. A theoretical framework was built based on 
the existing peace process literature focusing on the following three phases: 
1. Preconditions of negotiation (ripe moment theory, socio-psychological theories, 
synchronization theory); 
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2. Negotiation process theories (principled negotiation theory, mutual gain approach, 
bargaining theories); 
3. Theories that explain success on the basis of the agreement text and the role of a 
third party (the theory of agreement and the theory of third-party guarantor).   
 
1.4 Dependent Variables (DV): Definition and Operationalization 
To operationalize the research questions (RQ), observable indicators were used to 
represent the abstract elements of the questions.     
1. DV considered for RQ 1: Which factors made both parties agree to negotiate? 
The concept of agreeing to negotiate in this thesis means that the GoI and GAM 
consented to discuss interactively and to bargain their dispute of interest, including their 
political position in settling the conflict in Aceh. According to Rubin and Brown (1975), 
when parties agree to negotiate, the negotiators from both sides will work together to 
formulate agreements about the issues in conflict.  
2. DV considered for RQ 2: Which factors prevented both parties from reaching a full 
agreement in the CoHA and made both parties agree to sign a full settlement 
agreement in the Helsinki MoU?  
 A peace agreement is an agreement signed by at least two conflicting parties to 
address the problem of incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly 
outlining a process concerning the way the warring parties plan to regulate the 
incompatibility (Högbladh, 2006: 10). However, success in reaching an agreement is not 
a matter of an either/or question.  According to Högbladh (2006: 3), there are three 
types of agreement: 
● A peace process agreement is defined as an accord through which at least one 
conflict dyad agrees to initiate a process to settle the incompatibility. A typical peace 
process agreement has a detailed agenda for talks, but the parties only agree to 
initiate negotiations on substantial issues in some cases, such as the territorial status 
of a region.  
● A partial agreement is defined as an accord in which the parties in at least one dyad 
agree to settle part of the incompatibility. Some peace processes deal with one issue 
at a time in partial agreements, and the conflict is not regarded as solved until a final 
agreement has been signed.  
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● A full agreement is defined as an accord where the conflicting parties agree to settle 
all incompatibility issues and provide space for a political solution. This is the end 
result of a comprehensive agreement combined with the necessary implementation 
agreements. Generally speaking, peace-making efforts tend to be focused on reaching 
comprehensive agreements. Full agreements seek to make the conflicting parties 
agree to resolve all major issues. 
 The CoHA was a partial agreement that focused on confidence building and 
security issues before a final agreement was reached.
1
  
 Unlike the CoHA, the Helsinki MoU is part of a full settlement agreement in 
which the conflicting parties signed an agreement to settle all their incompatibilities 
permanently, which was confirmed in the preamble of the Helsinki MoU: ―The GoI and 
GAM confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution 
to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.‖ The full agreement includes the following 
components: Governing of Aceh (Law on the Governing of Aceh/LoGA, political 
participation, economic concession, and rule of law), human rights, amnesty and 
reintegration into society, as well as security arrangements.  
3. DV considered for RQ 3: Why did the CoHA fail and why did the Helsinki MoU yield 
a successful outcome and create durable peace? 
The implementation of agreement is an important criterion for the success of a 
peace process. Only if the agreement is implemented can we conclude that peace has 
been materialized. Secondly, success depends on whether or not the agreement and the 
peace process can actually manage to reduce political violence between the two 
conflicting parties. According to Bercovitch (1995), mediation is successful when the 
conflicting parties have made a considerable and positive difference in the management 
of a conflict and their subsequent interactions. Limited success of mediation is defined 
when it has only achieved a ceasefire or a break in hostilities. Bercovitch (1995: 10) 
also defines failed mediation as a mediation that has no discernible or reported impact 
on the dispute or the parties‘ behaviour.  
                                                 
1
―…The agreement was only the first stage in a confidence-building process, however, and did not attempt to resolve 
the crucial issues dividing the two sides. Only after hostilities had been reduced would it be possible to move on to 
the next stage in the process – the all-inclusive dialogue – at which substantive issues would be addressed.‖ Aspinall 
& Crouch, 2003: 46 
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This thesis defines the implementation of a peace agreement in the following 
dimensions: 
● The success of the Disarmament-Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. 
Here, the objective is to contribute to security and stability in a post-conflict 
environment so that recovery and development can begin. Disarmament is the first 
step, which includes collecting, controlling, disposing and documenting small arms, 
ammunition, explosives as well as all light and heavy weapons owned by 
combatants, and, often those in the possession of civilians. Demobilization is the 
formal and controlled discharge of combatants from armed forces or other armed 
groups. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization 
but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of 
transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their 
families. Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status 
and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a socio-
economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at 
the local level.
2
 
● The success of the DDR process following the signing of the CoHA is in contrast to 
the Helsinki MoU: even though both the GoI and GAM agreed to sign the agreement 
in 2002, it did not result in any impact in the field. In respect of the DDR process, the 
Helsinki MoU successfully passed the decommissioning and demobilization phase. 
Based on the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) report, by the end of December 
2005, the AMM had disarmed 840 GAM weapons and the GoI had relocated its non-
organic troops/TNI and the Police.  
● The number of incidents and causalities can be used as an indicator to measure the 
success of a peace agreement. These indicators include armed conflict incidents 
between the Indonesian military and GAM, in addition to casualties from both 
conflicting parties and civilians. Using these indicators, the research examines the 
reality of peace in the field. Based on data collected by the World Bank, there was a 
significant impact on the stability and security condition in Aceh following the 
signing of the agreement. The Helsinki MoU was successful in de-escalating the 
separatist conflict, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
                                                 
2
 See the United Nations website on DDR: http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php 
7 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Number of conflict incidents between the GoI and GAM, 1998–2005  
(Source: National Violence Monitoring Update) 
 
 Note that based on the NVMS and data that were collected from the media, the 
number of deaths remained quite high despite the on-going CoHA peace process in 
2000–2003 and only decreased significantly after the Helsinki MoU in 2005, as shown 
in Figure 1.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Number of deaths, 1998–2012  
(Source: National Violence Monitoring System) 
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 Based on the NVMS data, although which forms of violence statistically 
declined after the Helsinki MoU, various agreement violations still occurred during and 
after the negotiation process (refer to Figure 1.3).  
 
 
Figure 1.3 Forms of violence in Aceh, 1998–2008 
(Source: National Violence Monitoring Update (NVMS) 
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3
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● The length of time an agreement lasts. It measures the number of years of peace from 
the moment of signing the agreement until the government and at least one of the 
other signatories engaged in armed conflict, or, if peace has gained, to the last year of 
observation in the period under research (Nilsson, 2008: 10 – 11) 
● Implementation and adherence to the agreement by the parties; this definition 
captures the behaviour of the parties and their commitment to the agreement. This 
concerns the steps and measures taken to carry out the commitments made by either 
primary or third parties, such as implementation or any violation of the terms of the 
original agreement. In this phase, increased commitment and trust among the 
conflicting parties are also indicators of peace that can be measured through the 
number of incidents and casualties. It also concerns honouring and living by the 
terms of the agreement over the longer term. However, the difficulty with durability 
is that this thesis only examines the peace process, not the post-conflict peace 
building, and that both of these affect the durability of the agreement. While this does 
not pose a problem for the operationalization of the independent variable, it is a 
matter to keep in mind in the process of tracing route from the peace process 
modalities to durability.   
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the problem and 
the purpose of the study. Chapter 2 focuses on literature review relevant to peace 
process. This chapter integrates the existing theoretical literature into the current 
research project. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the review from the previous 
chapter and how it is used as an analytical tool for the empirical investigations. The 
structure of the existing literature and analytical framework is based on the readiness 
theory developed by Dean Pruitt (2005). This theory is used as a tool to bind the 
existing elements of theory into a coherent analytical framework.   
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 discuss the empirical analysis of the peace process. Chapter 
4 explains the pre-condition of the peace process in Aceh, including the historical 
background of the conflict. Chapter 5 focuses on the negotiation and mediation process, 
and Chapter 6 discusses the outcome of the agreement and factors contributing to the 
durability of peace. 
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Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations that can be utilized to inform future studies and policies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Classification of Existing Literature 
This chapter reviews the existing literature relevant to peace process and the success 
and failure of dialogues, mediations, and negotiations as components of a peace process. 
Analyses of theories, data, reports and case studies reveal factors and logical reasons 
behind the success and failure of a peace process. The authors specifically identify and 
analyse a grand theory to explain the association and/or causal relationship between the 
identified factors and the success or failure of a peace process, from the initial peace 
talk to the implementation of the peace agreement.  
To specifically analyse the theories relevant to the phase or stage of a peace 
process, this author has classified the theories into two major clusters. The first cluster 
consists of theories relevant to the precondition of a negotiation process that includes 
the precondition theories and the ripeness theory. It encompasses theories relevant to the 
question that addresses the factors that made both parties agree to negotiate and finally 
sign a full settlement in the Helsinki MoU and those that made them fail in the CoHA. 
While the precondition theories explain factors that influence the conflicting parties to 
agree to settling the conflict through negotiation, the ripeness theory is identified as an 
entry point to the explanation of the pre-conditional factors and their contribution to the 
negotiation process.  
The next theoretical review covers the negotiation process, which involves 
elements of pre-negotiations, the negotiation processes, and the success of mediations. 
Here, various theories are assessed to answer the main questions concerning the way a 
negotiation process reaches settlement, the roles of mediators, and other elements that 
have contributed to this process.  
The second cluster consists of theories relevant to the implementation of peace 
agreement and its durability. This cluster reviews theories relevant to explaining why 
the Helsinki MoU was able to be translated into sustainable peace while the CoHA 
failed, and to seek the factors of the peace process that influence the durability of the 
Helsinki MoU and the CoHA. Theories in this cluster include the mechanisms of 
agreement theories, the theories of third-party guarantors, and political process theories.  
12 
 
In addition to the two major clusters of theories, this chapter also presents a 
grand (or overarching) theory that covers cross-cluster theories and elucidates the 
research questions in an integral and coherent fashion. The grand theory is important to 
finding core answers to the research questions and identifying the main variables behind 
the research questions. 
 
2.2 Theories Based on the Precondition and Negotiation Process 
The precondition stage is identified as a period when the initiative of the peace process 
was undertaken, up until the conflicting parties signed the agreement. Theories within 
this cluster include (1) the ripeness or right-moment theory, (2) domestic settings, 
including intra-party and inter-party dynamics, political change, and willingness, and 
(3) international settings.  
 
2.2.1 Precondition 
2.2.1.1 Ripeness  
The concept of ripeness was introduced by I. William Zartman (1989) and further 
developed by Pruitt (2005), Mitchell (1995), Rubin (1991), Haass (1988), Stedman 
(1996) and others. The notion of ripeness indicates a moment when the conflict is ready 
to be solved through negotiations between dyads. Ripeness as ―the right time‖ or 
appropriate set of circumstances occurs when conflicting parties confront a costly 
impasse or stalemate, such as military tactics that have failed and the costs of future 
escalation of conflict that have become intolerable (Zartman, 1989; Rubin, 1991; 
Mitchell, 1995; Pruitt, 2005). The stalemate is thus based on a cost/benefit analysis 
(Touval & Zartman, 1985: 258–60) and relies on several consequences of conflict, such 
as the inability to bear the cost, subjective expression of pain and impasse, the nature of 
casualties, and other similar indicators of stalemate.  
Several references in the literature have identified various facets of ripeness, the 
first being the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) initiated by Zartman (1985), and 
elaborated on later by Haass (1988) and Stedman (1996). The main idea of MHS is a 
circumstance in which the conflicting parties believe that it is not possible to achieve 
victory by continuing their current strategy and that the only way to avoid a stalemate is 
to find a joint resolution through negotiation. The second model is the imminent mutual 
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catastrophe (IMC), also initiated by Zartman (1985). The main argument of IMC is that 
ripeness occurs when conflicting parties face some sort of imminent major catastrophe. 
Some conditions related to this include an exponential increase in the cost of the conflict 
including social, economic and political cost, undeniable disaster, and the perception 
that it is impossible to reach victory through the current strategy. The third model is the 
enticing opportunity (ENO) model, originally introduced by Crocker (1992) and 
Mitchell (1995). The main idea of ENO focuses on the leaders‘ initiative to change their 
mind-set in relation to the existing policy in favour of a peaceful solution. Here, 
ripeness occurs when conflicting parties are in favour of leaving behind the costly 
struggle and start looking for alternative ways to achieve their goals. Third-party 
peacemakers can assist in creating such favourable circumstances, the ripe moment for 
leaders and the offer of a mutually beneficial solution.       
On the other hand, and in relation to the de-escalation process, there are two 
dimensions of ripeness: external and internal ripeness (Mitchell, 1995: 11–13). External 
ripeness includes the overall conflict system, parties, their condition and relationship. 
Here, ripeness is produced as part of the conflict process itself or is embedded in it, such 
as the hurting stalemate and impeding catastrophe model, which, most likely, creates the 
condition in which conflicting parties will agree to negotiate, since no party can reach 
victory by continuing their current strategy without unbearable costs at this stage. The 
main idea behind external ripeness is a circumstance that leads both parties to 
reconsider their existing strategy to avoid a sudden increase in damage being sustained 
or in anticipation of a catastrophe. Moreover, all the external conditions created around 
the ripeness will influence the party in reaching a solution in their own interests.  
Internal ripeness reflects the condition within the conflicting parties, which, in 
turn, influences the external condition to be translated into a willingness to seek a 
peaceful resolution (Mitchell, 1995: 11). The internal dimension of the parties in 
conflict, such as regime change, change in power relations, the rise of new leaders, or 
emergence of a divided leadership, tends to change the objective criteria of the 
settlement, and, in turn, the strategy and tactics in mediation (Haass, 1998). The 
perception of ripeness is thus directly related to an individual and collective expression 
of search for a settlement. During this step, the willingness from both parties will direct 
the conflict towards a resolution. Willingness can be a function of internal political 
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changes when the new political leaders perceive the conflict from a different 
perspective, which motivates them to develop a pragmatic solution. Ripeness then 
comes as the moment when both parties are willing to accept a peaceful settlement 
(Kleiboer, 1994: 112). The internal dimension variables, as the ‗appropriate condition‘, 
exert a significant influence on the overall ripeness of the conflict, in which the ripeness 
is mainly created from the perception of the processes that are internal to the parties in 
the conflict (Stedman, 1991: 236–37).   
Based on the explanation above, the external and internal ripeness conditions are 
interrelated and rely on the interaction between the external conditions and the leaders‘ 
perceptions and decision as to whether external ripeness will be seized (Mitchell, 1995: 
12). It is noteworthy that external conditions alone cannot be taken as a ripeness 
indicator without the internal perception and willingness of the party leaders, which 
becomes a key element when the party engages in conflict resolution. Thus, it is 
necessary to further elaborate on certain factors, such as the willingness of the main 
parties, the internal settings of a party and how external ripeness influences leaders in 
the process of seeking conflict resolution. Consequently, this thesis focuses on the 
relations between external ripeness and internal perception and the decision towards a 
peaceful settlement. With this in mind, the internal settings of parties are further 
elaborated upon, followed by a discussion on additional elements, such as the domestic 
political settings, which although they do not necessarily fall under the ripeness theory 
still bear a direct correlation to the topic. 
Finally, the last element of ripeness is the concept of an alternative way out 
(WO), as introduced by Zartman (2001). This is when the internal and external ripeness 
have interacted, and subsequently both parties start to perceive that they can reach a 
possible solution through negotiation. A sense of WO is necessary when the conflicting 
parties share a common need to end the conflict and have the willingness to start the 
negotiation process. Without this sense of WO, both parties will be trapped in a 
stalemate.     
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2.2.2 Domestic Political Settings 
2.2.2.1 Democratic Peace 
The next variable in the context of preconditions is the domestic political setting. Does 
the type of existing political system affect the chances of successful conflict 
management? Several scholars have pointed out that a successful mediation is most 
likely to occur when a hurting stalemate or impending catastrophe develops between the 
conflicting parties in which both sides have to pay a high price if they stay in conflict 
without achieving any tangible goals. Nevertheless, the mediation success is not 
determined by these ripeness factors alone, but also by the way the political system 
itself ‗creates‘ or responds to the hurting stalemate and impending catastrophe 
(Mitchell, 1995: 3).  
 The political system within a party remains one of the important elements 
leading to de-escalation of conflicts. Hence, ripeness will lead to resolution when seized 
at the right moment in response to the political system, the perception of leaders, or the 
mediator (Stedman, 1991). Some studies, such as those by Baker (1996) and 
Azpuru(1999), have found that democratic structures can offer an effective means for 
the peaceful handling of a deep-rooted conflict through an inclusive, just, and 
accountable framework. Democracy is a system through which conflicts within a 
society are allowed to be formulated, to find expression, and to be managed in a 
sustainable way. 
 According to Baker (1996) in ―Conflict Resolution versus Democratic 
Governance‖, democratic institutions are built on a value system that makes it easier to 
legitimize comprehensive agreements, which, in turn, increases their duration. 
 Democracy is promising because the principles, institutions, and rules 
associated with democratic practice seek to manage the inevitable conflicts in deeply 
divided and less conflicted societies alike. Democracy, as a system of political decision-
making, is, in many ways, a system of conflict management in which the outcomes are 
unknown but the fundamental rules of the game provide a safe arena in which to 
compete. As Baker (1996: 568) rightly argues, ―former conflicting parties see peace as a 
precondition for democracy; and later see democracy as a precondition for peace‖. The 
decision to negotiate depends on the domestic political constraints placed on individual 
leaders.  
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 According to this view, civil wars that occur in democratic countries are more 
likely to end in a compromised settlement for one of the following three reasons (Walter 
2001: 10–11). First, leaders of democracies face higher domestic constraints in their use 
of force than leaders of authoritarian governments, and are therefore less likely to be 
allowed to pursue unpopular wars. Second, democratic leaders are likely to find it easier 
to credibly commit to peace agreements since they are more likely to be held 
accountable by their voting public for promises made. Lastly, democratic leaders 
accustomed to sharing political power have less to lose by opening the government than 
authoritarian leaders who stand to forfeit monopoly control of the government.  
 
2.2.2.2 Political Change toward Democratization 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is worthwhile elaborating further on domestic political 
change (which relates to the process of democratization itself that is relevant to the 
Indonesian condition), since the research covers the period between 1999 and 2007. 
Domestic political change has been observed to affect the re-evaluation of goals and 
strategies put forth by local policymakers. For example, structural change towards a 
greater democracy will create a more conducive environment for the negotiation process 
to start. In the context of civil war or intrastate conflict, such as the conflict between the 
GoI and GAM, the nature of the political structure also affects how the conflict is 
resolved. Thus, it has been stated that a democratic government has more capacity to 
address and resolve conflict when compared to other political structures. This is in 
accordance with Hegre (2004:2) who states that ―democratic political systems are 
supposed to allow all parties to a conflict to be heard, decisions are made on the basis of 
rules that all parties to the conflict agree to, open debates and a free press ensures that 
the decision-making is transparent, and the losing party in contentious issues is willing 
to comply with the outcome because the democratic constitution guarantees that the 
party may prevail in the future‖. 
Democratization itself constitutes the main focus, along with its various 
elements, such as transition democracy, consolidation democracy, and the type of 
regime. The elaboration of these processes could bring forth an analytical perspective 
on the ripe moment theory, noting that upon examining the various main ripe moment 
theories, there is no specific focus on democratization among these theories. The 
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elaboration of the political and leadership change in more specific terms is useful to 
identify how ‗change‘ can be relevant to conflict resolution, since the evaluation of rival 
policy is more likely to occur in the wake of broader changes in the governmental 
structure of one of the conflicting parties (Mitchell, 1995). As these political changes 
occur, re-evaluation and replacement of policy beliefs and assumptions follow. Related 
to this notion, J. Michael Greig stresses that only recent democratic policy changes 
within one of the conflicting parties increase the possibility for the success of a peaceful 
resolution (Greig, 2001).   
There are two key elements of the democratization process: transition of 
democracy and democratic consolidation, and these two elements influence the political 
behaviour of the parties, and, in turn, the conflict itself (Mansfield & Snyder, 1996; 
Stepan, 1986). Democratic transition is defined as the period starting from the collapse 
of an authoritarian regime until the establishment of a new democratic government 
through a general election. Institutionalization and legitimization of democracy are the 
indicators of a successful democratic transition (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Democratic 
consolidation is the period following the establishment of a popularly elected 
government in which the process of democratization is expected to take root, not only in 
the form of a formal government but also within a society‘s various structures. In fact, 
the democratization process is complicated and sometimes leads to internal violence and 
even the collapse of the state (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Casper & Taylor, 1996; 
Huntington, 1993). 
The critical period during the transition to democracy is called anocracy or what 
analysts describe as semi-democracies (Hegre, et al., 2001: 33) that are ―partly open yet 
somewhat repressive‖. Fearon and Laitin (2003) describe anocracy as a state where the 
central governments is politically weak. The anocratic regime puts institutional 
limitations on the decision-making powers of the leadership (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) 
that could lead to a political crisis when the executive and legislative struggle for power 
and authority spurs on the political system. Semi-democratic periods constitute 
vulnerable times and the ripe moment for civil war, during which inherent political 
change creates instability and the opportunity for individual rights groups to express 
their specific identity sentiments, which are sometimes translated into armed 
insurgencies. In these situations, governments, with their limited institutional power to 
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address the problem, will often resort to military action to secure leadership in resolving 
the conflict.  
 Obviously, despite the fact that the transition to democracy tends to create 
political turbulence, such as internal conflict (Gurr, 1994: 290–292), a democratic 
regime/leadership voted for and elected by the people will have the power to manage or 
resolve the conflict peacefully. Some scholars have indicated that a democratic regime 
will promote peaceful management during an intrastate war. Moreover, a democratic 
state provides an opportunity for power-sharing (i.e. distribution of power across 
conflicting parties), and is most likely to encourage ethnic accommodation (Horowitz, 
1998) in which the principles of compromise and negotiation inherent to the democratic 
system lead the party to a successful mediation. At least two reasons have been set forth 
by political scientists for the democratic peace to exist. The first deals with a cultural 
explanation, whereby the norms of trust and tolerance are cultivated as the basis of 
peaceful relations with each other, while the second implies a structural explanation 
defining democracy as a political institution, which develops non-violent resolutions 
including elections and legislature (Russett, 1993). A democratic state itself is founded 
on the basis of the respect for rules, law enforcement, ensuring basic civil liberties, and 
fair and competitive elections held to choose leaders. 
 
2.2.2.3 New Leaders 
As indicated in the previous section, the ripeness theory itself encompasses internal 
political change, especially when new leaders can influence the perception of a party 
and create willingness among its members for a peaceful settlement. This stage is 
primarily reached when the party faces a stalemate or anticipates an impending 
catastrophe. In line with the new leaders‘ perception on the condition of ripeness, Greig 
(2001) argues that political change within conflicting parties can cultivate the sense to 
re-evaluate current policies and improve the prospect of peace in a competitive 
relationship. On the other hand, Stedman (1991: 238) highlights the potential in 
leadership change and the new leaders‘ perception concerning the condition of mutual 
stalemate, something that was not discerned by previous leaders under the same 
circumstances.  
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Similarly, Haass finds that ripeness in internal party politics can be a function of 
new leaders coming into position or other internal political changes. Thus, re-evaluation 
of rival policies is more likely to occur when domestic political change and new 
leadership come to the political arena of one of the dyads (Kriesberg, 1992); the new 
leaders as the decision-makers then become the main actors in the process of changing 
the conflict conditions and are also responsible for evaluating and adopting new 
policies. As Mitchell (1995: 10) observes, ―it is the interpretation of these conditions by 
those leaders that determines whether the time, is indeed ripe‖. Mitchell (1995) and 
Zartman (2000: 228) further note that a major change of policy in conflict will depend 
on the cost-benefit analysis made with the argument that the enduring cost and pain 
caused by a hurting stalemate situation is the most important factor leading to a re-
evaluation by decision-makers. This relies on leaders learning and changing their 
attitudes primarily by experiencing the pain of damage and loss.  
 
2.2.3 International Context 
It is generally accepted that global politics affect every corner of the globe. Following 
the Cold War, the world has significantly changed. Firstly, intrastate conflicts are more 
dominant than interstate conflicts. An intrastate conflict can be defined as a conflict that 
occurs within the territory of a state sovereignty, and involves both state and non-state 
actors (Kaufmann, 1996). Intrastate conflicts can be caused by various factors, including 
the regime type, such as a non-democratic government, that can cause social tension, 
unfair distribution of political and economic power to the minorities, and the issue of 
identity among groups of a given community. As shown in Figure 2.1, it can be 
concluded that an increasing number of intrastate conflicts occurred after the Cold War.  
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Figure 2.1 Conflict Type after the Cold War  
(PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset–UCDP 2008) 
 
 The second factor is the change in the global trend after the Cold War when 
democratization and human rights issues became global norms and the basis of 
international relations (Stern & Druckman, 2000). The international community presses 
for an international obligation to protect the rights of individuals or groups that are at 
high risk of violation during such intrastate conflicts. The idea is that ―the rights of 
individuals and groups‖ have priority over ―the sovereignty rights of the state‖ (Snow & 
Brown, 2000: 468). Hence, the international community has the right to stop 
fundamental abuse of individual or group rights. Following the Cold War, the dynamics 
of social interaction gave space to a variety of actors who understood these dynamics in 
mediating intrastate conflicts (Waltz, 1954).    
 In fact, the dynamics of intrastate conflict and global norms for democratization 
and human rights affected the outcome of the conflict in East Timor and Aceh. East 
Timor is a good example, for during the Cold War, in order to prevent the Domino 
Effect of Communism in Southeast Asia, the US permitted and Australia supported 
Indonesia‘s invasion of East Timor in 1974. However, the situation then changed after 
the USSR collapsed and some countries that hitherto had supported Indonesia‘s 
invasion reformulated their foreign policy on East Timor based on the new global 
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condition of the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, some scholars argue that international 
dynamics tend to influence the peace processes and outcomes of internal conflicts 
(Darby & McGinty, 2003; Rubin, 1991). The international influence could be reflected 
in various ways, including military intervention, economic embargo and participation of 
mediators. Developments at the international community level may produce ―a new set 
of circumstances that spell success or failure for the peace process‖ (Darby & McGinty, 
2003: 4). Positive or negative developments within the international arena could lead to 
favourable negotiating conditions (Rubin, 1991). 
In addition to the internal context, ripeness is also determined by external 
environment leading to a favourable condition by attempting to de-escalate a conflict 
through negotiation. Kriesberg (1998) focuses on factors that may prompt governments 
to take initiatives towards de-escalation. Besides domestic conditions, the role of third-
party intervention, and adversarial relations, he also examines the concurrent conflicts 
happening internationally and their influence on creating other conflicts seems less 
important. In this condition, the international context can increase the tension or prompt 
escalation activities. This entails a superimposition of global and regional conflict onto 
the existing conflict, which now becomes linked to broader issues (Kriesberg, 1992). 
The other facet of the international context is the economic and political pressure 
exerted by other (powerful) parties that encourage but may also sometimes frustrate 
conflict settlement efforts (Kleiboer, 1996).  
In conclusion, many have supported the notion that a ripe moment does not only 
arise at a certain stage of the conflict (such as a mutually hurting stalemate) but also 
from the international context, including pressure from the international community on 
the conflicting parties, developments in global or regional systems, and from the overall 
dynamics within the international arena (Zartman, 1985, 1996, 2000; Haass, 1990; 
Kriesberg, 1987; Rubin, 1991; Stedman, 1990; Kleiboer, 1994; Mitchell, 1995). 
 
2.3 The Negotiation Process 
This section focuses on the review of two clusters of theories related to (1) pre-
negotiation, and (2) the negotiation and mediation processes. Pre-negotiation is defined 
as the transition time between the perception of ripeness of the conflicting parties and 
the informal approach of one party to the other to assess the possibility of dispute 
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settlement. In other words, pre-negotiation constitutes the early steps of a peace process, 
which is generally followed by formal negotiation, the signing of a peace agreement, 
and its implementation. 
 
2.3.1 Pre-Negotiation 
Pre-negotiation is a necessary step or, as has been argued, a critical diagnostic phase 
within a negotiation process when conflicting parties define their problems, develop the 
commitments to move towards a formal negotiation, and invite a potential third party as 
mediator (Saunders, 2000; Zartman, 1989; Stein, 1989; Druckman, 2001). Pre-
negotiation can also become a part of the negotiation itself where it plays an important 
role by changing the dynamics of the existing relationships and paving the way for 
solutions to end the conflict. Thus, the goal of the pre-negotiation phase is not only to 
encourage conflicting parties to begin the negotiation and commit to it, but also to ―start 
a political process that can change the relationship and lead to end of violence, to peace 
and reconciliation‖ (Saunders, 1996: 421), especially in the context of sensitive 
conflicts that are not open to negotiation, and involve issues such as identity, justice, 
security, and dignity that may constitute further hurdles.  
During the pre-negotiation phase, conflicting parties transform the conflict into a 
co-operative agreement and identify a potential third party to take up the role of 
mediator (Kriesberg, 1998: 176). However, the main characteristic of the pre-
negotiation phase is to obtain commitment from the conflicting parties to look at their 
differences, and identify and remove obstacles blocking the path to negotiation 
(Saunders, 1996: 428). The pre-negotiation begins when one party recognizes 
negotiation as an option to solve the problem, or, in other words, when the parties move 
from pursuing a unilateral solution in search of a cooperative solution.  
During the process of moving from pre-negotiation to the negotiation, Tomlin 
(1989) mentions key stages, which include problem identification, the decision-maker 
choosing negotiation as the best option, and signalling to the other party to commence 
the negotiation process. Furthermore, the pre-negotiation phase also gives time and 
space for the parties to prepare and manage their internal/domestic support and to build 
the necessary coalition before the formal negotiation begins. This function is critical, 
especially in anticipating ‗spoilers‘ within the party when the peace agreement is 
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reached. The more support the conflicting parties can obtain domestically, the smoother 
the negotiation process will run (Stein, 1989: 232).  
 
2.3.2 Negotiation Process and Mediation Success 
Frequently, the negotiation and mediation process would act as the next step following a 
pre-negotiation where the parties would agree to negotiate their differences formally. 
The negotiation and mediation processes are closely correlated. Mediation through a 
third party is a means in the conflict management process in which the conflicting 
parties allow their relationship to de-escalate or terminate the conflict in a peaceful way 
(Bercovitch, 1986). Third-party mediation does not only mediate both parties in the 
negotiation but also helps them to find a win-win solution, which they cannot find by 
themselves (Zartman & Touval, 1996). The mediator may even pressurize and reward 
the parties in order to leverage the context of the conflict and its process in general 
(Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2005).  
 Kesner and Shapiro (1991) argue that the success of the mediation process is 
determined by the signing of an agreement. Meanwhile, the success index of Haass 
(1990) defines mediation as successful when it makes a great difference to settling a 
dispute, and as partially successful when it leads to the initiation of negotiations and 
some dialogue between the parties. However, mediation is a limited success when it 
only leads to a ceasefire or break in hostilities and is considered unsuccessful when it 
has no tangible impact on the dispute (Haas, 1986). This goal-oriented approach has 
been adopted by scholars, who define success in terms of whether or not mediation can 
effectively fulfil the objectives of the parties or the mediator (Smith, W. P., 1985; 
Touval & Zartman, 1985). 
Finally, there are several determining factors in the success of a mediation 
process, some of which also overlap with the precondition factors. These factors do not 
only influence conflicting parties to take a step towards negotiation but can also 
determine the outcome of the negotiation itself. They include conflict ripeness 
influencing the motivation of the parties, the level of intensity of conflict, and the type 
of regime and the international context, as discussed earlier. Furthermore, pre-
negotiation in itself can act as a factor and a crucial basis for the development of a 
formal negotiation. Other major factors in the mediation process are the nature of the 
24 
 
issue and the character of the mediator.  Several of these major determining factors are 
presented below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Probability of Victory and Cost of Conflict 
The probability of victory will directly affect the way parties settle the conflict. If one 
party has a higher probability of victory than the other, then the likelihood that that 
party agrees to settle an agreement is low because the dominant party will be more 
interested in reaching victory than in making a settlement with the rival (Bercovitch & 
DeRouen, 2005: 162). In intrastate conflict, the probability of victory is largely 
dependent on the armed forces of both the government and the rebel group. On several 
occasions, the size of the government‘s army is negatively correlated to the likelihood 
of a successful mediation. The larger the government‘s army, the greater its expectation 
of a probable victory and, as a consequence, the government is frequently found to 
reject negotiation with the rebel group and to aim at reaching victory in the battle zone 
instead (Greig & Regan, 2006).  
This is widely common in many intrastate conflicts around the world. A power 
imbalance tends to make the greater power, such as a government, refuse negotiation 
with the opposing group. Some governments also reject negotiation with rebels as a 
political decision of not to recognize the latter group‘s existence as a political entity. 
The balance in power between the parties will also determine the scope of a mutually 
acceptable settlement (McCarthy, 1991). Even when the dominant party sometimes 
rejects negotiation and assumes that a quick victory can be reached, the escalating cost 
of the conflict itself will, at some point, determine the parties‘ commitment to their 
efforts to achieve victory. Hence, even if one party has a tangible chance of reaching 
victory, it may prefer to resort to a negotiated settlement if the cost of continued conflict 
exceeds that of a negotiated settlement.  
Analysts argue that the cost of conflict, including the casualty rate, will drive 
both parties to a negotiated settlement; furthermore the higher a party‘s casualty rate, 
the lower its projected probability of achieving victory (Mason & Fett, 1996). In 
addition, the cost of conflict could also refer to the level of intensity, scope, and degree 
of threat of the tension, the magnitude of violence and number of overall fatalities. This 
can create a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) or impending catastrophe, and, as 
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Zartman (1989, 2000) argues, this condition will be ripe for a negotiated settlement. It is 
believed that the greater the intensity of a conflict, the higher the likelihoo of conflicting 
parties to accept and discuss their differences as a means of minimizing losses (Jackson, 
1952; Young, 1967; Kleiboer, 1996). 
 
2.3.2.2 Duration of Conflict 
The next factor that influences the success of mediation is the duration of the conflict, 
which, sometimes, is related to the cost of the conflict, as discussed above. The notion 
here is that the longer the amount of time required for the parties in conflict to achieve a 
potential victory, the more likely the willingness of the parties to pursue a settlement 
rather than continue fighting. The hypothesis proposed by Mason and Fett (1996: 173) 
states that ―the longer the duration of the conflict, the greater the probability of the 
participants seeking a negotiated settlement‖. In this situation, the parties will resort to a 
benefits analysis between the utility of victory and the time required to achieve what 
directly implicates an increasing cost of conflict. Both parties will be more likely to 
accept the immediate settlement when a conflict lasts long and the utility of victory is 
low.  
Thus, the parties will weigh the benefits and the utility of victory minus the 
accumulated cost in reaching it, and, the longer the estimated time, the lower is the 
parties‘ estimate of the utility of an eventual victory. Particularly when dealing with 
guerrilla strategy in intrastate conflicts, Mason and Fett (1996) argue that the 
government is more likely to negotiate a settlement than continue a war in anticipation 
of a Pyrrhic victory. In many cases, when the government invests over a long period of 
time, to totally destroy the rebel force would sometimes undermine its popularity and 
support from the state and society. Thus, in general, the duration of conflict directly 
affects the change of the conflicting parties‘ attitude towards the conflict and its 
settlement. 
 
2.3.2.3 Willingness and Motivation 
Undeniably, the aforementioned factors (probability of victory, cost of conflict, and 
duration of conflict) exert considerable influence on the perception of parties to resolve 
the conflict. In addition, the above conditions could directly affect the immediate 
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willingness or motivation of the parties to reach the mediation outcomes. Concurrently, 
the more the conflicting parties are willing to resort to conflict settlement, the more 
prospects and resources are available for mediators and, therefore, the higher the 
probability of a successful mediation (Bercovitch, 1997; Zartman & Touval, 1996). 
Rubin (1992) emphasizes that the motivation of the conflicting parties is a pre-requisite 
for effective mediation. Hence, it becomes important to motivate parties towards a 
positive, successful outcome, especially when the parties‘ willingness is low (Moore, 
1996; Smith, D. D., 1997) and, consequently, the strategy of mediation to be adopted 
revolves around the level of motivation or the willingness of the parties.     
 
2.3.2.4 Cohesiveness of the Party 
Cohesiveness relates to the internal power structure stability of a party, for instance, 
how clearly their leaders represent the party‘s interests during the negotiation process 
and how reliably they can secure the implementation of the negotiated agreement, 
which is sometimes measured by the nature and number of domestic constituencies 
(Assefa, 1987: 13). High cohesiveness is normally associated with the existence of a 
single constituency. Internal cohesiveness is also an important factor for a successful 
third-party intervention, especially through the appropriate representation of the party 
during the negotiation process. The representative of a party with a high degree of 
cohesiveness, who can negotiate authoritatively, will facilitate concession because s/he 
has the support from a single constituency (Assefa, 1987: 80). In the case of a civil war, 
the cohesiveness of the insurgent party, which enjoys strong support from locals, 
constitutes an important factor for the power equivalence on the battlefield to 
dramatically alter the asymmetrical relationship between the parties (Zartman, 1993). 
This equivalence in power will lead to a stalemate condition, which hurts the 
combatants and population alike, and, in the process, will turn the stalemate into a 
willingness to reconcile (Zartman, 1996).    
 
2.3.2.5 The Role of a Third Party as Mediator 
Another determinant for the success of mediation is the role of the third party to assist 
the conflicting parties in transforming or resolving the conflict (Saunders, 2001). There 
are two reasons why a third party would intervene in a conflict, either formally or 
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informally. The third party can be invited by the conflicting parties to facilitate the 
negotiation process, and in other cases the third party sometimes intervenes 
spontaneously. In general, third-party interventions can take place through the act of 
individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGO), representatives of larger groups, 
or state leaders.  
In the civil war context, Holl (1993) identifies two bases for third-party 
intervention. First, when there is potential for the conflict to expand and cross the 
national borders, and second, when the third party shows an interest in one of the 
elements of the conflict, either with one of the belligerents, with the issue of the conflict 
or when it is driven by a moral imperative. Bercovitch (1984) specifies various 
conditions when mediation takes place, such as in a long-term conflict; when the efforts 
of stakeholders end in a deadlock; when neither party is ready to withstand further costs 
or escalation of the dispute; and when both parties are willing and ready for some form 
of mediation and to be involved in a direct or indirect dialogue. 
However, there are several motives that may influence the conflicting parties to 
accept the intervention of a third party as the mediator (Zartman, 1985). First, the 
parties expect the mediator as a driving force towards a more favourable settlement. 
Second, the presence of the third party is viewed as a face-saving device when reaching 
an agreement. The parties thus appear to accept the mediation to protect their domestic 
interests and international reputation. Third, mediation is ceased when the parties are 
facing a dilemma between military action and making a direct concession to the enemy. 
Greig and Regan (2006: 8) propose a hypothesis that states ―as the costs increase and 
the probability of victory for either side decreases, the likelihood that an offer of 
mediation will be accepted increases‖. Improving the relationship between the mediator 
and the adversary is also one of the strategic motives. 
 
2.3.2.6 Characteristics of the Mediator 
The characteristics of a third-party mediator form an important attribute to support a 
mediator‘s performance during the mediation process. The mediator should have these 
following attributes: impartiality and motive, leverage, and status (Susskind & Babbitt, 
1992: 35). Impartiality may refer to the consequence, intention, appearance (Kriesberg, 
1982) or the mediator‘s stake in the substance of the issues in conflict (Princen, 1992). 
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Several researchers underline the fact that a mediator‘s impartiality will affect the 
success of the mediation and is a necessary condition for gaining acceptability (Touval, 
1975; Smith, W. P., 1985).  
The next characteristic is leverage, which refers to a mediator‘s ability to 
pressurize one or both parties to accept the proposed settlement. Leverage remains one 
of the most elusive elements of mediation (Kleiboer, 1996). The mediator should have 
power, influence, and resources to lead a fruitful mediation (Cot, 1972; Brookmire & 
Sistrunk, 1980; Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille, 1991; Touval, 1992), The required 
resources include negative and positive sanctions (Touval & Zartman, 1985) and 
material elements, such as economic aid; and non-material elements, such as the 
possibility of moral and psychological pressure or sanctions if the need arises (Princen, 
1992). In contrast, Yarrow (1978) argues that conflicting parties would be more inclined 
to accept a mediator who is strategically weak or lacks power, because this ensures that 
the mediator would offer a more relaxed and open negotiation, and would be less 
intimidating for both sides. 
The last characteristic is status, which is related to the mediator‘s personal 
reputation, track record, special expertise, and position in an institution or organization. 
Institutional status implies that a given mediator acts on behalf of or represents his/her 
organization, national state or non-governmental organization, and that the 
organization‘s status itself will reflect the necessary leverage (Rubin, 1981). The 
positional status is linked to the mediator‘s standing in either his/her own country or 
organization. Mediators normally tend to use the strongest organizational affiliation to 
ensure the highest status. This status will also influence how seriously both parties will 
take the mediation process. To sum up, the higher the mediator‘s status, the greater the 
chances of success will be (Princen, 1992). 
 
2.3.2.7 Mediator Behavior 
Mediator behavior relates to the strategies and tactics used by the mediator during the 
mediation process and is one of the significant factors contributing to the mediation 
success (Wall & Lynn, 1993). The strategy is the way the mediator intends to manage 
the case, the parties, and the issues (Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2005). Although there are 
numerous classifications of the strategies used in the literature on mediation, many 
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scholars often use the typology developed by Kressel (1972), and Touval & Zartman 
(1985). Kressel (1972) divides the categories of strategies into three types of behavior. 
First comes reflective behavior; this is the most passive category in which the mediator 
tries to ―achieve some convergence of expectation by reducing distortion, ignorance, 
misperception, or unrealistic intention‖ (Bercovitch, 1984: 98). The second is non-
directive behavior, where the mediator will support the conflicting parties with a 
minimum of assistance to achieve a mutually acceptable solution, such as finding a 
neutral location for peace talks. In this category, the mediator is more proactive than in 
reflective behavior. The main focus of this behavior is to create a favorable environment 
for conflict management (Bercovitch & DeRouen, 2005).   
The third type is directive behavior, where the mediator plays an active role in 
encouraging a specific solution in offering the proposal or recommending a solution. In 
the strategy to end the conflict, the mediators tend to manipulate the parties and put 
direct pressure on them. This approach is more powerful because it involves a direct 
attempt to change the attitude of the parties in conflict. The tactics include giving 
substantive input on the settlement, helping devise a framework for acceptable 
outcomes, and pushing parties towards flexibility. The goal of this behavior is changing 
the parties‘ perception of the cost, benefits, and consequences (Bercovitch & DeRouen, 
2005).  
Directive behavior can also create willingness and motivation by pressurizing 
and persuading the disputants to agree to an outcome. The lower the trust, willingness, 
and motivation of the parties, the higher the need for mediators to resort to directive 
behavior. It is argued that the more active the strategy used by the mediator, the more 
effective the mediation will be (Bercovitch, Anagnosan & Wille, 1991). A mediator‘s 
experience also constitutes an important factor in influencing the strategy and 
effectiveness of mediation. It has been documented that more experienced mediators are 
able to secure a higher number and better quality of settlements (Carnevale & Pegnetter, 
1985). The presence of an experienced mediator also affects the mutual perception, 
trust, and relationship of the parties during the process. 
The mediator‘s knowledge and expertise are also seen as an image of 
competence and credibility and the confidence of the conflicting parties is further 
enhanced if the mediator is seen as being credible (Bercovitch, 1991, 1992). 
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Understandably, the mediator‘s credibility is an important factor since this perception 
helps secure the positive attitude of the parties involved during the process. Thus, the 
mediator will be in a more favorable position (greater confidence, greater acceptance, 
greater satisfaction, and greater fairness) when s/he has attained a high level of insight 
into the disputants‘ interests and needs, and is perceived as credible. In turn, this 
influences the belif of the conflicting parties in the third party‘s capability to assume 
their basic role in the mediation process (Tome, 1992). Moreover, the parties will 
evaluate more favorable recommendations from mediators who have attained a high 
level of insight than recommendations from mediators with less insight. In brief, the 
conflicting parties‘ perception of a mediator‘s degree of insight is expected to directly 
influence their perception of the mediator‘s credibility. These perceptions will, in turn, 
positively contribute to and support the mediator‘s capability in formulating high 
quality recommendations.     
 
2.3.2.8 The Nature of Issues and Negotiation Strategy 
It is also argued that the nature of issues at hand will affect how the conflict will be 
resolved. In general, conflicts involve more than one specific issue and each issue will 
influence the probability of success of the mediation. Conflicts are sometimes triggered 
by a single issue, but, in the process, other issues can arise. There are at least five types 
of issue identified in modern conflicts (Bercovitch, Anagnosan & Wille, 1991: 14): 
1. Sovereignty issues, related to a specific claim over a piece of territory; 
2. Ideology issues, concerning basic values, socio-political principles, beliefs and 
political systems; 
3. Security issues, pertaining to borders, territories, and frontiers; 
4. Self-determination and national identity issues in independence conflicts; and 
5. Other types of conflict. 
Ideology and independence issues are more difficult to settle than territorial or 
security issues. Although ideology-related conflicts are difficult to solve, the mediator 
and conflicting parties should be able to redefine the conflict by identifying their 
interests rather than their position. Contrary to position, which could be characterized 
more concretely, interest is characterized by being abstract and intangible and is 
basically the cause behind the position (Provis, 1996: 305). 
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In many cases, negotiated settlements focus on interest, not position. Normally, 
the negotiation will focus on a party‘s subjective interest, but the position is also used as 
a tactical reason and as a means to attain the party‘s interest at stake in some cases 
(Provis, 1996). Furthermore, a party also tends to use a positional bargaining approach 
to maintain internal unity and identity. Provis (1996) argues that religious and identity 
conflicts could easily be described in terms of the position of the parties rather than their 
objective interests, since the respective positions can be translated as the articulation of 
their worldviews, focusing on interest alone ―may also be misleading,‖ especially when 
a party‘s unity is dependent on a unified position (Provis, 1996: 320). 
In terms of negotiation strategy, other factors affecting negotiation outcome 
include four basic strategies (Pruitt, 1991): problem-solving, contending, yielding, and 
inaction. Problem-solving focuses on mutually beneficial outcomes and is based on the 
interests of the parties. Besides aiming to cater to the interests of both parties, the 
problem-solving strategy also improves the relationship between the parties. The tactics 
commonly used during problem-solving include compensation, increasing available 
resources, exchanging concession on low priority issues, minimizing the cost of 
concession, and putting forth new, mutually beneficial options (Pruitt, 1991).  
This strategy is important because it usually produces a more satisfactory, 
negotiated settlement for both parties (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg 1988). Other conflict 
analysts, such as Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991), call this strategy ―integrative 
bargaining‖, ―interest-based bargaining‖ or ―win-win bargaining‖, all of which can be 
classified as principled negotiation. Another strategy is contention, also called 
―positional bargaining‖, which is often used as an opening strategy and to be replaced at 
a later stage by problem-solving. In this strategy, one party negotiates with the other 
party based only on their own interests. Persuasion, threats, inflated demands, and 
binding commitment are part of these contentious tactics. Contention strategies tend to 
yield poor outcomes and may escalate a conflict since they only focus on the position of 
each party with opposing points of view, and there are many interests behind each 
position, as a matter of fact. Normally, if the negotiation does not end in a deadlock 
situation, this strategy can only lead to a compromise, which does not directly satisfy 
the true interests of the parties.    
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Next is the yielding strategy, which is generally used by a party to close 
negotiations when the time pressure is high and the issues are not significant. When 
both parties resort to this strategy, the outcomes tend to be repressed and can 
successfully contribute to the problem-solving approach. The last strategy is inaction, 
which implies doing as little as possible during the negotiation process. Inaction refers 
to the time pressure strategy exercised by one party over the other and is a feasible 
strategy when the latter party is more susceptible to time pressure than the inactive party 
and when their resistance to yielding is low (Pruitt, 1981). Pruitt (1991) notes that the 
feasibility factor affects the choice of strategy, adding that ―a strategy is seen as feasible 
to the extent that it seems capable of achieving the concerns that give rise to it‖ (Pruitt, 
1991: 35).  
In contrast, when the aspirations of the trusted party are weak, the other party 
will adopt a contentious strategy and will expect the trusted party to yield. The party 
will often abandon this strategy when it fails and this strategy may be used to 
underscore one‘s commitment. Lewicki, Litterer, Minton and Saunders (1994) calls this 
strategy ‗distributive bargaining‘, in which the goal of each party is diametrically 
opposed to that of the other, and each party only focuses on its own benefit. Moreover, 
here, the party estimates that their resources for negotiation are adequately fixed.  
Kriesberg (1992) argues that a good negotiation strategy will lead to a speedy 
and smooth negotiation process, and will sometimes open windows of opportunity. This 
strategic choice probably plays the largest role in determining whether or not the 
negotiation concludes with agreements. An effective strategy should consider issues, 
parties, and the inducement of background conditions. Kriesberg (1992) also noted that 
peripheral issues are usually discussed in the early stages of de-escalation, and that 
subsequently, parties move to a more comprehensive negotiation at a later stage. Clear 
communication is crucial throughout the process of negotiation. Miscommunication can 
create misperception and misinterpretation of the message being put across. 
Furthermore, negotiation can reach a deadlock when both parties are concurrently using 
different strategic approaches (Lewicki, et al., 1994). Therefore, there are several factors 
that influence the choice of strategies, which include the expectations of the parties from 
the mediation process, complexity of the issues, negotiation procedures that are used, 
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balance of power between parties, the stage of the conflict, and the ability of parties to 
resolve the conflict (Moore, 1996).    
Besides elaborating upon the ramifications of various strategies, which directly 
or indirectly affect the initiation of a successful negotiation or mediation, Holsti (1990) 
and Walter (1999) identified factors that can affect the negotiation once the process has 
started. These factors can be divided into two groups. 
First, negotiations fail because the combatants are only buying time to revitalize 
their forces before returning to conflict after having rested and resupplied, or because 
one of the conflicting parties is making a concession for reasons not related to achieving 
real peace. Often, pressure from outside patrons who insist that their ―partners‖ 
participate in a peace process or those who want to appease citizens weary of the on-
going war is the common reason why parties go into negotiation. These situations arise 
because the source of incompatibility still exists and manifests itself even after the 
agreement is signed. Parties in conflict continue to see the military way as the main 
vehicle to achieve the solution and use the peace process as a break time to consolidate 
their power and to mobilize more support from the outside. Parties sometimes also use 
negotiation processes as the medium for transmitting their issues to the international 
community and in trying to obtain support from them (Holsti, 1990: 67). Second, the 
conflicting parties are willing to sign an agreement but cannot reach a mutually 
acceptable deal.  
Walter (1999: 131) further identified four factors that could make reaching an 
agreement difficult, even when both sides are genuinely willing to settle the conflict. 
These include: (1) the conflicting parties cannot agree on how to divide the stakes in a 
mutually satisfying way, which makes settlement less likely (Pillar, 1983; Modelski, 
1994; Wagner, 1993): (2) the value of winning the war: both parties place an equally 
high value on winning the war, leaving little room for compromise because they bargain 
aggressively (Fearon, 2004); and (3) the problem of partial information: each party has 
an motive to hold back or alter private information they have regarding their own 
military strength or staying power. For example, a party pretends that they are better 
supplied, more willing to return to war, and less open to compromise than their rival 
because the longer a group can hold out, the more likely it will be able to convince its 
opponent to yield.  
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Unfortunately, misleading concerning one‘s strength, even if individually 
rational, could result in prompting parties to pursue the conflict much longer than they 
would if this actual information were public. The last factor that hinders an agreement is 
(4) irreversible commitment: negotiations are also bound to fail if both sides have tried 
to increase their bargaining leverage by committing to strong demands from which they 
cannot withdraw (Walter, 1999:132). This is done, for example, by provoking popular 
nationalistic sentiment in support of certain demands. This bargaining tactic would 
allow a leader to announce credibly that he would like to make a concession, but the 
followers will not let him. If both parties resort to this tactic, no settlement will be 
achieved (Schelling, 1966; Crawford, 1982). 
 
2.3.2.9 Dynamic Relationship between the Parties  
The commitment of the parties is an important requirement in interest-based 
negotiations, which will be determined by the dynamic relationship between the parties. 
In their book Negotiation, Roy J. Lewicki, Joseph A. Litterer, John W. Minton and David 
M. Saunders (1994) shed more light on the dynamics of the parties that could influence 
the negotiation process according to three main relations: 
1. The history of the relationship between parties. The defensive and win-lose attitude 
approaches are based on the past relationship of the parties. The more past 
competition and conflict that exist, the more likely negotiators will be to approach 
the current negotiation with a defensive, win-lose attitude.  
2. A belief that an issue can only be resolved in distribution tends to lead negotiators 
to polarize issues or consider them only in win-lose terms.   
3. The mixed-motive nature of most negotiation situations. Most situations are mixed-
motive cases, containing some elements that require a distributive bargaining 
process, and others that require integrative negotiation. – In addition, Zartman and 
Touval (1997) state that conflicting parties may sometimes sign an agreement for 
other purposes. Agreement, such as a ceasefire, may actually be strategic in that it 
might provide one side with an opportunity to improve its military position and 
fight longer (Zartman & Touval, 1997: 11).  
Moreover, interest dynamics between conflicting parties and the success of a 
negotiation are most likely influenced by several factors. Many scholars consider that 
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one such important factor is the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). Zartman (2003) 
argues that a peace process is rarely successful unless it happens at a point in time when 
the conflict is in a mutually hurting stalemate. This happens when violence is at a 
deadlock and parties see negotiation as a better outcome than continued fighting. At that 
point, third parties can take important steps to facilitate a negotiated outcome (Zartman, 
1996).  Deadlock is the most favourable condition for settlement. 
 
2.4 Theories on Outcome of Agreement 
In the literature, several perspectives exist related to factors affecting the durability of 
peace. Some scholars, such as Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), hypothesize that 
the final settlement will be affected by dimensions of power-sharing, which are 
meticulously incorporated into the negotiated agreement. On the other hand, Walter 
(1999, 2002) argues that peace agreements are more likely to be durable when the 
agreement is reinforced by the credible commitment of a third party. The presence of a 
third-party guarantor, including peace-keeping forces, will support the former 
combatant‘s commitment towards the agreement, especially in inspiring them with more 
confidence during the demobilization process. Fortna (2003), Doyle and Sambanis 
(2000) also support the crucial role played by peacekeeping operations, which can lead 
to a longer span of peace following the agreement.   
Another perspective introduced by Fortna (2003) is that the durability of an 
agreement will be determined by the mechanism embedded within the agreement as 
guidance to peace implementation. Based on the explanation above, and within the 
context of this thesis, the major elements relevant to the durability of peace are hereby 
divided into 1) the mechanism within the agreements, 2) third-party guarantors, and 3) 
the political process, which will be addressed in the following sections. 
The durability of agreement and the success of mediation can be examined in 
two ways: the short-term success and the long-term success (Pruitt et al., 1993). The 
short-term success focuses on the immediate outcomes that are observable at the time of 
the mediation process, including whether the parties sign the agreement, the quality of 
agreement, the parties‘ feeling of satisfaction towards the agreement, and whether the 
agreement represents the most important goals identified at the end of the negotiation.  
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The long-term success, on the other hand, deals with the delayed outcomes that 
are observable following the elapse of a certain period of time after signing the 
agreement, including whether the agreement has raised complaints by the parties, 
whether the parties‘ relationship was improved, and the absence of significant problems 
in several months following the mediation. In general, it is argued that the term 
―successful peace process‖ is based on the fulfilment of several basic criteria: both 
conflicting parties agreed to a sign peace agreement, the agreement reduced the number 
of casualties, leaders from both parties committed to support implementation in the 
field, and trust building was improved during the peace process and implementation 
(Pruitt et al., 1993). 
More specifically, some representatives of the peace building/conflict resolution 
NGO sector, the European Commission, the European Council and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council/UN stand-by team, in a meeting on Evaluating Peace Mediation held 
on 28 February 2008, identified several key questions towards successful mediation:
4
 
● What were the direct and indirect impacts of the mediation process on the ground? 
● Did the conflict situation (e.g. sense of security, level of violence, humanitarian 
situation, conflict dynamics, etc.) change over time and what was the contribution of 
the mediation process? 
● Did the outcome of mediation (e.g. a peace agreement) satisfy the fundamental 
interests of the conflicting parties?  
● Did the parties remain committed to the agreement after the mediation process? Were 
there mechanisms and guarantees for the implementation of the agreement? What 
was the role of international actors in the implementation?  
● Did the parties ―own‖ the mediation process? Did the mediator draft and structure the 
agreement with or without the participation of the parties? 
● How did mediators address ―spoilers‖ during the process? How did this affect the 
role of  ―spoilers‖ in the implementation phase? 
● Did the mediation process change the attitude of the parties and their interaction with 
one another? Have they learned to better understand each other‘s interests? 
                                                 
4
 Source: Evaluating Peace Mediation. Proposal of A General Framework for Evaluating International 
Mediation Activities. Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP); the paper was written by swisspeace in 
cooperation with the Center for Peace Mediation of the European University Viadrina.  
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As previously mentioned, the conflict between the GoI and GAM is classified 
under the intrastate conflict. The peace agreements in intrastate conflicts mainly involve 
power sharing or autonomy, with a focus on creating balanced institutions, and 
dismantling some of the centralized political structures. Frequently, the durability of a 
political solution is determined by the social and political ‗contract‘ (agreement) ‗for 
peace and development‘ between the conflicting parties (Sahadevan, 2006).  Political 
solutions tend to focus on creating a power-sharing arrangement and autonomy within 
the state system towards a new balanced institutional structure. To be effective, the 
agreement must be translated into action, including well-formulated and well-developed 
implementation and monitoring plans. A solid implementation plan should include 
criteria for measuring performance, general and specific implementation steps, methods 
for measuring and enforcing compliance, and procedures for managing future changes 
or conflicts (Moore, 1996).  In general, there are three main concerns that should be 
addressed by peace agreements: procedure, substance, and organization (Walter, 1997; 
Hartzel, Hoddie, Rothchild, 2001; Stedman, 2001,; Rothchild, 2002): 
1. The procedural components map the process to establish and maintain peace, 
including processes and measures that help build peace, such as the establishment of 
schedules and institutions that facilitate the implementation of substantive issues: 
disarmament, elections, justice and human rights.  
2. The substantive components are part of the agreement dealing with what is to 
change once an agreement is reached, including economic, political, and social 
structural changes that are needed to remedy past grievances and build the way for a 
fair and equitable future. The distribution of power, the management of natural 
resources, and the type of mechanism to solve past injustice fall under the 
substantive components. 
The organizational/institutional components refer to the arrangements/mechanisms 
intended to promote peace consolidation efforts following the agreement. These 
mechanisms aim to provide guidance to carry out the activities to consolidate the 
vulnerable peace and build the foundation for sustainable peace and development. 
There are two types of organizational component. The first is referred to by the UN 
as the ―implementation mechanism‖, which follows a peace agreement and is 
intended to promote agreement implementation and designed to provide a neutral 
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monitoring capacity to ensure peace agreement commitments are respected, a 
steering capacity that establishes priorities and monitors the progress and timeline of 
implementation, and a political forum that assists parties in reconciling potential 
implementation disagreements over political dialogues (Yawanarajah & Ouellet, 
2003). 
The implementation mechanism involves other relevant actors needed to help 
build peace, collectively known as the ‗peace-keeping operation‘. The second type of 
organizational/institutional component is intended to resolve subsequent conflict over 
substantive issues, such as the state violation of human rights, and to promote 
transparency and accountability in governance. This mechanism, referred to by the UN 
as the ―peace building mechanism‖, helps uphold a culture of peaceful conflict 
resolution in the society involved and builds public confidence in the state‘s capacity to 
resolve future grievances methodically and impartially (Lederach, 1997; Doyle & 
Sambanis, 1999). This could include the establishment of a commission on human 
rights and strengthening of the judiciary system with international advisory and/or 
monitoring capacity, and setting up a new office of an Ombudsman, and the like. Peace 
building mechanisms are designed to empower the state with a neutral structure and 
capacity to resolve future conflicts and complaints, provide tools for the peaceful 
resolution of public grievances before they become a source of conflict in a society, and 
offer a means for foreseeing and thwarting future conflicts (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; 
Lederach, 1997; Doyle & Sambanis, 1999).  
Therefore, effective mechanisms within an agreement constitute a fundamental 
aspect of the implementation of peace. Other important factors for a successful process 
are demobilization, disarmament, and the reintegration of armed forces (DDR). Without 
a comprehensive DDR process, violence will most likely resume, which would 
jeopardize the agreement over the long term. Lastly, political transition, such as the 
holding of elections, promoting human rights, establishing the rule of law, and 
reforming the judiciary, is the final approach for conflict transformation in a process, 
which can help sustain peace (Zehr, 2001: 330–331).  The next section will elaborate 
more on the implementation phase subsequent to the signing of the peace agreement.      
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2.4.1 Mechanisms within the Agreement 
In general, peace agreements consist of structural provisions, which determine what is 
going to happen, and procedural provisions, which determine how peace is to be 
established and sustained. Peace implementation concentrates on the specific, relatively 
short-term efforts to make conflicting parties fulfil their written commitment to peace. It 
is the process of carrying out a specific agreement that has been signed after a 
negotiation process. A fine peace agreement should provide the guidelines and 
deadlines that determine how the agreement is to be implemented (Hartzell, 1999, 
2002). Without proper mechanisms or implementation guidelines, it will be nearly 
impossible to enforce the agreement that has been reached.  
Fortna (2003) introduces mechanisms using ceasefire agreements as an example 
of a critical agreement to support durable peace. These mechanisms, including 
establishing demilitarized zones, a dispute resolution commission, peacekeeping, 
external guarantees and settlement of the political issues. The mechanisms within an 
agreement theory state that for the effective implementation of a peace agreement, a 
well-designed plan is crucial. Immediate, self-executing agreements are easier to 
implement. However, many settlements will require parties to act over an extended 
period of time. Implementation plans will be more successful when they include criteria 
for measuring performance, methods for measuring and enforcing compliance, general 
and specific implementation steps, and procedures for managing future changes or 
conflicts. 
Therefore, while an agreement can employ three types of strategy in fostering 
durable peace, in turn, these strategies should have specific observable mechanisms 
(Fortna, 2003: 342–343), as follows:    
1. Changing the incentive by making it more costly to attack. War will resume if the 
incentives to attack exceed the cost of breaking the agreement. However, there are 
steps the conflicting parties and the international community can take to increase the 
costs of an attack. These steps widen the bargaining space between the conflicting 
parties and make another round of war less likely.    
2. Reducing uncertainty about the actions and intentions. Agreements can reduce 
uncertainty by specifying the terms of a ceasefire. The more specific the agreement, 
the less uncertainty there will be about what constitutes compliance. Spelling out the 
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rules of the ceasefire explicitly helps to define compliance and non-compliance. 
Identifying the exact location of the ceasefire zone, counting the number of weapons 
to destroy and the number of troops to demobilize, can prevent misunderstanding 
and avoid unnecessary tensions. In addition, in fostering durable peace, the presence 
of neutral referees can play an important role, such as in settlement claims and 
complaints about violations.  
3. Preventing or controlling accidental violations. Reciprocal strategies can be very 
vulnerable to accidents and misunderstandings. One wrong move from the troops 
can provoke an unnecessary reaction from the other side. This situation can quickly 
escalate into war. If leaders have little control of their military, a rogue group can 
easily trigger a new war and provoke retaliation. Establishing a forum between 
parties as part of a dispute resolution procedure can alleviate this danger through 
dialogue to prevent misunderstandings.      
Moreover, Fortna (2003) explains that the mechanisms within an agreement can 
make durable peace more likely by altering the incentives to not break a ceasefire, by 
reducing uncertainty about action and intention, and by preventing accidental violation 
from triggering another round of fighting. Thus, the contents of the peace agreement 
and the implementation of its specific mechanisms might affect the durability of peace. 
The specific mechanisms could be applied under various aspects of the peace 
agreement, such as the procedure for the ceasefire, the timing of and the number of 
troops withdrawn, the location of the demilitarized zone, the rule of the third-party 
guarantee, and the security arrangement procedures. 
 
2.4.1.1 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Process (DDR)   
The DDR process might contribute to stability and durability of peace by preventing 
former conflicting parties from re-attacking each other. The DDR process, as the entry 
point, not only focuses on stability but also on broader reconciliation and socio-
economic development. The UN resorts to the DDR approach as part of its 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The UN Integrated DDR Standards 
(DDRS) define each stage as follows (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 
2006): 
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● Disarmament is ―the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of 
the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible 
arms management programmes‖. This stage is largely symbolic, but essential to the 
demobilization process. We can divide this phase into numerous steps, including 
identification of the existence of armaments, collection, storage, destruction, and 
redistribution of arms to the national security forces (Pouligny, 2004).  
● Demobilization is ―the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend 
from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of 
troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, 
assembly areas or barracks)‖. The key steps of this phase include planning and 
stationing, registering, disarming, and orientating ex-combatants prior to their 
release, as well as actually releasing them (Pouligny, 2004). Demobilization includes 
the assembly of ex-combatants, orientation programmes, and transportation to the 
communities of destination. 
● Reintegration is ―the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income‖. Essentially, this phase involves administering 
social and economic activities with open timelines, primarily within communities. 
The reintegration phase is part of the general development of a country. It is a 
national responsibility and often requires long-term foreign aid. We may add 
reinsertion, rehabilitation, and resettlement to this phase. Initially, the reintegration 
phase is aimed to give ex-combatants economic opportunities in the form of 
vocational training. Later, a social component was added to better reconcile societies 
undergoing post-war restoration (Nilsson, 2005).  
Several studies view the DDR as a major component of peace implementation 
and successful disarmament as a factor of development (Fusato, 2003; Caramés & Sanz, 
2009). The main goals of the process are the restoration of security and stability at the 
end of an armed conflict. A progressive DDR can build and increase trust between 
parties and allows room for post-conflict humanitarian intervention. It also targets the 
sustained social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants into a peaceful 
community. To turn a DDR process into a success, the conflicting parties should reach 
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political agreement to end the hostilities; the DDR can only be implemented in the 
context of a negotiated settlement, ceasefire, or a peace agreement.  
Moreover, in terms of the DDR implementation, the agreement should involve 
realistic goals and a timetable for implementation, clear eligibility criteria of the DDR, 
and the creation of a credible, responsible institution. The DDR should also have 
support from different stakeholders at various levels. Disarmament without reintegration 
and demobilization without previous disarmament and planned economic and social 
reintegration will only end up as short-lived efforts.  
One of the crucial supporting elements that determine the successful 
implementation of the DDR is the role played by outsiders as the peacekeeping agents 
and third-party guarantors (Diehl, 1998; Stedman, 2001). Here, it is noteworthy that by 
initiating demilitarization under what are predominantly conditions of anarchy, civil war 
peace agreements have the potential to create security dilemmas. As parties begin to 
disarm, they contribute to an increasingly tense situation; the fewer arms conflicting 
groups carry, the more susceptible they feel, and, in turn, the more sensitive to potential 
violations they are bound to become. Consequently, this makes them less inclined to 
fulfil their side of the deal.  
One of the main challenges that parties face at the negotiating table therefore is 
not only how to end the armed conflict, but how to devise a settlement that encourages 
both sides to drop their individual defences and comply with the newly established 
political rules at a time when no government or police force can either protect them or 
warrant compliance (Walter, 1997, 1999). Combatants emerging from intrastate conflict 
would commonly be willing to cooperate in negotiating treaties, which reduce the 
dangers of demobilization and bind parties to the terms, but their willingness to do so 
will depend on the degree to which the treaties can guarantee that they will obtain the 
long-run benefits of peace and power-sharing. If combatants can significantly reduce the 
possibility of an unexpected attack and the possibility of permanent exclusion from 
power, they will sign and implement peace settlements. If they cannot obtain a 
guarantee, they will hold on to their arms and continue to fight (Walter, 1999).   
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2.4.1.2 Third-Party Guarantees  
Even after all other obstacles to resolution are removed, states still confront a unique set 
of commitment problems intrinsic to the need of integrating two or more parties into a 
single state. For fruitful settlements, each party should persuade the other that it is 
committed to disengaging their military forces, and subsequently share power in a 
genuine way. This necessitates a complex array of external and internal guarantees. The 
likelihood of signing and implementing peace accords is higher when parties feel more 
secure and self-confident vis-à-vis the safe consolidation of military forces and 
regarding the opening of the political process (Walter, 1999).   
According to Walter, policy makers interested in resolving civil wars should 
consider the following suggestions. First, the majority of negotiations, even the most 
promising ones, normally require third-party enforcement if they are to succeed. In 
general, opposing parties will be more likely to proceed with a peace plan when an 
outside guarantor has the political force to verify or implement demobilization. 
Whenever a guarantor is incapable of taking action (or in some way reluctant to do so), 
the combatants may become hesitant to abide by their commitment and even signed 
agreements could fail. The third-party guarantor may not be able to deploy a large 
number of peacekeeping officers to the conflict zone to monitor implementation of the 
agreement; however, it should be able to offer firm assurance and a convincing pledge 
in support thereof.  
Conflicting parties should ascertain that peacekeepers would indeed monitor 
compliance and offer protection to those reporting to assembly areas, in addition to 
staying put until the demobilization process is complete. Failure to do so may lead to the 
collapse of the agreement. In addition, unrealistic expectations of free and just elections 
as a direct introduction to democracy by states rising from civil war are illusionary and 
disappointing for the parties involved. The parties may withdraw from the negotiations 
and return to war if they realize that the winner of the initial post-conflict elections will 
be inclined to establish an authoritarian state, ban the opposition, and possibly prosecute 
its members (Brown, 2001).  Therefore, third parties should be cautious about pressing 
for a quick democratization process, and should appreciate the serious implications of 
attempting to concurrently end a civil war and set up a fully liberal democracy without 
the necessary democratic transition. Next, since combatants are prone to being anxious 
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and insecure as the process of demobilization begins, they should be avidly reassured if 
they are to disarm fully, particularly when the political terms of agreement have not 
been fully executed.  
Additional measures of self-help offered to one of the conflicting sides (usually 
the combatants) by third-party guarantors include territorial autonomy, open borders, 
and significant asylum provisions. Finally, lessons learnt from past civil war cases 
indicate that even though enforcement is necessary, it is only effective in the short term 
(Walter, 2002). If external states have a stake in enduring civil-war settlements, they 
must subsequently look at how the new institutional parameters reflect each group‘s 
expectations of their future security, and affect their decisions of fighting or 
cooperating. A military/peacekeeping presence could be central to demobilization, yet 
ingenious institutional design has deeper implications in the long term (Brown, 2001).     
Walter (2002) also advocates the importance and assurance of third-party 
involvement. Moreover, she argues that conflicting parties, with assistance from 
outsiders, should design reliable guarantees over the terms of a settlement for peace to 
prevail. She further affirms the vital role of third-party security guarantees and effective 
power-sharing accords, which could be decisive for settling the matter of whether 
parties continue to negotiate or fight (Walter, 2002). Peacekeeping efforts have also 
been shown to make an impact on the durability of peace in both interstate (Fortna, 
2003) and intrastate wars (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell, et al., 2001). While the 
need to involve outsiders as conflict managers may indicate the complexity of the 
baseline characteristics of the conflict and disputants, and the resulting difficulty in 
establishing a lasting peace, the presence of third parties makes it more likely that these 
agreements last than if no third party had been present in the same scenario (Walter, 
1999). 
To reiterate, in intrastate or civil war peace settlements, the main outcome from 
the negotiated agreement must consolidate previous conflicting parties into a single 
state, create a new government that is able to accommodate their interests, and offer a 
sharing of power. Moreover, before the rebelling side begins to demobilize, disengage, 
and disarm, a third party should guarantee that the government will protect them and 
that it is fully committed to implementing the agreement. In brief, only the degree of 
credible assurance of long-term benefits of peace and power-sharing can determine 
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combatants‘ cooperation during the negotiation. Thus, the successful intrastate conflict 
resolution is not only affected by the ability of both parties to reach a win-win solution, 
but also by the willingness of the third party to guarantee the process of demobilization 
and disarmament (Walter, 1999; Fortna, 2003).  
The credibility of the third party will affect the realization and durability of 
peace implementation because it will give a guarantee to disarm and power sharing 
(Walter, 1997). The third party will enforce the settlement and guarantee that neither 
side is dishonest (Fortna, 2003) because even if both parties have agreed to end the 
conflict, memories from the atrocities committed during the conflict are bound to 
remain fresh. In such delicate periods, an external actor will observe the implementation 
of the agreement and have great potential to support the peace process through 
mitigating security dilemmas.  
Importantly, third-party assistance is expected to create transparency and build 
confidence around the settlement agreement. Although parties agree to stop the fighting, 
memories of past atrocities committed during the war are still fresh, and full reliance on 
the former combatants is difficult. Mutual mistrust is often a factor that exacerbates 
conflicts. Unless the cause of mistrust is addressed, it will continue to present an 
obstacle to a successful peace process. Designing security guarantees that dealing with 
these fears adds stability and allows for more productive negotiations. The adversaries 
often need an outsider to enforce the settlement and to guarantee that neither side is 
cheating (Fortna, 2003: 341). If an outside state or international organization is not 
willing or able to provide such guarantees, the warring parties will reject a negotiated 
settlement and will continue or resume their war.   
Not all third-party security guarantees are equally effective. A security guarantee 
is only effective if the third party arrives on the ground with the required mandate. If 
combatants do not believe that the third party will faithfully verify or enforce 
compliance, or if they notice that the third party fails to commit sufficient resources to 
the task at hand, promises of monitoring and protecting will have no positive effect and 
combatants will refuse to abide by their agreements.  
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2.5 Political Settlement  
The political settlement that addresses the governance issues (including components of 
power-sharing, elections, the autonomy system, and political amnesty) is one of the key 
factors that determine the durability of peace. The political settlement is geared towards 
the establishment of a democratic post-conflict environment, which will prevent the 
probability of an intrastate conflict to re-occur. However, there are many cases in 
modern history in which peace agreements were not followed by political change. 
Moreover, political change can only occur if there is a reasonable period of peace 
following the agreement (Regan & Stam, 2000). Agreements that only last for a brief 
time fail to provide sufficient opportunity for effective political change since they fail to 
provide the necessary space for new institutions and policies to gain traction and lead to 
lasting peace (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006: 28). Change can only occur if there is a 
period of peace following an agreement. Thus, a critical aspect in the peace process is to 
―make it over the hump‖ and allow dispute settlement to take effect and alter the 
underlying political situation fuelling the dispute (Gartner & Mellin, 2009: 4).  
The political content of an agreement is another important consideration. If 
possible, resolving the underlying issues of conflict is a way of removing a key reason 
for violent conflict. Most conflicts end with the fundamental issues still in dispute, even 
when one side clearly wins the war. Nevertheless, when settlement of the substantive 
political issues is reached, whether imposed or agreed, one should expect it to be 
associated with the reality of peace. 
Solving the short-term problem of demobilization, however, does not solve the 
long-term problem of political participation. The political process in post-conflict 
society involves the participation of both the people and the stakeholders, meaning that 
after the settlement is negotiated by both parties, the following process will invite and 
involve society at large in the transitional period from conflict to peace. Hence, the 
realization of a settlement or peace process will depend on public trust and participation 
(Sisk, 2003). A sustainable peace is more likely to occur when political issues are 
resolved. Political processes are more likely to influence the durability of peace when 
democratic processes are being used, such as local elections and the participation of 
political parties, and when the process of constitution is conducted in Aceh. 
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2.5.1 Power Sharing 
The main focus of political settlement remains an issue of power-sharing that relates to 
autonomy as the basis of conflict resolution. By granting autonomy, the central 
government reduces excessive control of local territories, increases transparency, 
empowers the local electorate in assessing political movement, and supports the 
arrangements for decentralization (Bigombe, Collier, & Sambanis, 2000).  
In general, territorial autonomy concessions help reassure groups in an alienated 
society that the power of the state will not be monopolized by one group and be used to 
compromise the security of the other, and as such, these provisions are assumed to 
contribute in a significant way to the prospects for peace of weary societies (Rothchild 
& Hartzell, 1999). Hence, decentralization of power through territorial autonomy is 
found to diminish tensions and contributes favourably to the likelihood of lasting peace. 
While looking more closely at elements of territorial autonomy contributing to 
durability of peace, one can clearly discern the following (Hartzell, Hoddie, & 
Rothchild, 2001): 
● Territorial autonomy shifts decision-making power to the subdivisions of the state 
and thus limits control at the political centre. Often, authority on issues such as 
language, education, access to governmental civil service, and social services is 
considered to be vital and reassuring for groups yearning for autonomy and for 
securing their survival. Moreover, in empowering policy makers at the sub-national 
level, groups acquire an increased sense of ownership and assertion that they have 
been granted the means to protect them from the rule of central authority, especially 
when territorial units can develop their own judiciaries and police forces, which, in 
turn, increase their autonomous capacity (Coakley, 1993; Levine, 1996; Sisk, 1996; 
Ghai, 2000). 
● Territorial autonomy can help minimize competitive rivalry among groups in a 
divided society. This can be achieved by reducing any existing imbalance among 
groups by empowering minorities in local bureaucracies and educational systems. 
Moreover, by allocating material resources and providing opportunities at the district 
level, territorial autonomy can also spread part of the economic power formerly 
under the control of the political centre (Diamond, 1993; Lake & Rothchild, 1999). 
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Based on the arguments above, negotiated settlements that make provisions for 
granting territorial autonomy to relevant parties are found to be more stable. Further 
research finds that the probability of lasting peace is impacted by certain dimensions of 
political power-sharing among former combatants included in the peace agreement 
(Hartzell, 1999; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2001). By assuring the opposing groups that they 
are in a position to leverage decision-making processes in the future, it is expected that 
power-sharing arrangements will most likely prevent adversaries from once again 
resorting to violent conflict to settle disputes. In contrast, the absence of these kinds of 
assurance might result in a breakdown of peace, as minorities that are excluded from 
power will probably also remain excluded, and, almost invariably, lose their adherence 
to the regime (Lijphart, 1985). 
 
2.6  The Grand Theory of Peace Preparedness 
From the above exploration of various existing theories, this thesis integrates the 
relevant theoretical elements and seeks to examine whether these elements could be 
incorporated into a contradiction-free overarching theory that could be probed 
empirically against the experience in Aceh. The various theories above are combined 
into the readiness theory as the framework of analysis of the research questions, such as 
readiness to start negotiations, readiness to reach a compromise, and readiness to 
implement the agreement.  
The readiness theory was introduced by Dean Pruitt (2005) and originally 
expanded on Zartman‘s views of a ―hurting stalemate‖ and ―imminent mutual 
catastrophe‖ (1985). In this readiness theory, Pruitt (2005) offers more detailed 
explanatory and predictive factors, focusing on reason, while Zartman (1985) focuses 
on pain and cost for pushing conflicting parties to halt violent conflict and enter into the 
negotiation process. The readiness theory argues that leadership is a key factor in 
transforming a conflict condition into a peaceful resolution. A change in leadership is 
often needed to pull away from previously failing policies that led or contributed to 
escalation of the conflict (Mitchell, 2000; Stedman, 1991).  
However, existing circumstances (such as impediments and deadlocks) also 
affect the leaders‘ perception of the on-going conflict situation. These circumstances, 
defined by Zartman (1985) as the ―ripe moment‖ to change the direction of conflict, can 
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favorably influence a leader to become more rational when a sudden turn of events –a 
―shock‖ – strikes the mind and stimulates rational thinking (Bercovitch, Diehl & Goertz, 
1997; Mitchell, 1995). New leaders have a different mindset from their predecessors 
that enables them to review old conflict policies and segregate the persons affiliated 
with those failing policies during the new leader‘s ―honeymoon‖ phase (Ho-won Jeong, 
2008). In addition, new leaders may be more flexible and could provide their 
adversaries with opportunities to open an initial dialogue and start negotiations (Pruitt, 
2005).  
As noted in earlier sections, the external actor as a guarantor should motivate 
local leaders to recognize and act with the objective to achieve all of the ripeness 
elements before providing direct assistance with the negotiation (Mitchell, 2000; 
Zartman, 2000). A ripeness element in which neither of the parties is progressing 
towards victory encourages the adversaries to end the conflict and creates optimism for 
a successful negotiation. While ripeness influences the conflicting parties to end a 
violent conflict and begin the peace process, the readiness theory argues that without 
motivation and optimism from all sides, the ripe moment will be worthless. Motivation 
to end the conflict is initiated through the parties‘ perception that the conflict is 
dysfunctional, or by way of external pressure. The clearer the perception that they are 
heading towards the imminent loss, the stronger the motivation of the parties to stop the 
conflict will become. 
The costs and risks of on-going conflict (such as running out of resources and 
spiralling escalation) are crucial elements in the process of changing the direction of 
conflict. The greater the perceived cost and risk of the conflict, the stronger the 
motivation to end the conflict (Pruitt, 2005). Optimism, on the other hand, is the sense 
that it will be possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Optimism among the 
parties is not only required when they enter negotiation but also during the negotiation 
process. It is part of a certain ―working trust‖, the belief that the other party is equally 
motivated to settle the conflict and is committed to negotiating the dispute (Kelman, 
2002).  
In addition, the perception of negotiators who are capable and act as valid 
representatives of each side will determine the level of optimism of the parties. Pruitt 
(2005) argues that to start the negotiation, optimism must be present on both sides, and 
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that more motivation can compensate for less optimism, and vice versa. Concerning 
concession making and reaching an agreement at the end of the negotiation process, he 
states that readiness increases the probability of parties agreeing to make certain 
concessions. Usually the party with the greater readiness is the one to make more 
concessions in the final agreement.  
Moreover, the outcomes of the negotiated agreement depend on whether the 
factors affecting motivation to end the conflict continue after the agreement is reached, 
and whether optimism about the usefulness of agreement is maintained. As for the 
agreement itself, Pruitt argues that negotiation will move to deeper issues if and when it 
becomes clear that the conflict will continue unless those issues are addressed and 
settled. Additionally, the presence of a third party as the mediator during the negotiation 
process (or the guarantor after the agreement is reached) can be argued based on their 
intervention depending on the readiness that induced the motivation to end the conflict 
and the optimism about the success of negotiation. Similarly, with conflicting parties, 
Pruitt believes that motivation and optimism depend on the costs and risks associated 
with the conflict.  
Interestingly, Pruitt notes several mechanisms concerning how the process of 
motivation and optimism translates into a peace process. First, the motivation to end a 
conflict normally necessitates diminishing one‘s goals and aspirations; less ambitious 
goals involve less divergence in interests, and encourage greater optimism about the 
success of negotiation, on one or both sides. Second, strong optimism creates new 
motives to open communication and share new information with each other. This new 
information from the other side will change old perceptions and stereotypes of the 
―enemy‖ image of the adversary. The third mechanism involves wishful thinking, which 
means a selective tendency to find evidence that the other party is motivated to settle the 
conflict.  
Fourth, parties will send conciliatory signals or start contacting each other 
informally when they are interested in ending a conflict. Fifth, the third party will 
motivate the parties to end the conflict by becoming more optimistic to resolve the 
conflict and take the initiative to mediate by inviting the parties to the negotiating table. 
The third party can also mediate the exchange of messages to transfer motivation and 
optimism from one side to other.  
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To ensure a successful outcome of the negotiation, Pruitt argues that the 
readiness theory should not consider the leader‘s readiness in isolation but also examine 
the various factions involved. In this regard, he divides the political spectrum into three 
groups: hawks, moderates, and doves. Hawks have more extreme goals and are less 
optimistic about the success of the peace process due to the extremity of their demands 
and their lack of trust in the other party. Readiness for negotiation is always greatest for 
doves and least for hawks (Pruitt, 2005). To support the negotiation and develop a 
lasting agreement, both sides should strive to create a central coalition of people who 
are ready for negotiation across the political spectrum. With a broad coalition, the 
negotiation becomes achievable; and, if the coalition persists, a lasting agreement is also 
likely to be reached. In recent years, the presence of a broad central coalition has been 
found to be crucial for maintaining the peace agreement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Research Design 
This section shows how different theoretical elements in the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables can be merged into a coherent grand theory of 
peace preparedness by modifying the theory of Dean Pruitt (2005) into a less elitist 
form. In this thesis, based on the structure of the existing theories explained above, the 
readiness theory is divided into two main parts: 
1. Readiness to start negotiating and to make compromises in negotiations 
(precondition and negotiation processes). The precondition process includes its 
various elements: ripeness, domestic political settings and the international context, 
whereas the negotiation process includes the pre-negotiation, negotiation and 
mediation processes involved. 
2. Readiness to implement the agreement (outcome of agreement). The mechanisms 
within the agreement include disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration 
process; the third-party guarantee and the political settlement. 
As stated by Pruitt, the motivation and optimism (which affect the success of the 
peace process) are not only significant at the beginning of a peace process but also 
during the mediation/negotiation process and during the implementation of the 
agreement. These variables are also addressed to the third party, as the intermediary 
actor in the negotiation. 
 
3.2 Readiness in the Pre-Condition and Negotiation Process 
3.2.1 Pre-Condition 
This thesis aims to identify the ripe moment that was perceived by the GoI and GAM as 
bringing them to the negotiating table, and whether that moment happened during the 
CoHA or the Helsinki MoU process because the clearer the perceived cost and risk, the 
stronger the motivation of parties to stop the on-going conflict. The various factors 
considered include: 
● Conflict intensity: number of casualties recorded each month, military expenditure, 
and the number of military and combatant fatalities; 
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● The impact of conflict on economic, social and political sectors that are measured 
through economic growth, poverty percentage, political stability and effectiveness, 
and the amount of public and private infrastructure destroyed; and 
● Undeniable disaster or catastrophe. 
Furthermore, this thesis examines the factors within the internal political setting 
of the parties that motivated and contributed to their settling the conflict, since the more 
democratic the actors, the more favourable the conditions for managing the conflict. The 
transitional period and institutionalization of democracy were significant factors that 
reflected the perception and motivation of leaders, such as their response to the ripeness. 
Pruitt (2005: 15) argues that intra-conflict cannot be permanently transformed unless a 
political transition takes place.  
The level of policy change was another important factor to examine. It includes, 
among other things, the fair election law in Indonesia, the new president along with 
his/her mandate, the GoI‘s ability to control the military, multiple political parties, civil 
liberties including open public discussion, freedom of assembly and demonstration, 
competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and the GoI‘s decision to make 
concessions to GAM, such as the content of the political settlement, and, last but not 
least, the way the cohesiveness of the party affects the negotiation and maintenance of 
the reached agreement. Cohesiveness can be measured through certain elements, such as 
the response of the opposition or other state institutions during the CoHA or the 
Helsinki MoU process. 
The last factor concerns the international setting, which is the factor that drives 
or coerces the conflicting parties to find a peaceful solution, as Pruitt (2005) argues in 
his readiness theory. In terms of international setting, there are several areas of focus in 
this thesis. Firstly, the issues and agenda in the international setting during the CoHA 
and Helsinki peace process. Secondly, the way the GoI and GAM perceived the 
international setting in relation to the peace process, and finally, the relation between 
the international actors that pressurized the GoI and GAM to change the direction of the 
conflict. 
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3.2.2 Negotiation Process 
In the negotiation process, Pruitt (2005) focuses mostly on optimism as the main 
element in reaching a negotiated settlement. While the perception of mutual hurt creates 
a motive for bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table, he argues that 
without optimism from both sides, the ripe moment will be worthless. Optimism arises 
when both parties sense that they will possibly reach a settlement; this is not only 
required when the peace negotiation starts but also during the process itself.   
At the beginning of readiness, pre-negotiation can take the shape of 
conciliatory signals that are sent to the other side. This step can be initiated when one 
party has reached some degree of readiness to assess the prospect of negotiation. Pre-
negotiation is a crucial process in changing the party‘s relationship and assessing the 
way the conflict will be settled. Moreover, the party would internally anticipate 
potential spoilers within its ranks when the negotiation starts. This thesis examines 
the level of optimism of the GoI and GAM, and how it functioned during the pre-
negotiation process in the CoHA and Helsinki MoU process by way of: 
● Behavior change from violent drive to political tactics: policies to reduce firearms in 
the field and control aggressive military movement; 
● A clear proposal that accommodates similar goals and a common perspective of 
peace offered by the GoI and GAM, or at least one party, during the pre-negotiation 
process; 
● Building trust and confidence, and setting the level of intensity and of formal and 
informal communications to be conducted between the GoI and GAM. 
● Setting the framework of negotiation. The clear and specific agenda that affected 
how smooth the settlement process could be and how it could only be developed 
when the GoI and GAM showed high optimism concerning the negotiation; and 
● Optimism during pre-negotiation can also be identified by how a party anticipates the 
spoilers within its ranks, from the start of the peace process until the agreement was 
reached.  
Moreover, optimism is also necessary during the negotiation and mediation 
process. The readiness theory argues that the third party (as the mediator or the 
guarantor) should be motivated to end the conflict and be optimistic concerning the 
success of the mediation. Thus, in principle, the readiness to intervene, which is present 
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when the disputants are ready to negotiate and are motivated to end the conflict, will be 
noted by the third party who becomes more optimistic about mediating the conflict. The 
third party should also motivate the leaders of the conflicting parties to recognize the 
ripeness of elements and create optimism towards the success of negotiation. In 
addition, a strong third party will exert effective pressure on the disputants to influence 
the parties trying to end the conflict, and this can increase the parties‘ optimism 
concerning the success of the negotiation.   
This thesis further examines the readiness context of the third party through 
several investigations, including: 
● The motivation variable: How did the HDC and CMI perceive the ripeness, cost and 
risk associated with the conflict at the early stage of the peace process?  
● The ptimism variable: Were there similarities in the perceptions held by the 
mediators (HDC and CMI), the GoI, and GAM concerning the ripeness, either in the 
CoHA or Helsinki process? Are there similarities in perceptions held by the 
mediators (HDC and CMI), the GoI, and GAM concerning the negotiation process, 
including agenda and topic?  
● The strong third-party variable: What was the role of the HDC and CMI associated 
with their mediation behavior and strategy (Kressel 1972; Touval and Zartman 
1985)? What had the HDC and CMI experienced in the past, such as the number of 
prior mediations conducted by each? What was the commitment of both parties in the 
two peace processes? How did the HDC and CMI criticize the position of the GoI 
and GAM? How did the HDC and CMI pose the problem to be solved? How did the 
HDC and CMI challenge the disputants to develop new ideas and how did the HDC 
and CMI suggest new ideas for resolving the problem? How did the HDC and CMI 
go about asking embarrassing or sensitive questions about a disputant‘s story or 
position? How did the HDC and CMI build and prioritize the agenda to be discussed? 
How did the HDC and CMI develop efforts to keep order, such as when attempting 
to tone down the parties‘ hostility and to take control of the session?  How did the 
HDC and CMI pressurize GAM to reach an agreement (e.g. mentioning the 
escalating cost of non-agreement, making threats, and the like)?         
Furthermore, the readiness theory is related to interest-based negotiation or 
problem-solving. The theory argues that the common solution will work when both 
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parties scale down their individual goals and aspirations and that it will encourage 
greater optimism for the success of the negotiation for either one or both parties. 
Optimism will also increase when the parties have trust in each other, and as a 
consquence, feel confident that they can reach a consensus and commit to it. 
This thesis has identified the variables in the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU, in 
order to identify optimism in the interest-based negotiation context, and to assess the 
GoI‘s and GAM‘s behavior during the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU peace talks. In 
particular, was there a tendency for problem-solving behavior, such as open 
communication, collaborative attempts to sharpen issues, concern for each other‘s 
interests, exchange of information, and invention and critiques of the new alternative? 
Or, was there a tendency towards contentious behavior, such as threats, heavy positional 
commitment, hostile questioning, behavior put-downs, and character assassination? 
 
3.2.3 Readiness in the Outcome of the Agreement 
One of the important notions mentioned in the readiness theory is the nature of 
agreement reached in the negotiation. The theory argues that the conflict will continue 
unless the deeper issues are resolved and both parties agree on political settlement, as a 
ceasefire will never halt military action permanently. The party that shows the greater 
readiness should make more concessions and hence be less favoured, that is to say, in 
the final agreement. The durability of the negotiated agreement is determined by 
whether the motivation and optimism continue and are maintained after the agreement is 
signed, not only by conflicting parties, but also by the third party as the guarantor (Pruitt 
2005: 13–14). 
Related to the outcome of negotiation, the research examines how the readiness 
theory works in supporting the durability of agreement by investigating: 
● The type and mechanism of agreement that has been signed: e.g. a partial or full 
agreement, and 
● The content analysis of the peace agreement that has been produced, e.g. provision of 
political settlement, and of mechanism implementation (including ceasefire and the 
DDR process). 
 Readiness is defined by the agreement and its mechanism in which the 
motivation and the optimism are sustained and maintained by both conflicting parties. 
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The level of commitment of the conflicting parties to the agreement and respect towards 
the third-party presence was also assessed. This was measured through violations of the 
agreement and implementation of provisions. 
As noted, the third party is an important element in translating the agreement 
into peace. Pruitt (1997: 89) argues that motivation and optimism are variables that 
influence the effectiveness of a third-party guarantor. At this point, the research 
examines the capability of the third party in controlling the behaviour of the parties after 
the agreement has been reached, including the number of violent incidents, number of 
compliances, and implementation of the DDR. The third party also facilitates the 
implementation of the new institutional arrangement as conflict transformation, 
including support for elections and establishment of the new law.  
Another important factor in conflict transformation according to the readiness 
theory is that peace can only be sustained when the political issue is settled. To identify 
whether political issues have been settled, this thesis examines the different kinds of 
political settlement: how the parties‘ interest was accommodated in the settlement and 
how the political settlement worked as part of conflict transformation. Specifically, the 
focus is on the mechanism in which the readiness theory functioned through multiple 
steps, thus affecting the durability of peace in Aceh by addressing the following 
questions:   
● How did motivation influence the GoI and GAM to end the conflict and encourage 
greater optimism for the success of the negotiation? 
● How did optimism create a new motive to start the pre-negotiation processes and 
send conciliatory signals to the other side? 
● How did the third party motivate the GoI and GAM to resolve the conflict by 
becoming more optimistic itself and taking the initiative to be a mediator? 
● And finally, how did the motivation and optimism translate into the agreement, and 
how were motivation and optimism maintained after the agreement was achieved? 
 
Table 3.1 Factors influencing the peace process leading to the hypotheses of this thesis 
 
Which factors made both parties 
agree to negotiate? 
Which factors prevented both 
parties from reaching a full 
Why did the CoHA fail and 
why did the Helsinki MoU 
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agreement in the CoHA and 
made both parties agree to sign 
a full settlement agreement in 
the Helsinki MoU?  
 
yield a successful outcome 
and create durable peace? 
Factors in each phase: 
Factors in the precondition phase:  
- The ripe moment and interest 
dynamics of parties including 
mutually hurting stalemate  
(ripeness), and the perception 
of a ―way out‖ 
- Existing domestic political 
setting  including trend of 
democratization and 
perception of the leaders 
- International community 
support that is influenced by 
the global trend 
Factors in the negotiation 
process phase: 
- Negotiation approaches, 
whether the parties applied 
positional negotiation or 
interest-based negotiation 
- Mediation approaches 
including the role, strategy 
and behavior of the mediator 
- Dynamic relationship 
between the parties 
 
Factors in the outcome of 
agreement phase: 
- Whether the mechanism 
within the agreement is 
well designed  
- The effective role of the 
third-party guarantee for 
post-agreement 
implementation  
- The success of the political 
process implementation: 
transition from conflict to 
peace through civil 
participation, elections, 
formulation of the 
constitution, and promotion 
of human rights.   
 
3.3 Data Collection and Personal Involvement  
This thesis was conducted by analysing the concurrent relevant literature, 
comprehensive case studies of similar conflicts, and field observations to investigate the 
impact of conflict and peace agreements in the community. The field observation also 
included the study of the impact of the Helsinki MoU on the socio-political life 
combined with some existing statistical data related to the conflict intensity before and 
after the agreement. The research materials included peace agreement documents, 
official documents, media statements, relevant books in the local and other languages 
and official reports from government or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
statistical data.  
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The data and information used in this thesis have been collected since 1999 
when the author was actively involved in the peace process in Aceh, as a peace and 
human rights activist, interlocutor for the HDC and President Ahtisaari, informal 
advisor to President Wahid, a negotiator for the Joint Committee for Consultancy 
Democracy that represented GAM, and as Head of the Interpeace/Indonesia Peace 
Institute Institut Perdamaian Indonesia, an organization that facilitated the 
communication between the representatives of the GoI and former GAM leaders after 
the end of the AMM.  
The author‘s involvement in the peace process gave advantages to understanding 
the events in detail and also the opportunity to understand the perspectives of both 
parties, including the mediators. The discussions and interviews were conducted with 
the key stakeholders involved in the peace process. These stakeholders included GAM 
combatants in Aceh during the period of 1999–2003, a GAM spokesperson at the field 
level (1999) and in Sweden (2011), and former GAM members who established the 
Markas Besar GAM (MB-GAM) or GAM Headquarters in 2010. The author also 
conducted interviews with student activists, NGO workers, and prominent leaders in 
Aceh such as ulama (religious leaders), political leaders and parliament members from 
1999 to 2005, who were involved in the peace campaigns. 
In addition, the author had an opportunity to communicate with President 
Abdurrachman Wahid, who initiated the peace process in Aceh. The author, along with 
several peace activist groups, also met with several ministers who were involved in the 
peace process, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hasan Wiradjuda (the Minister 
of Defence), Mahfudz MD (the Coordinating Minister for Law, Security and Political 
Affairs), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the former head of negotiators of Indonesia, 
Ambassador Wiryono Sastrohandoyo. These opportunities have provided the author 
with deeper insights into and a better understanding of the approaches and strategies 
used by the Indonesian elites to the settle the problem. 
During the Helsinki MoU process, the author also communicated intensively 
with Mr. Juha Christensen, who was one of the key actors in this process. From 
Christensen, the author obtained comprehensive information on the chronology of the 
negotiation and mediation process, and about the strategies developed and efforts made 
to build and maintain trust during and after the negotiation process. In addition to the 
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aforementioned people, the author also interviewed several key informants from GAM 
to find information about their internal dynamic, motivations and the goals they wanted 
to achieve in the peace process. These informants perceived the author as an Acehnese 
scholar and peace activist, and were therefore willing to be interviewed and to share 
some confidential information that sometimes differed from what was published in the 
media. 
The author‘s personal involvement in the peace process of Aceh since 1999 to 
2008 is illustrated in Table 1. All data and information were obtained through in-depth 
discussions, private meetings, interviews and direct observations.  
 
Table 3.2 List of the author‘s involvement during the peace process in Aceh 
(1999–2005). 
 
Date Organization 
of the author 
Position and 
activity of the 
author 
Resource 
person  
Position Issues discussed 
1999–
2000 
National 
Committee of 
Acehnese 
Youth and 
Students 
- Member 
- One of the 
initiators of 
the 
Referendum 
movement  
Ismail 
Syahputra 
GAM 
Spokesperson 
 
GAM 
Commander in 
North Aceh 
Historical 
background of 
GAM. 
GAM‘s 
motivation in 
negotiation, and 
GAM‘s strategy 
in winning the 
war 
 
 
 
Malik Mahmud Prime Minister 
of GAM 
GAM‘s vision 
and strategy  
 
 
 
Ambassador 
Usman Hasan 
President 
Habibie‘s 
special envoy 
to Aceh 
How to solve 
human rights 
violations in 
Aceh 
 
 
 
President 
Abdurrachman 
Wahid 
President of 
Indonesia, 
Muslim leader 
How to open the 
dialogue with 
GAM, the role of 
civil society the 
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process, and law 
enforcement 
approach for 
stability‘s sake  
 
 
 
Karya Saman GAM leader, 
Minister of 
Defence 
Armed struggle 
strategy and 
negotiation 
 
 
 
Syamsuddin 
Mahmud 
Governor of 
Aceh 
Initiative to open 
dialogue with 
GAM leader in 
Sweden  
 
 
 
Naimah Hasan Indonesian 
Negotiator, 
Women Affairs 
Activist 
Special 
Autonomy as a 
realistic solution 
for Aceh 
 
 
 
Muzakir Manaf Chief  
Commander of 
GAM 
GAM‘s military  
strategy during 
negotiation 
process   
 
 
 
Hassan 
Wiradjuda 
Foreign 
Minister; 
initiator of the 
peace process 
Negotiation 
issues 
 
 
 
Mahfudz MD Defence 
Minister 
Security issue 
1999–
2000 
The Institute 
for Peace and 
Human 
Security 
Studies 
- Director 
- Research 
Resource 
person 
Afdhal Yasin Facilitator 
between civil 
society in Aceh 
and President 
Abdurrachman 
Wahid, and 
interlocutor for 
President 
Abdurrachman 
Wahid 
The involvement 
of civil society 
in the peace 
process 
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-  
Radhi 
Dharmansyah 
SIRA activist  Referendum 
strategy 
 
 
-  
Muhammad 
Nazar 
Chairman of 
SIRA 
Referendum 
strategy 
 
 
-  
Syarifuddin 
Tippe 
Komandan 
Resimen 
Militer, or 
Military 
Regiment 
Commander 
Security 
approach and 
dialogue 
  -  
Nur Nikmat Acehnese 
Businessperson
and friend of 
Hasan Tiro  
Informal 
approach to start 
negotiation. 
1999  
Team 21 – 
Peace 
Advocate 
Member Abdurrachman 
Wahid 
President of 
Indonesia, 
Muslim leader 
Facilitating 
communication 
between the GoI 
and GAM to 
start the 
negotiation 
process 
2001–
2002 
Aceh NGO 
Coalition for 
Human Rights 
Program 
Manager 
Sofyan Ibrahim 
Tiba 
GAM 
Negotiator 
The political 
strategy of GAM 
 
 
 
T. 
Kamarazuman 
GAM 
Negotiator 
The political 
strategy and 
GAM position in 
the negotiation 
process 
 
 
 
Wiryono 
Sastrohandoyo 
GoI Negotiator Prospect of 
peace 
negotiation  
2001 
Free Aceh 
Movement/ 
GAM 
Negotiator of 
Joint 
Committee 
HDC, and 
negotiator 
member from 
Facilitators and 
Negotiators 
Negotiation 
process and 
obstacles  
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Democratic 
Consultation 
GAM and the 
GoI 
2004 
National Early 
Warning 
System 
Team Leader Juha 
Christensen 
Peace initiator  Pre-negotiation 
process and 
support of civil 
society 
 
 
 
CMI Mediator  The role of 
mediator and 
civil society 
2008 
Interpeace 
 
Head of Office 
– Aceh 
Zaini Abdullah GAM leader Reconstruction  
 
 
 
Amiruddin Brigadier 
General, Head 
of  FKK 
Communication 
and Security 
Forum 
Implementation 
of the MoU, 
elections, truth 
and 
reconciliation, 
and security 
issue 
 
 
 
Muzakir Manaf GAM 
leader/Former 
GAM 
Commander 
Implementation 
of the MoU: 
security issues, 
and elections  
 
 
 
Farid Husain Peace initiator Implementation 
of the MoU 
  
Being Acehnese himself, the author avoided the potential ethnic bias by way of 
approaching resource persons or informants with an analytical distance. All information 
is filtered with the awareness of the informants‘ interests. As a human rights activist and 
civilian, the author put more effort into understanding the perspective and approach of 
both of the military wings of the conflicting parties. Although difficult to obtain 
information or statements from these military wings during the conflict period, some 
information was collected through the media.  
Despite being an insider who had been involved in the peace processes since 
1999, the author had access to confidential interviews with many important informants, 
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but since it was only one decade after the conflict ended, the author negotiated with 
these informants and resources to publish these sensitive items of information in this 
thesis in compliance with the ethical standards of the University of Helsinki.       
 
3.4 Analysis of Data 
Qualitative research design was used in this thesis to explore the failure of the CoHA 
and the durability of the Helsinki MoU. Theories and facts were analysed by 
operationalizing the theoretical concepts into elements that can be empirically observed. 
This operationalization uses qualitative and quantitative data as the basis of the analysis. 
Based on the ripe moment theory, this thesis focuses on the perceptions of GAM and the 
GoI of the existing conditions regarding the mutually hurting stalemate and mutually 
enticing opportunity during the peace talks. To identify these conditions, the following 
data were collected: 
● Social implications during conflict: including human rights violations and economic 
growth; 
● Impasse: the number of deaths on the battlefield for both GAM and TNI/POLRI; the 
impact of conflict (military operation) on stability and peace in Aceh correlating to 
the development sector and the level of international support for GAM‘s survival. 
● The impact of the tsunami on both the GoI and GAM. 
● The large budgetary commitment by the central government to the military 
operations in Aceh versus the meagre results achieved in terms of building stability 
in Aceh. 
Positional negotiation and interest-based bargaining negotiation approaches 
were also used to analyse how the GoI and GAM negotiated their aims and how these 
were translated into the durable peace. These negotiation styles were used as the basis to 
analyse the relationship between the peace agreement and its implementation, including 
the ways in which the issues, values, perspectives of crucial points and goals from each 
party were transformed to develop mutually beneficial agreements and whether they 
contributed to establishing peace in Aceh.  
In this context, questions surrounding how the conflicting parties bargained 
during negotiations needed to be resolved. Did they create the value or claim the value? 
Did they discuss the values cooperatively or competitively? Did they demand 
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concession as a condition of the relationship or separate the people from the problem? 
Did they distrust others or did they have a realistic appraisal to attempt to develop trust? 
Did they dig into their position or focus on interest? And did they try to reach a win-win 
solution as the join-gain or win-lose (zero sum) solution? Accordingly, to understand 
the factors that contributed to the durability of peace, this thesis examines the 
mechanisms within each agreement by using data-collection techniques. These include 
using any available information to evaluate the content of the peace agreement 
documents, interviews with key informants, and observations of the agreement 
implementation.  
 
3.5 Process Tracing and Comparison Methods 
This thesis identifies different characteristics of each peace process in Aceh and 
analyses the mechanism of each process through the historical approach and process 
tracing methods. George and Bennett (2005) define process tracing as a method that 
attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal 
mechanism – between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent 
variable. The method was to specify the mechanism linking the causes and effects. 
These theories guided the process tracing through reconstructing an explicit chronology 
of the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU that constitutes the process of interest. Data on the 
process between the independent and dependent variables were collected and used to 
determine how, for example, positional bargaining led to failure, and how a ripe 
moment led to the willingness to negotiate.  
This thesis attempts to explain what had stimulated GAM and the GoI to enter 
the negotiation process. This thesis also discusses how the conditions led to a successful 
and/or an unsuccessful negotiation, including a discussion on the way the negotiation 
and the mediation style led to the implementation of a peace agreement and their effects 
on the durability of peace. A comparative method in examining the CoHA and the 
Helsinki MoU has been used in this thesis. It focuses on differences and similarities, 
such as the factors that have been translated into the durability of an agreement derived 
from both peace processes. The unit of analysis compared was the peace process from 
the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU that had been translated into failure or durability, 
including the respective techniques of mediation, content of negotiation and agreement, 
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perspective of conflicting parties, violation of agreement and conflict intensity in the 
field during the peace process.  
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE TWO PRE-
CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE PROCESSES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, to develop a systematic explanation, this thesis has 
categorized the readiness theory into three phases that reflect the process of peace, 
which is the pre-condition, the negotiation and mediation process and the outcome of 
agreement. This division into three phases facilitates the explanation of comparing the 
two peace processes in Aceh by tracking the existing factors that led to the success or 
failure of the negotiations. The author has received consent from his previous 
organization where he was employed to use the data for this thesis (with reference to 
Chapter 3, Table 3.2). 
 
4.1.1 The Roots of the Movement 
The conflict in Aceh was the longest post-colonial conflict in Indonesia. This was the 
first intrastate conflict after Indonesia proclaimed its independence, which involved the 
rebellious movement Darul Islam (DI) in 1953, a movement aimed to establish an 
Islamic State in Aceh. This resistance movement was led by Daud Beureueh, an 
Acehnese charismatic religious leader, known as ulama. The main trigger of the 
movement was the controversial policy of President Sukarno to merge Aceh into the 
province of North Sumatra. The conflict between DI and the GoI lasted for four years 
before both parties agreed to sign a peace agreement in mid-April 1957. This 
agreement, which is known as Ikrar Lamteh or the Lamteh Pledge, granted Aceh special 
status under the sovereignty of Indonesia. Specifically, it guaranteed Aceh‘s autonomy 
to handle its religious affairs, customary laws and regulations in the field of education.  
However, peace in Aceh only lasted for nineteen years. The second conflict in 
Aceh erupted in 1976, involving a movement called Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or 
the Free Aceh Movement initiated by Muhammad Hasan di Tiro. This movement 
emerged as a result of the economic disparities and a centralistic development system of 
the GoI. This cause is relevant to the internal conflict theory that states that conflict can 
arise from relative economic deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Kell, 1995). In the context of 
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Aceh, the relative economic deprivation arose from the exploration of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG).   
In 1974, Aceh became the third biggest contributor to Indonesia‘s national 
revenue. In the 1980s, Aceh contributed USD 2–3 billion annually, and by the 1990s 
Aceh contributed around 30% of export revenue through oil and gas while Indonesia 
contributed about 40% of LNG in the world (Foisy, 2001: 9). Ironically, according to 
Biro Pusat Statistik (BPS Report, 1993) or the Central Bureau of Statistics, only 10% of 
all villages in Aceh had access to electricity and only 20% of families living around the 
LNG Plant had access to clean water in 1993. Almost half of the Acehnese people lived 
in poverty. Around 40% of Acehnese were categorized as impoverished, and, from a 
total of 5,643 villages, 40.23% (2,275 villages) were categorized as underdeveloped, 
most of which (692 villages) were located in North Aceh. Aceh did not receive an equal 
share of benefits from its natural resources exploited by the GoI. Ironically, Aceh was 
the seventh poorest province out of the 27 provinces in Indonesia (BPS Report, 1995).  
The other source of grievance was that the special status awarded to Aceh as 
political compensation was never fully implemented since Suharto came into power in 
1966. In line with his approach to development and political stability, Suharto resorted 
to centralizing all local authorities and powers in his hands, standardizing the rules of all 
traditional organizations, negating all local authorities and the ―special‖ region of Aceh, 
and implementing a centralized governance system. This approach was legalized in 
Undang-undang Pokok Pemerintah di Daerah Nomor 5 Tahun 1974 (Basic Law 
concerning Local Government No. 5 of 1974). 
In his book Why Men Rebel (1970), Ted Gurr argues that when one‘s way of life 
is threatened by a new expansion, people tend to be rebellious. While he focuses more 
on the gap in economic expectation as the main factor of rebellion, in the Acehnese 
context there was another gap, namely thwarted political expectation. In this case, 
according to Bachtiar Abdullah, the GAM headquarters spokesperson and also the 
negotiator in the Helsinki MoU process, the Acehnese felt unjustly treated and felt 
frustrated with the central government. In terms of political grievance, the source of 
relative deprivation was the gap between what legally belonged to Aceh, the 
implementation of the Special Province, or Daerah Istimewa, and what President 
Suharto was willing to give in practice (interview with Bachtiar Abdullah in Stockholm, 
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November 2010). Being aware of this precarious situation, Hasan Tiro politicized the 
local discontent and transformed it into a form of Acehnese nationalism, as he wrote in 
his book The Price of Freedom (1984):  
―In a cabinet meeting today we decide that it is time to begin preparation to 
safeguard our natural resources. Which are being increasingly plundered by the 
Javanese and their foreign cohorts, especially our oil and gas. Without the 
money they are making from the illegal sale of our oil and gas, the Javanese will 
never be able to finance colonial war against us‖. (Tiro, 1984: 105) 
 
Moreover, Tiro and his followers instilled Acehnese pride through propaganda 
that Aceh politically deserved the right to self-determination and reminded the people of 
the historical fact that Aceh was actually an independent state, internationally known as 
an Islamic Sultanate, before the Dutch colonial war in 1873. As stated by Gurr in his 
book Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-political Conflicts  (1993), the risk of 
intrastate conflict is much greater for ethnic areas that have been ―independent‖ before 
the colonial period, such as Aceh.  
In GAM‘s perspective, Indonesia was not a ―genuine nation‖. They argued that a 
nation must consist of a group of people sharing a certain geographical area, a common 
language, traditions, and way of life, as well as history and aspirations, and therefore, 
this concept does not apply to Indonesia (Abdullah, 2010). Historically, before the 
Portuguese, Dutch and British landed in Nusantara (the name given to the area in 
former times), the area consisted of independent kingdoms that were established on the 
basis of a pre-existing ethnic plurality (Malays, Acehnese, Batak, Javanese, and others). 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the VOC (Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie or Dutch East Indies Company) identified the kingdoms in Nusantara and 
subordinated them under the Dutch administration by using the term ―Netherlands 
Indies‖. Subsequently, the kingdoms succumbed to the colonial government of the 
Netherlands Indies through force and violence (Riclef, 1991). 
During the independence war in 1945–1949, all national leaders, who came from 
different ethnic and ideological backgrounds, came to repel in unison their common 
enemy, the Dutch colonialists. However, GAM argued that, even after 1945, 
colonialism in fact did not end. As the Dutch colonists left, Javanese colonialism began 
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under the same administrative regions using the same government system and laws used 
during the Dutch colonial era (Declaration of Independence of Aceh). By simplifying 
the historical background, GAM asserted that Indonesia was in fact a product of Dutch 
colonization, treated as an administrative region in the Dutch colonial empire. If the 
Dutch colonialism had been wrong, the Javanese colonialism as the successor to the 
Dutch regime was also wrong, as stated in International Law Ex Injuria Jus Non Oritur 
(Tiro 1984), meaning that law does not arise from injustice. For Hasan Tiro, as he wrote 
in the Declaration of Independence of Aceh, rights for justice could not arise from the 
crime; the truth could not arise from the mistake. This perception became the basis of 
GAM‘s struggle. 
As the insurgency in Aceh escalated, from 1978 until 1979, the GoI undertook a 
military action encoded as Operasi Nenggala, or the Nenggala Operations, XXVI and 
XXVII, to limit GAM‘s manoeuvres with 125 members that were mainly concentrated 
in Pidie (Conboy, 2003: 185). As a result, Hasan Tiro and his followers left Indonesia 
and sought refuge in other countries. During the 1980s, GAM leaders actively recruited 
the new followers and sent some of them to military training in Libya. From 1985 to 
1989, many GAM combatants who were previously trained in Libya returned to Aceh. 
By way of response, in July 1990, the GoI deployed 6,000 military personnel to Aceh, 
included two battalions of Kopassus (Hamzah, 2014: 567). The military operation code-
named as Operasi Jaring Merah (Red Net Operation) I–IX was continued for nine 
years. Aceh then became a Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) or Military Operation Zone. 
The military approach to counter GAM‘s movement had resulted in gross human rights 
violations that made the conflict more difficult to resolve. 
 
4.1.2 The Reform Era and the Open Dialogue with GAM 
To protect the territorial integrity and to resolve the main problem that was created by 
Suharto‘s centralistic regime, Habibie‘s interim presidency (1998–1999) offered a 
decentralization model to rebuild a new relationship between the GoI and Aceh. Habibie 
promised to grant special status to Aceh in accordance with Act 4/1999 concerning the 
Special Status of Aceh. This law legalized Aceh as an ethnic entity with the privilege of 
managing its internal affairs, which included all sectors except foreign affairs, defence, 
monetary, fiscal, security and judicial affairs. Besides the decentralization policy, 
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Habibie showed his willingness to re-establish a good relationship between Aceh and 
the central government by making the Chief of Army, General Wiranto, apologize for 
the violations committed by the Indonesian military during DOM (7 August 1998). Two 
weeks later, the non-organic military group gradually withdrew from Aceh. During the 
DOM period, a very conservative report noted that 6,873 people had been killed 
(National Commission for Human Rights, 1988); however, other reports from the NGOs 
estimated that approximately 12,000 to 15,000 were killed in ceh between 1976 and 
1998 (Aceh‘s NGO Coalition for Human Rights Report, 1999). 
In early 1999, Habibie granted amnesty to 39 GAM political prisoners and 
promised to treat them just like brothers. In March 1999, Habibie visited Aceh and 
publicly apologized again for the human rights tragedy during DOM and promised that 
the GoI would never again use a military approach to settle the conflict in Aceh. 
Habibie‘s presidency wanted to give a signal to the public that Indonesia would start a 
new era in which human rights principles would be the basis for building a relationship 
between the government and its citizens. In his Presidential speech, on 17 August 1998, 
commemorating Indonesian Independence, Habibie declared that the government would 
protect and promote human rights in coherence with Indonesian democracy and global 
norms.   
However, Habibie was in office for only seventeen months. During this short 
period he had laid the groundwork for the transition to democracy in Indonesia. 
Abdurrahman Wahid was inaugurated as the next President of Indonesia (1999–2001). 
He was known as a democratic activist, who continued the reform agenda, such as 
passing the Human Rights agenda into the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, 
Chapter X A, Act 39/1999 concerning Human Rights, the Government Regulation No. 
1/2000 concerning the Human Rights Courts, and Act 26/2000 concerning the Human 
Rights Courts. To resolve the conflict in Aceh permanently, President Abdurrachman 
Wahid, as the new leader, brought the prospect of peace by offering two solutions: the 
establishment of autonomy for Aceh, which had been started in Habibie‘s period, and an 
open dialogue with GAM as well as with other members of Acehnese society.  
In early 2000, Wahid started the negotiation process with GAM, which was 
mediated by HDC. At the same time, with recommendation from the central parliament, 
he also offered the special autonomy option including the implementation of Islamic 
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Law for Aceh. According to the central government, allowing the implementation of 
Islamic Law for Aceh was one of the solutions that were considered effective for 
resolving the conflict in Aceh, noting that the majority of Acehnese were Muslims, in 
addition to the fact that Aceh had been fighting for an Islamic law since the 1950s. 
Through this Islamic law approach, somehow, the central government assumed that 
GAM was an Islamic movement that would defuse its tenacity and accept the offer of 
autonomy (Naga, 2000). 
President Wahid showed his political will by releasing numbers of political 
prisoners from GAM who had been punished for their subversive acts during Suharto‘s 
era. This policy was very significant and indicated that a democratization process was 
taking place in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Wahid‘s presidency did not survive long. The 
political support for him gradually decreased. His policy to reform the military and 
replace several ministers was considered too hasty, and he had disappointed certain 
political parties from Poros Tengah or the ―Central Axis‖. Some of his hasty statements 
often created controversy. Some analysts commented that Wahid‘s presidency was 
progressing in a ―chaotic way or zig-zag manner‖ and that he was trying to rush the 
reform agenda with very limited political capacity and capital to complete what was 
started. In doing so, he made many enemies within his own coalition, which 
consequently caused the decreased support for his policy (Tempo, 13 April 1999). 
In mid-2000, Wahid was involved in two financial scandals, popularly known as 
―Buloggate‖ and ―Bruneigate‖, when he was not able to account for the use of USD 2 
million he had received from Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog), or the Logistics Agency. 
This scandal spread throughout Indonesia, and resulted in parliamentary impeachment. 
He was finally removed from office on 23 July 2001. He initially garnered very strong 
support from the Islamic Parties in parliament through the Central Axis, but in the end, 
the parties withdrew their political support, and he succumbed to impeachment. The 
only party that gave him all-out support was Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, or the 
National Awakening Party), the party that was founded and chaired by him. However, 
the party could not provide much help to him, as it was a small party that only had won 
12.61% of the votes in the 1999 election, with 51 seats in the central parliament. 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, the Vice President during Wahid‘s presidency, became 
the fifth President of Indonesia (2001–2004). She continued to work on the policies left 
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by Wahid concerning Aceh and continued the negotiation with GAM that had started in 
2000 and was mediated by HDC. The GoI proposed a political solution for GAM, the 
implementation of special autonomy in Aceh through Act 18/2001. This law was the 
revision of Act 4/1999, which was considered to accommodate the Acehnese‘s 
proposal. Act 18/2001 included one of the provisions stating the change of name of 
Aceh Province to Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Aceh Peaceful State). The special 
autonomy allowed Aceh to control over 70% of its oil and gas revenue for the next eight 
years (Act 18/2001, Article 182, paragraph 4). However, the provision of wider 
autonomy garnered a minimum amount of response from the Acehnese as autonomy 
was viewed as an insubstantial step in relation to the problems in Aceh. According to 
GAM‘s spokesperson, Ismail Syahputra,  as an armed ideological force, had clearly 
stated that it would continue to choose the road to independence, and autonomy was 
only viewed as a trick that the central government employed to draw sympathy from the 
Acehnese (interview with Ismail Syahputra in North Aceh, April 1999). 
The negotiation process resulted in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement for 
Aceh (CoHA) that was signed by the GoI and GAM on 9 December 2002. 
Unfortunately, this agreement could not bring sustainable peace. In fact, only after six 
months, the peace process ended in stalemate. On 18 May 2003, the last meeting in 
Tokyo took place during which Indonesia demanded that GAM relinquish the armed 
struggle, eliminate pajak naggroe (state tax), stop extorting the people and commiting 
other criminal acts, and accept autonomy as the only solution. GAM refused to agree on 
the first day of the meeting (Abdullah, 2010). 
 
4.1.3 Military Operation and the Helsinki MoU 
A few months before martial law was established in May 2003, the Indonesian military 
had already played a more intensive role in Aceh by creating and consolidating the pro-
Indonesia militias or Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) in Central Aceh Districts. The military 
believed that GAM would never surrender. The Army Chief of Staff, General 
Ryamizard Ryacudu, said that TNI‘s duty in Aceh was to focus on destroying GAM‘s 
military force and that other issues were of no concern to the Indonesian military 
(Serambi Indonesia, 3 March 2003). On 18 May 2003, Megawati issued martial law for 
Aceh, and the GoI started its largest integrated military action since Indonesia had 
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invaded East Timor in 1974. The GoI deployed 20 of 50 military battalions to Aceh. 
Since 1977, the GoI had launched 16 military operations to destroy GAM (Hamzah, 
2014: 542). 
The GoI perceived that Aceh‘s state of danger had reached the military 
emergency level. To avoid international criticism, the GoI combined the non-military 
approach in the structure of a joint-operation that included humanitarian operations, 
refortifying the local administration, security restoration operation and law enforcement. 
The GoI argued that the military operation was not a war in the traditional sense but was 
combined with social and political approaches, as military force alone could not resolve 
the political crisis in Aceh.    
The military operation was designed as an integrated operation or Operasi 
Terpadu with the deployment of 34,154 TNI personnel and 14,500 Indonesian police 
against 5,000 GAM guerrillas with 2,000 weapons (Serambi Indonesia, 19 May 2003). 
The government designed Martial Law as a comprehensive approach that cost almost 1 
billion Euros over a period of 12 months (Parliament press statement, 20 May 2004). 
The comprehensive approach was divided into four operations: security restoration, 
humanitarian operation, law enforcement, and government stabilization (Serambi 
Indonesia, 20 May 2003). Security restoration aimed to restore security in Aceh by 
destroying GAM‘s forces and its influence in the community, both militarily and 
politically.  
The humanitarian operation focused on normalizing civilian life including health 
services, livelihood programs, civilian protection, and providing job opportunities for 
the unemployed. Law enforcement focused on the strengthening the part that targeted 
GAM members. Lastly, the government‘s stabilization focused on improving the local 
government functions at the village, district, and provincial levels. On 5 May 2004, the 
military headquarters reported that 4,750 out of 5,947 villages and 99 out of 228 
districts did not have a functioning local government (Serambi Indonesia, 28 May 
2003). Thus, the operation was expected not only to undermine GAM‘s forces but also 
to win the hearts of Acehnese people through the normalization of civilian life and 
government functions (Kompas, 20 May 2003). By way of this integrated operation, the 
government hoped that a successful military operation would be followed by a non-
military approach.  
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The military operation that was originally planned for six months (May to November 
2003), continued for another six months as the TNI argued that the GAM commander 
was still actively fighting although thousands of GAM members had been arrested or 
killed in the first six months of operation (Serambi Indonesia, 8 January 2004). The 
military operation then became less intensive after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono came to 
power on 20 October 2004 through a democratic election process. Yudhoyono, who 
became the new president by popular mandate, was expected to bring new hope to end 
the conflict in Aceh peacefully. Farhan Hamid, one of the Aceh MPs, argued, ―An 
opportunity like this cannot be obtained if the administration remains the same‖ (Detik, 
28 December 2004). 
By the end of 2004, the GoI and GAM agreed to re-open the negotiation panel 
that would be mediated by Martti Ahtisaari through CMI. After five rounds of peace 
talks, both parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki on 15 August 
2005 to end the conflict. From 2005 until 2011, this Helsinki MoU was able to bring 
forth durable peace in Aceh as evidenced by the successful Disarmament 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process, the formulation of the law on the 
Governing of Aceh, and the successful implementation of the election and political 
transition. Generally speaking, the Helsinki MoU had made Aceh a more peaceful place 
to live. 
 
4.2 Ripeness, Readiness, and Motivation 
Based on the description above, this part focuses on the empirical analysis to examine 
how the readiness theory could explain the research question dealing with which factors 
made both parties agree to negotiate in the Helsinki peace talks or in the previous 
negotiation. The structuring of the explanation and analysis is divided into two parts: 
1. The pre-condition process for the CoHA 
2. The pre-condition process for the Helsinki Peace Talks 
This thesis explains how motives and optimism were the factors that determined 
how the conflict in Aceh was carried out according to various aspects. In terms of the 
precondition aspect, perception was the key factor that motivated the GoI and GAM to 
negotiate, and this thesis finds that the perceptions were related to certain conditions, 
such as conflict dynamics, as well as the domestic and international situation. The GoI 
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and GAM had partial perceptions concerning ripeness, which caused each party to 
perceive the conditions according to different interests. Despite the fact that both parties 
were ready for negotiation, they had different motives for utilizing the peace talks, 
either for joint settlement or ‗personal‘ victory. This situation could be found during the 
first round of the peace process; even though both parties were ready to negotiate, they 
had different motives and levels of optimism. In the Helsinki MoU process, both parties 
were ready to negotiate with similar motives and optimism that were determined by 
how the party perceived the ripeness. 
However, the readiness to negotiate would not always reflect the party‘s 
perception of ripeness. Contrary to Pruitt‘s view (2005), this thesis finds that even 
though the level of readiness and ripeness in one party might be low, negotiations could 
still be held and produce a settlement despite the fact that it might not necessarily 
translate into peace. Readiness can only be measured when each party is committed to 
implement the peace agreement, as the negotiation and peace agreement might not 
always be an indicator of readiness if both parties are not committed to its 
implementation.    
The next part of this thesis explains the main factors that affected the perception 
of both parties during the CoHA and Helsinki MoU processes, which attempts to 
answer the first research question concerning the factors that made both parties agree to 
negotiate. 
 
4.2.1 The Precondition Process for the CoHA 
As previously described, the new leaders had brought the possibility of  change, 
whether for better or worse. This part of the thesis explains the conditions that brought 
the GoI and GAM together for peace talks in 2000. They were related to the change of 
presidential power from Suharto, to Habibie, to Wahid and then Megawati between 
1998 and 2004. The initiative and policy options for Aceh taken by the leaders – 
Habibie, Wahid, or Megawati – were affected by various conditions including the 
economic crisis and its impact, the 1998 reform movement calling for democratization, 
as well as the intensive expansion of public space, such as media publications, all of 
which attracted attention and support from the national and international communities 
for the case in Aceh. 
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4.2.2 The GoI: Perception of the Cost of Conflict and Future Catastrophe 
The process towards the CoHA started with President Wahid and when he came to 
power in 1999, the country had not completely resolved past problems. Wahid faced a 
multi-dimensional crisis that included an economic crisis, the demand for justice for 
human rights violations during the Suharto era and the current era, inter-communal 
conflicts in Ambon, Poso, and Kalimantan, the struggle for power among political 
elites, challenges in reforming the military‘s role in politics, the potential and actual 
separatist movements in Riau, East Kalimantan, Southern Moluccas, Aceh and West 
Papua, and the loss of East Timor – all of which could potentially result in Indonesia 
becoming the ―Asian Balkans‖.  
 
4.2.2.1 Escalating Violence and Tension 
Noting these various problems, Wahid argued in our private meetings in January 2000 
that the separatist movement in Aceh was one of the main priorities that needed to be 
urgently settled considering the humanitarian costs of the conflict. This appeared to be 
the main reason for Wahid to open a dialogue with GAM for humanitarian settlement 
(personal interview with Wahid in Jakarta, January 2000). Since the fall of Suharto, a 
violent conflict had flared up between TNI-Police and GAM, which resulted in many 
human rights violations. The extra-judicial killing practices and absence of law 
enforcement for human rights violators led to a state of anarchy. Numerous cases of 
gross human rights violations were recorded since the fall of Suharto, from May 1998 to 
the end 1999, including the KNPI tragedy, the Ida Cut massacre, the Simpang KKA 
tragedy, and the Teungku Bantaqiah-Beutong Ateuh massacre. 
According to Koalisi NGO HAM Aceh (2000), or the Coalition of NGOs for 
Human Rights in Aceh, for 18 months (May1998 – 1999) there were human rights 
violations in Aceh that could be classified as gross violations of human rights and 
crimes against humanity. From 1,523 reported cases, 365 cases consisted of 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, 293 cases of arbitrary arrest and 
detention, 111 cases of enforced or involuntary disappearance, and 754 cases of torture 
and other acts of cruelty. The Coalition of NGOs for Human Rights in Aceh noted that 
there were all sorts of human rights violations in Aceh, which had dramatically 
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increased in comparison to the nine years of the DOM implementation (Koalisi NGO 
HAM, 2000).    
 
 
Figure 4.1 Direct battle deaths in Aceh between 1990 and 2008  
(Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program 1990-Version v5/2010) 
 
Aside from the human rights violations, the number of internally displaced 
peoples (IDPs) had also dramatically increased. It was noted that 120,000 ethnic 
Javanese who were working at transmigration plantation projects had fled Aceh because 
of their fear of terror and robbery (Schulze, 2007). The Acehnese were also afraid and 
intimidated by the military patrols in the villages. There were 30,000 IDPs recorded in 
1999 (Koalisi NGO-HAM, 2000). Security personnel in Aceh also became victims of 
the violence. Between July and December 1999, 53 policemen were killed (Schulze,  
2004: 30).  
In 1999, from 16 April to 17 December, at least 829 buildings were burnt down 
including 138 schools and government offices. According to the Coalition of NGOs for 
Human Rights report, 94 buildings had been burned down. This figure continued to 
increase until 2003. The education sector clearly suffered from the worst impact. 
Between 1998 and 2002, some 60 teachers were killed and 527 schools, 89 official 
houses for teachers, and 33 houses for principals were burnt down (ICG, 2001). More 
than 27 schools were destroyed, and, later, in May 2003, over 600 schools were burnt in 
the first week of martial law. 
The conflict led to the loss of credibility of the central government in Aceh. This 
was caused by either the government‘s inability to bring forth justice for the cases of 
human rights violations, or the increasing popularity of GAM in Aceh, as GAM was 
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seen to be a saviour by the common Acehnese. GAM took advantage of the 1998 
political momentum by beginning to spread its ideology to the people, especially in the 
hinterlands, suburban areas and through the mass media in Aceh by means of dakwah or 
propaganda. Furthermore, GAM also started to create a shadow government to replace 
the government of Indonesia, which successfully worked in the village territories, 
mainly along the east coast of Aceh, such as Pidie, Bireuen, North Aceh and East Aceh. 
GAM argued that the local government structure in Aceh was associated with being part 
of Indonesia as a colonialist structure, and should thus be replaced by GAM‘s structure, 
which was adopted from the traditional Acehnese governance system. In 2001, GAM 
claimed that they had taken over 60–80% of the government roles and functions, 
including Aceh‘s legal system (ICG, 2001: 5). Until May 2003, 99 out of 228 sub-
districts and 4,650 out of 5,947 villages did not have a functioning local government 
and some 3,500 heads of villages were controlled under GAM‘s command (ICG, 2001: 
5).  
Meanwhile, the political tension in Aceh was increasing. The democratization 
process had encouraged freedom of speech, and the student movement at the national 
level had influenced the Acehnese student movements and inspired them to be the 
agents of change that focused on the issue of human rights. Most Acehnese agreed that 
the cases of human rights violation should be investigated, and they demanded the 
Indonesian government to quickly bring the perpetrators to the human rights court of 
justice and provide compensation and rehabilitation for the victims
5
. However, these 
demands were not completely met during Habibie‘s presidency. In addition to the 
political instability and potential disintegration of Indonesia, it would have been very 
risky for Habibie to drag the military to court. The Indonesian government assumed that 
only the military would be able to defend the integrity of the nation and support the 
ruling regime.  
However, due to the worsening conditions in Aceh, in January 1999, the GoI 
launched Operasi Wibawa (Dignity Operation), a security operation that combined the 
police and military power to restore the situation in Aceh. The security operation was 
later changed to Operasi Sadar Rencong (Rencong Awareness Operation) and then 
                                                 
5
 Press release Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Aceh, or Aceh – Legal Aid Foundation, in Banda Aceh, 2000.   
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changed to Operasi Cinta Meunasah (Love the Mosque Operation). These operations 
were also the responses to the strengthening of GAM since GAM had started to 
establish its military and political structure from the provincial to the village levels. 
 
4.2.2.2 The Pro-Referendum Movement  
Since the GoI responded to the human rights issues passively, the students moved 
towards a political struggle that they had learned from East Timor. Kongres Mahasiswa 
dan Pemuda Aceh Serantau, or the Acehnese Student and Youth Congress, which was 
conducted in February 1999, was initiated by several Acehnese students (including the 
author, who studied in Yogyakarta and Jakarta) and, supported by the students in Aceh, 
had recommended a referendum as the political solution for Aceh. One of the 
recommendations of this Congress was to establish SIRA, referring to Sentral Informasi 
Referendum Aceh (SIRA) (the Aceh Referendum Information Centre) as the task force 
to disseminate the idea of a referendum and seek support for the realization of the 
referendum in Aceh. According to Muhammad Nazar, the Chairman of SIRA, the 
students then actively approached other civil society groups, such as the traditional 
ulama and santri, or Islamic students (personal interviews with Radhi Dharmansyah in 
Banda Aceh, December, 1999). Subsequently, the ulama and santri were involved in the 
congress and recommended the referendum as the solution. Later on, they established 
the organization Himpunan Ulama Dayah Aceh (HUDA), or the Ulama Association, 
and Rabithah Taliban Aceh.  
The student congress in February 1999 had caused a snowball effect in the civil 
movement in Aceh in that most of them identified and consolidated themselves based 
on profession and political orientation, including women‘s groups, fishermen, peasants, 
conflict victims, and high school students. Most of the elements demanded a referendum 
which had been inspired by the East Timor case, proposed giving fair opportunity to the 
Acehnese to vote concerning whether they wanted to separate from Indonesia or accept 
the GoI‘s proposal concerning special autonomy. One of the SIRA members, Radhi 
Dharmansyah, stated that a referendum was a democratic way to solve the conflict 
peacefully rather than the military approach that would only prolong the conflict and 
create a cycle of revenge that would eventually produce new conflicts in future 
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generations (personal interview with Radhi Dharmansyah) in Banda Aceh, January 
2000).  
The referendum movement reached its phenomenal momentum on 8 November 
1999, as SIRA managed to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people in Banda Aceh in 
a big rally. This rally shocked Indonesia and the international community. President 
Wahid even stated from Phnom Penh that Aceh had the right to a referendum, such as 
East Timor, ―Kalau boleh ada referendum di Timor-Timur kenapa di Aceh tidak boleh? 
Itu tidak adil namanya.‖ [If  a referendum was allowed in East Timor, why not in Aceh? 
That wouldn‘t be fair] (Serambi Indonesia, 9 November 1999). Moreover, Wahid 
promised that a referendum would be conducted in seven months‘ time (Serambi 
Indonesia, 10 November 1999). This statement was seconded by Amien Rais, the Head 
of the People‘s Consultative Assembly or Majelis Permusyawatan Rakyat (MPR), who 
claimed that Aceh was, de facto, independent (Waspada, 30 November 1999).  
After 8 November 1999, the referendum option was more popular in Aceh than 
either independence or autonomy. In one meeting with a civil society group, Wahid 
responded to the charismatic ulama from Aceh, Teungku Ismail Bardan, known as Abu 
Panton: ―I have heard all these demands and I agree. However, the problem is how to 
convince TNI/POLRI, the legislative powers and parliament…‖ (Waspada, 1 December 
1999). This statement increased the expectations of those who had attended the meeting. 
In fact, Wahid later clarified his statement in that, as a Democrat, he could not stop the 
aspiration of the Acehnese for self-determination, but as the president, he had the 
responsibility to maintain national unity (Radio Netherlands, 20 November 1999). 
Although it was perceived publicly that the referendum movement was part of a strategy 
towards Aceh‘s independence, GAM‘s leaders, as expressed by Karya Saman, the 
Minister of Defence, initially assumed that the referendum movement had shifted public 
support to GAM‘s movement and that SIRA could be their potential political rivals in 
Aceh (interview with Karya Saman in Hatyai, South Thailand, in August 1999). 
4.2.2.3 Risk of Future Catastrophe: Economic Impact and International Pressure 
Aceh is a so-called Daerah Modal, or a capital region. This predicate was given as a 
token for Aceh‘s important role in history during the early days of independence at the 
time when Aceh was the only area not occupied by the Dutch second military 
aggression (1945–1949), which, accordingly, had made the international community 
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recognize that Indonesia still existed as an independent state. The predicate was later 
associated with Aceh as the fourth richest province in Indonesia (World Bank Report, 
2002).  Aceh is located in the Malacca Straits and is rich in natural resources, such as 
oil, gas, minerals, fishery and forestry. For many years, this province contributed 11% 
of the Indonesian national revenue (Sukma, 2004: 3). The GoI feared that further 
escalation of the conflict would lead to a decrease in oil and gas production in Aceh, 
which could further affect Indonesia‘s economic recovery process. Local media reports 
stated that GAM had sabotaged the gas and oil industry activity in North Aceh through 
the kidnapping of PT Arun executives in early 2001 and only released them after the 
payment of a USD 500,000 ransom (Serambi Indonesia, 17 January 2001). In August 
2001, GAM also kidnapped six ship crews and asked for a USD 33,000 ransom. 
Furthermore, GAM confiscated over 50 ExxonMobil operational vehicles (Serambi 
Indonesia, 20 August 2001).  
Besides economic factors, continuing the conflict in Aceh was risky because of 
the international pressure on Indonesia, which had been accused of human rights 
violations just after the announcement of the referendum results in East Timor. This 
negative image created pressure on Indonesia, especially in front of the EU, the USA 
and the UN, as Indonesia was simultaneously struggling for economic aid and financial 
support from these actors who had requested that aside from the economic preconditions 
that had to be followed by the GoI (such as financial liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation), the international regime requested the political conditionality of aid. The 
doctrine of democracy and human rights has been a key issue since the mid-1980s and 
after the Cold War, and is embedded within an evolving system of international 
humanitarian law and diplomacy. The international regime that was initiated by the 
USA and its allies proposed the agenda of democratization and respect for human rights 
as the starting point for the government to improve economic growth and political 
stability. 
International aid to Indonesia was part of the American allies‘ strategy for 
hegemony in Southeast Asia and to enable them to expand their sphere of 
influence. After the Cold War, the international constellation was dominated by 
liberalism, democracy and capitalism, and many developing countries were adjusting 
and reforming themselves to receive support from Western countries. The US and its 
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allies in theCold War had placed emphasis on democratization programmes and used 
these programmes in their foreign affairs policies. Several principles adopted in the 
American diplomacy and international aid programmes through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) include ―providing relief in 
humanitarian crisis, helping to promote development and reduce poverty in the poorest 
countries, advancing humane concerns by improving the quality of life for the neediest 
and most vulnerable abroad, and supporting the expansion of democracy and human 
rights.‖ (Lancaster, 2000)  
During the post-Suharto era, USAID provided support to the democratization 
programme whose strategy between 2000 and 2003 was to assist the GoI in rebuilding 
social, economic and political foundations to survive the multidimensional crisis. The 
aid focused on accelerating the transition to democracy, facilitating the decentralization 
process and reducing potential conflict threats. For the US government, Aceh was one 
of the key transitional issues in Indonesia.  In 2000, the US congress authorized USD 5 
million to support a peace process and the renewal and expenditure of an additional 
USD 10 million to support the CoHA (Huber, 2004: 63).  
Furthermore, the GoI clearly understood that without the support of international 
donors, Indonesia would be unable to handle the multidimensional crisis, although, in 
fact, during the presidential terms of Habibie, Wahid and Megawati, a few policies were 
appropriate and in accordance with the global agenda.  
Habibie‘s presidency produced two laws on human rights protection, namely 
Act 5/1998 concerning the ratification of the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Act 29/1999 concerning 
the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1965. Habibie also established the National Commission on Women‘s 
Rights and he took an alternative approach to give wider autonomy to East Timor in 
1998. Habibie offered a radical solution as he agreed to a referendum to be held as the 
option to reach a lasting solution, and, accordingly, the international community showed 
great appreciation for and gave positive feedback to Habibie‘s presidency. In addition, 
the IMF and World Bank gave more support to Indonesia and offered USD 43 billion to 
settle the economic crisis (Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, Indonesia, 
2004: 12). 
84 
 
  Although Wahid had taken the same approach as Habibie in promoting human 
rights and civil rights, he also initiated many reforms in reshaping the civil–military 
relationship. In a democratic country, civilians control the political arena, and Wahid 
used human rights violations in East Timor as the reason to reduce the military‘s role in 
the Indonesian political system. The United Nations Security Council resolution on 
East Timor (1999) claimed that Indonesian military and militia groups should be held 
responsible for the barbaric actions that had been systematically planned before and 
after the referendum in East Timor. Wahid subsequently dismissed General Wiranto as 
the Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs because he had been Chief 
of the Indonesian Army during the Habibie era. This decision gained support and high 
appreciation from Kofi Annan, the General Secretary of United Nations, ―the decision 
[concerning Wiranto] has proven that Indonesia had taken on the responsibility to 
ensure that those responsible for the atrocities in East Timor would be made 
accountable‖ (CNN.com, 16 February 2000). 
In many international forums, Wahid (who was also known as an activist for 
democracy) promised to promote civil rights and used the dialogue approach in settling 
separatist conflicts in Aceh and Papua. Later, the US, the European Union, Japan, and 
the World Bank, supported Wahid and Megawati in the peace process and promised to 
allocate funds for peacebuilding projects. Human Rights Watch (2003), an NGO based 
in the US that focuses on human rights advocacy, argued that the ―quartet‖ used 
maximum pressure on the GoI to protect civilians from human rights abuses. 
Nevertheless, in the context of Aceh, the GoI had to create a new Indonesian image that 
respected human rights more, as Wahid felt that it was too risky if Indonesia would once 
more be accused of human rights violations in Aceh, in view of the fact that the 
perpetrators of the atrocities during the Suharto era had not been brought to justice and 
that the East Timor tragedy was still receiving attention from the international 
community. A wrong policy for Aceh could have made the international community 
abandon Indonesia in its multidimensional crisis and could have allowed GAM to gain 
more support in the international arena. All of these conditions – human rights 
violations, distrust of the central government political instability and the spread of GAM 
ideology blended with the multidimensional crisis faced by Indonesia – could have 
dragged Aceh and Indonesia into a crisis.  
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For this reason, Wahid pushed for an alternative solution to resolve the Aceh 
conflict. At the same time, the House of Representatives, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
(DPR), established a Special Committee dealing with the Problem in Aceh or Panitia 
Khusus (Pansus) tentang Permasalahan di Aceh in a plenary meeting on 18 November 
1999, to list and analyse the problems in Aceh and provide recommendations to the 
DPR. On 16 December, the Pansus provided ten recommendations to the DPR that 
included establishing a court for the human rights violations, intensifying dialogue with 
all parties in Aceh, and the avoidance of solving the Aceh conflict through military 
means. This recommendation was a sign that the GoI was leaning towards an alternative 
solution, although the government did not specifically state any negotiation with GAM.  
This recommendation was interpreted by Wahid as a signal to start the dialogue with 
GAM as the key-securitizing actor in Aceh. 
The non-military approach taken by Wahid in 1999 was supported by the 
international community. From 1999 to 2003, USAID had already been running projects 
in Aceh to strengthen civil society, which was known as the Civil Society Strengthening 
Program (CSSP), one of whose focuses was on human rights advocacy, such as legal aid 
assistance for the conflict victims, conflict monitoring, and improving civil society 
capacity. The project was implemented in the worst conflict-affected districts in Aceh.       
 
4.2.3 GAM: Feasibility of Winning 
Contrary to the GoI‘s perception of the current conditions in Aceh and Indonesia, GAM 
realized that the weak condition of Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto was the ripe 
moment for intensifying the fight for independence. GAM felt that the GoI would go 
bankrupt and collapse just like Yugoslavia, which had been dominated by the Serbs 
since the beginning and had faced many internal conflicts between the Serbs and the 
minority ethnic groups. This condition was similar to that perceived by GAM when the 
Javanese, as the major ethnic group, dominated the country and exploited all the 
resources from the minorities.  
Moreover, the liberation of East Timor had affected GAM‘s confidence and 
most Acehnese thought that they too could achieve independence, noting the similarity 
between Aceh and East Timor (Syahputra, 1999). GAM elites were also inspired by 
international trends after the Cold War when many former Soviet Union states attained 
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independence. With human rights and democratization high on the global agenda, GAM 
perceived that they could utilize this opportunity, because, based on the universal 
human rights principles and the history of Aceh, GAM argued that Aceh had the right to 
self-determination (Daud, 2011). GAM and some Acehnese claimed that the unification 
process of Aceh into Indonesia in 1945 was illegal because it had only been decided by 
a few Indonesian and Acehnese leaders and not through consensus by all of the 
Acehnese people. Based on this reason, GAM argued that the legal status of Aceh 
should be decided by the International Court of Justice in The Hague (Abdulgani, 
2010). 
International attention increased significantly after November 1999, when SIRA 
facilitated a peaceful rally in which almost one million people participated and had 
succeeded in announcing to the world that Aceh wanted a political solution through a 
referendum. International support was the last phase for GAM to achieve independence. 
Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba (2002), one of GAM‘s negotiator members, explained that the road 
to independence could be divided into three phases: the familiarization phase from 4 
December 1976 up to 1989, the armed struggle period from1989 to 2000, and the 
diplomacy period that only started in 1999.  
To justify their goal, GAM referred to the UN Resolution on Self-
Determination, dated 12 December 1958, and the UN General Assembly‘s resolution of 
10 November 1975 concerning the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. 
GAM believed that Aceh had the right to self-determination that should be recognized 
by Indonesia and international community. Moreover, GAM claimed that Aceh‘s status 
was that of a ―successor state‖, with the Acehnese as the ―citizens‖, Hasan Tiro as the 
leader or the Wali Naggroe (State Trustee), and GAM as ―the government in exile‖. 
GAM assumed that they already had 75% of the requirements to become an 
independent state since they had citizens, territory and a form of government; the 
remaining 25% was the international recognition that must be gained through diplomacy 
(Tiba, 2003) 
The moment was ripe for GAM when the GoI sent a signal for dialogue and 
GAM elites were ready to negotiate with the GoI. However, the motivation was 
different. For GAM peace negotiation could be utilized as a means to gain support and 
recognition from the international community. The negotiation process would bring the 
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opportunity for GAM to promote their political agenda, which covered the human rights 
violations during the DOM. GAM elites believed that human rights issues could justify 
their demand and gain international support. According to Ismail Syahputra, the peace 
talks should be the way to independence (personal interview with Ismail Syahputra in 
North Aceh, April 1999). 
 
4.2.4 Precondition Process of the Helsinki MoU 
The Helsinki MoU was a result of two important factors: first, the output from a new 
leader who came to power, and second, the process of democratic consolidation in 
Indonesia that advanced the democratic institutions and procedures, which included the 
establishment of a new electoral system. Electoral reform was a precondition for 
democratic consolidation in Indonesia, and replaced the previous system in which 
parliamentary members were selected by a political party. Instead of people voting for 
parliamentary candidates, they were voting for political parties, the same is true for the 
President and Vice-president who were voted for by Members of Parliament. 
 
4.2.4.1 The New President‟s Perception of the Ripeness  
In 2004, Indonesia started its first-ever, direct election for parliamentary and 
presidential candidates. In the new electoral system, the candidates for president and 
vice president, who came from the political parties, were voted directly by the people, 
however, only political parties that had at least 15% of the popular vote in parliament 
could run for the presidential election (Law of Presidential Election, Article 5, 
Paragraph 4). Out of 150 political parties registered for the election in 2004, Golangan 
Karya (GOLKAR) won 21.58% of the votes and 128 seats in parliament (Laporan 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Election Commission report, May 2004).   
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (nicknamed SBY) became the first president 
directly elected by the people, replacing Megawati Soekarnoputri. Yudhoyono, a former 
general, came to power with 61% of the popular vote, which gave him greater 
legitimacy than any of the previous presidents in Indonesian history. Learning from 
Wahid, Yudhoyono believed that political consolidation with the parliament was 
important since parliament had strengthened after the amendment of constitution in 
1999 (Fatwa, 2012). Yudhoyono, from Partai Demokrat (the Democratic Party) that 
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only won 7.45% in parliamentary elections, wanted to form a coalition. His party 
invited GOLKAR (Group of Functionaries), Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star 
Party), Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party) 
and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party), to form one coalition called 
Koalisi Kerakyatan (Coalition of Democracy). This coalition had almost 54% of the 
Parliamentary mandates. The position of Partai Demokrat also became stronger when 
Yudhoyono‘s vice president, Jusuf Kalla, was elected the chairperson of GOLKAR 
(2004–2009), which was the biggest political party in parliament.  
During the election campaign, one of Yudhoyono‘s promises was to settle the 
internal conflict permanently within three years (Tempo.Co, 25 September 2004). 
Resolving the conflict in Aceh was also an important step in rebuilding Indonesia‘s 
reputation at the international level for which domestic stability was the key point in 
attracting foreign investment for strengthening Indonesia‘s economic growth (Bappenas 
Report, 2013). Yudhoyono had a clear picture of the conflict in Aceh since he had 
previously been involved in the peace process during Wahid‘s and Megawati‘s 
presidencies. He believed that a non-military approach was not only rational but also a 
cheaper option compared to the military operations that had cost almost IDR 1.4 trillion 
or 1 billion Euros per year since mid-2003 (Koran Tempo,10 February 2005).  
Yudhoyono‘s strategy of conflict settlement was based on alleviation of the 
grievances. He wrote in his book that separatist movements are not always based on the 
struggle for independence from the main state, but separatism sometimes emerges from 
the grievance and the discontent in the majority‘s centralistic approach towards 
minorities and how their central peripheral relationship creates disparity in justice and 
development (Yudhoyono, 2001). Although his approach was ridiculed by some of his 
military colleagues and some nationalist groups in the parliament, the president 
remained determined. Yudhoyono had supported a conciliatory, non-military approach 
ever since he was the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs during the 
Megawati presidency.  
Yudhoyono‘s approach to resolving the Aceh conflict was probably a reflection 
of his military experience and intellectual background (Ali, 2008). Yudhoyono had 
received his military training in Indonesia and the United States, where he later received 
his Master‘s degree in Business Administration from Webster University. Yudhoyono, 
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an avid reader of Eric Nordlinger‘s books and Samuel P. Hutington‘s works, is not only 
skillful in terms of military strategy but has also extensive knowledge of Economics, 
Social Sciences, art and politics. Yudhoyono apprehends the complex relationship and 
the conflicting interests of the civilians and military in economic affairs and politics 
(Ali, 2008:38).   
 
4.2.4.2 Cost of Conflict and Infeasibility of „Truly‟ Winning 
The re-evaluation of the martial law policy was based on a cost–benefit analysis in 
which Yudhoyono, as the new leader, perceived that the cost of a conflict was not only 
destroying Aceh but was also counterproductive for the development of the entire 
country (Tempo, 6 February 2005). This view arose from various facts, which included, 
first, that the conflict had resulted in more gross human rights violations instead of 
protecting civilians from the GAM insurgency. Since the implementation of the DOM 
(1990–1998), human rights organizations reported more than 12,000 cases of human 
rights violations and the fact that more than 2,000 people had been killed during the 
martial law phase (2003–2004)6. According to the official report of the Military 
Regional Commander, the number of unemployed reached up to 363,398 in November 
2003. Many companies, private businesses, plantations, agriculture sector and fishing 
activities were suspended as a result of the operation. This situation directly increased 
the poverty level in Aceh. In November 2003, approximately 1.6 million people were 
reported as being poor, or 40.1% out of 4.1 million people in Aceh. The number of poor 
households also increased to 55.53% after one year of military operations.
7
  
The conflict also impacted the education sector. Over 505 schools were burnt in 
the first month of martial law (Kontras Aceh Report, June 2003) and towards the end of 
the military operation a total of 611 schools had been burnt down, including thousands 
of books and other school supplies and facilities. The Security and Human Rights 
Bureau (2004) reported that one year after the implementation of the military operation, 
                                                 
6
Based on the reports published by Human Rights NGOs, such as KONTRAS, ELSAM, the National 
Commission for Human Rights, the Legal Aid Foundation, Aceh NGOs Coalition for Human Rights, and 
the Forum for Human Rights in Aceh. During 1999, the local media, Serambi Indonesia, published the 
human rights violations during the DOM era.  
7
 Press release Solidaritas Gerakan Rakyat untuk Aceh (Segera), or People Movement Solidarity for 
Aceh,  20 August 2003, published by Cybernews 
http://portal.cbn.net.id/cbprtl/cybernews/detail.aspx?x=General&y=cybernews|0|0|4|2352 
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54,000 children had lost their opportunity to study. Furthermore, the integrated 
operation increased corruption and other illegal business activities among the military 
and government officers. Yudhoyono felt that martial law had taken Aceh further away 
from a solution, and that the conflict kept inciting resentment and revenge among 
people who suffered (Tempo, 6 February 2005).  
Moreover, prolonging the conflict would be detrimental to economic 
development as the central government faced bigger social, economic and political 
issues. The conflict would force the GoI to allocate twice as big budget, that is to say 
one huge budget for military operations and another to pay for the costs of the conflict. 
In fact, Indonesia still found itself in the ‗economic crisis recovery‘ phase and one way 
to accelerate the economic development programme was through economic efficiency 
and political stability. Indonesian economists predicted that the ‗war‘ in Aceh would 
further increase the burden on the state budget, since the GoI needed to spend USD 
800,000 per day
8
 to support its military operation (Hamzah, 2014: 569). Even without 
this military operation, the burden on the state budget was already heavy due to the 
significant increase in the global price of oil since the end of 2003, and in 2004, the 
situation became even more critical for Indonesia since the IMF programme was 
terminated and the Paris Club was immediately closed. By way of comparison, for the 
last two decades, the GoI had spent almost USD 28 billion in handling internal conflict, 
meaning that USD 1.2 billion was to be spent annually and that hundreds of millions of 
dollars must be allocated to Aceh (IIAS, 2003: 156–157).  
Third, there was a perception that ‗truly‘ winning the conflict was infeasible and 
that the conflict was not bringing any permanent solution. President Yudhoyono and 
Vice President Kalla learned that one year after the declaration of martial law, GAM 
was seen to become less powerful compared to its condition in 1999 when they were 
able to influence and control almost 80% of the administrative areas in Aceh. The 
military operation had also isolated GAM‘s armed forces (known as the TNA, Teuntra 
National Acheh) from its logistic support and divided TNA into smaller groups. Even 
though the Indonesian military could have achieved total victory in Aceh, Yudhoyono 
argued that there was no guarantee that there would be lasting peace in Aceh if the root 
                                                 
8
 The military operation in Aceh started on 19 May 2003 and continued until 15 August 2005, amounting 
to 816 days.  
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of the problem was not solved. This perception was later conveyed by the TNI‘s Armed 
Forces Chief, Endriartono Sutarto, who considered that although the military approach 
might have been able to destroy GAM, it did not mean that the separatist idea would 
completely diminish, because the roots of the problem were about injustice – social, 
political and economic – due to the impact of the centralistic and repressive regime 
during the Suharto era (1966–1998).  
Thus, the government should take a comprehensive approach through 
negotiation to reach a permanent and fruitful solution for Aceh (Media Indonesia, 9 
June 2005). For the GoI, as stated by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, to the GAM leaders, 
even if the Indonesian army could not destroy GAM, Indonesia would still be able to 
continue the war for another 100 years. On the other hand, GAM would not be able to 
achieve victory with 5,000 combatants. If the conflict continued, the Acehnese would 
lose and would become the main victim because the war was waged in Aceh 
(Antaranews, 8 April 2007). 
All the above considerations led Yudhoyono to open new peace talks with 
GAM. In fact, the peace initiative process by Yudhoyono and Kalla had started since 
they were ministers in Megawati‘s cabinets, although this initiative only manifested 
itself when they both came into power. Both of them played a different role in operating 
their peace agenda. Yudhoyono, as the former general, controlled TNI as the key 
element in making peace, whereas Kalla as the chairman of the biggest political party in 
parliament, GOLKAR, took care of the political parties to anticipate an ‗attack‘ from 
parliament (Morfit, 2006: 130).  
Kalla then took the lead for the peace process with two agendas that would be 
implemented simultaneously. The first was to approach GAM‘s leaders, who were 
based in Aceh, in order to send a clear conciliatory signal from the GoI offering a new 
dialogue, and the second agenda item was to mobilize international actors for 
humanitarian and political support for the GoI‘s agenda (Ali, 2008). In approaching 
GAM‘s leaders, Kalla was assisted by his ‗field operator‘, Farid Husain, who was to 
play a very important role at a later stage in cultivating trust between GAM and the GoI.  
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4.2.4.3 GAM‟s Internal Dynamics: Transition of Leadership 
The author suggest that the transformation in GAM‘s leadership had an important 
influence on the peace process in Aceh. When Hasan Tiro‘s health deteriorated on 15 
May and in October 1997, the disruption in GAM slowly began. GAM elites split into 
two groups: the group of Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah, and Karya Saman, and the 
group of Daud Husin (also known as Daud Paneuk) with his son, Yusuf Daud and 
Syahbuddin Abdurrauf, and Husaini Hasan, who joined them later. Daud Paneuk was 
accused by Malik Mahmud and his followers of taking over Hasan Tiro‘s throne.  
 At the Stavanger meeting, on 21 July 2002, Malik Mahmud was appointed by 
GAM members to become the Prime Minister of GAM. Unlike Hasan Tiro, Malik 
Mahmud‘s group was more concerned about improving GAM‘s military capacity than 
strengthening their international support (interview with Syahbuddin Abdurauf, member 
of Markas Besar GAM or GAM Headquarters, in Stockholm, 2010). Malik Mahmud 
recruited more Acehnese youths to become GAM combatants to strengthen GAM‘s 
military power in Aceh. GAM‘s leaders believed that without armed forces, the GoI 
would never listen to Aceh (Syahputra, 1999). This strategy was influenced by political 
condition in Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto. Specifically, Malik Mahmud 
intended to take advantage of political instability in Indonesia.  
 The strengthening of GAM‘s military was also considered as a moral calling for 
GAM to protect the people from Indonesian soldiers who committed many human rights 
violations during the DOM era. As a result, GAM rapidly grew during 1999–2002. 
GAM‘s political structure and military commands were established from the provincial 
to the grass-roots level. Many young Acehnese who were motivated by the sentiment of 
local nationalism were recruited by GAM, and even some criminals and the former 
Pasukan Bela Negara (PBN)
9
, or State Defence Force, such as militia, young villagers 
who were trained by Kopassus during 1991–1995 in Pidie, North Aceh, and East Aceh, 
have joined GAM since 1998 (interview with Banta, in North Aceh, 2012). 
Pragmatically, GAM would accept anybody who was ready to fight for independence, 
whatever their background had been. In the Stavanger declaration of 21 July 2002, 
                                                 
9
In 1990, the Indonesian army established militia groups known as Unit Kesatria Penegak Pancasila 
(UKPP), Bela Negara, Pemuda Keamanan Desa, Laskar Rakyat, Rakyat Terlatih. In every village, the 
army recruited 20 young people to join the militia group. Together with military personnel, the militias 
became the front-liners in fighting against GAM (Hamzah, 2014: 557) 
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GAM declared that its military wing, also known as Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
(AGAM) or the Armed Independence Movement of Aceh, had become Tentara 
Nasional Aceh (TNA) or Acehnese National Armed Force. 
 Although the internal rift within GAM ousted Daud Paneuk and Yusuf Daud 
from the organization, it did not stop them from working for peace in Aceh, and, in mid-
1997, they established the Association for a Free Aceh (Föreningen för ett Fritt Atjèh) 
based in Stockholm. When Husaini Hasan, one of the senior GAM members (who had 
been inactive since the mid-1980s), returned from Malaysia to Sweden and joined Daud 
Paneuk and Yusuf Daud, he subsequently led Markas Besar GAM Europe (MB-GAM) 
or the Headquarters of GAM in Europe. MB-GAM then collaborated with Majelis 
Pemerintahan GAM (MP-GAM), which was established on 22 March 1999 and based in 
Malaysia. MP-GAM, which was managed by Teuku Don Zulfahri, proposed an internal 
reform of the GAM structure after Hasan Tiro suffered a stroke. This was done in order 
to reconcile GAM members and reunite the organization, to reform the cabinet of GAM, 
as well as to revitalize the organization because MP-GAM noted that since 1976, the 
cabinet had never been reshuffled and that most of the cabinet members were inactive – 
some had even passed away in the meantime.      
 Unlike MP-GAM, which was more focused on internal reform, MB-GAM 
actively approached international actors to mediate the conflict in Aceh after the 
downfall of Suharto. In 1999, MB-GAM visited Helsinki and through the mediation of a 
Finnish scholar named Timo Kivimäki, Husain Hasan was introduced to President 
Martti Ahtisaari to discuss the possibility of the Finnish Government mediating between 
Aceh and the GoI. Nevertheless this communication was never continued since HDC 
was also making facilitation efforts in Aceh (Huber, 2004). 
In terms of the negotiation strategy and approach, some former GAM members 
who were interviewed in Sweden (2010) believed that there were differences between 
Hasan Tiro‘s and Malik Mahmud‘s leaderships. First, Hasan Tiro preferred to negotiate 
about the legal status of Aceh with the GoI rather than about humanitarian issues, as 
mediated by HDC, or autonomy, as proposed by the GoI. Second, Hasan Tiro would 
accept a strong mediator that understood international law who could also decide on the 
legal status of Aceh rather than an NGO, such as the HDC or CMI.  Furthermore, Hasan 
Tiro did not consider his struggle for Aceh based on GAM‘s military strength in 
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fighting the Indonesian army, even though he believed that GAM‘s military existence 
was important, but he understood that with that alone, GAM could not achieve 
independence. Based on his past experience of being involved in the Darul Islam 
movement in 1950, Hasan Tiro realized it was important to gain international support 
(interview with Yusuf Daud, member of Markas Besar GAM or GAM Headquarters, in 
Stockholm, 2010). 
 
4.2.4.4 GAM‟s Perception of Ripeness: Weaknesses in International Diplomacy 
The peace talks proposed by the HDC and the GoI were perceived by GAM as an 
opportunity to consolidate GAM‘s strategy in Aceh, the GoI, and at the international 
level when the dialogue was initially perceived as an early political victory of GAM 
noting that they could sit as equals at the negotiating table with the representatives of 
the GoI. Secondly, the peace talks could be a stepping stone for internationalizing Aceh. 
Thirdly, the peace talks could be utilized for GAM‘s consolidation between Aceh and 
GAM‘s leaders overseas. Fourthly, the peace talks would justify GAM as the 
representatives of Aceh, and, last but not least, the peace talks would provide the time 
and space for GAM to strengthen its military force (Syahputra, 1999). In the World 
Acehnese meeting on 19 July 2012, Malik Mahmud explained in his paper ―Political 
prospects in Aceh and overseas‖: 
 
―... the purpose of the struggle is to liberate from Indonesia and agree to resolve 
the issue through peaceful means that have been initiated by the HDC since 
2000. If this fails, ASNLF is ready for military struggle with Indonesia ... Aceh 
will fight to preserve the dignity and territorial sovereignty of Aceh from 
Indonesia ... Actually, the battle is happening now in Aceh, which has political, 
economic, defence and security implications at the international scale, especially 
Western and American economic interests related directly to Aceh. Thus, if the 
West and the Americans want political and economic stability, particularly in 
Aceh-Sumatra, and in the ASEAN countries in general, the Aceh problem 
should be resolved. If not, all foreign interests in Aceh will be disrupted or 
destroyed, because Aceh is fighting invaders for consideration Indonesia‖ 
(Malik Mahmud, 2012: 2). 
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Nevertheless, the weak capacity in the negotiation process and international 
experience had meant that GAM could not utilize the opportunity of the peace talks. 
During the CoHA process, the HDC had planned to improve GAM‘s capacity but the 
HDC was stuck in the mediator‘s moral dilemma of impartiality, and whether or not to 
improve GAM‘s capacity to understand the negotiations (HDC Internal Review, 2003). 
In addition, Bachtiar Abdullah (2010), said that in the Helsinki peace process, when the 
key issue of negotiation was autonomy, none of the members of the GAM delegation 
fully understood the scope and substance of autonomy. Instead, their focus was on the 
term of self-government, according to one of the negotiators.  
In fact, unlike the support received by East Timor, GAM failed to gain 
significant international support until 2005; instead, the improvement of GAM‘s 
military wing since 1999 had enabled the GoI to stigmatize GAM as terrorists. The 
change in GAM‘s strategy since 1997 had focused on armed struggle rather than 
diplomacy and a political approach. Consequently, when GAM‘s military force could be 
attenuated through military operations in 2003–2004, GAM also lost the bargaining 
power in the Helsinki peace talks, while, at the same time, they were not ready to 
negotiate on the basis of autonomy as the permanent political solution for Aceh. 
 While the GoI‘s perception of ripeness considered the cost of conflict and the 
infeasibility of ‗truly‘ winning, GAM‘s motivation to end the conflict focused on the 
infeasibility of achieving independence for Aceh. This research found that the 
ineffectiveness in GAM‘s diplomacy, the impact of martial law and changes in 
international trends had affected GAM‘s perception that they were not winning the 
conflict. Since the beginning, Hasan Tiro stated that the independence struggle through 
international diplomacy was GAM‘s priority rather than military means (Kivimäki & 
Gorman, 2008). From the outset, GAM believed that independence for Aceh could only 
be achieved through international recognition on the legal status of Aceh in which Aceh, 
as the ‗successor state‘, had the right to attain self-determination through a referendum 
or plebiscite.  
 This thesis classifies GAM diplomacy into three phases between the years 1976 
and 2004. The first phase lasted from 1982 to 1989. After Hasan Tiro left Aceh, he 
approached Muslim countries and led the call for Aceh‘s independence through anti-
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neo-colonialism and anti-capitalism arguments. Looking upon the Shi‘ah Revolution in 
Iran and the oil boom in the early 1980s, Hasan Tiro felt that Muslim countries were 
becoming important international actors. He also assumed that Western countries were 
the allies of Indonesia, as they were involved in the exploration of natural resources in 
Aceh. Hasan Tiro then moved from the U.S. to Sweden, a country that had been 
applying a social democratic system, and a country that Tiro perceived as being more 
neutral since it did not hold a special interest in Indonesia (Daud, 2010). Actually, in the 
beginning, the GAM leaders had applied for asylum in France and Germany, but both 
countries refused to accept Acehnese refugees; hence they followed the Papuan 
refugees, based on suggestion from Jacob Prai (Papuan leader in Sweden), who applied 
for asylum in Sweden (Kivimäki, 2006). In the following years, Sweden became 
GAM‘s headquarters when it accepted the first wave of Acehnese asylum seekers.  
Since the early 1980s, Hasan Tiro was actively lobbying the international 
community, and also improving his collaboration with other Indonesian separatist 
leaders. These included Dr Johan Manusama, the leader of Republik Maluku Selatan 
(RMS) or Republic of the South Moluccas or South Maluku, who was based in the 
Netherlands, and with East Timorese leaders including Mari Alkatiri who was living in 
Mozambique. However, Tiro realized that lobbying and diplomacy at international level 
would not have any impact if GAM‘s struggle did not really exist in Indonesia and the 
idea of independence had not been fully transmitted to the people in Aceh (Daud, 2010).  
The opportunity to revitalize the movement came in 1985 when Hasan Tiro went 
to Tripoli, Libya, for the anniversary of the Great Al Fateh Revolution on 9 September. 
During his visit, Muammar Gadaffi (who had invited Tiro to Libya) offered GAM 
military training in Libya. This program was part of Gadaffi‘s policy to support Non 
State Armed Groups, such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the PLO 
(Conboy, 2003: 143–144). At that time, Hasan Tiro promised to send 5,000 GAM 
members to the training session. Even though Hasan Tiro was not really sure that he 
could bring 5,000 followers to Libya, he wanted to show Gadaffi that GAM had the 
potential power to fight for its liberation (Daud, 2010). However, in 1986, GAM was 
only able to recruit 42 young Acehnese for the military training and from 1988 to 1989 
GAM only brought around 800 people to Libya (Abdurauf, 2010). Hundreds of young 
Acehnese – on average under the age of 30 – were trained for seven to twelve months in 
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various camps in Libya, including the Military Academy of Tajura, Ismail Training 
College, Camp Jamahiriyah, Camp Benina – Military Airfield, Camp Aziziyah, Camp 
Maktabah, Camp Al-Adem in Tobruk, the Military Academy of Libya, and the Wadi 
Rabik Campus (Hamzah, 2014: 546).      
For Tiro, establishing GAM‘s military wing was an important strategy for 
political recognition, that would never be achieved if Aceh was seen as bangai, gasiën, 
gusuën, or ignorant, poor and cowardly (Daud, 2010). However, the military training 
was not the only purpose for Hasan Tiro, but he also believed it was important to 
familiarize the people in Aceh with the idea of independence through the young men 
who were sent to Libya. In ―The Price of Freedom; The Unfinished Diary of Teungku 
Hasan di Tiro‖, Hasan Tiro wrote, ―We never talk about the guns first, but the political 
ideas first‖ (1984: 68). For Hasan Tiro, Aceh Merdeka or Aceh‘s independence is a 
political movement (Tiro, 1984:7), but in every movement, there are three fronts that 
interrelated where GAM must take the victory: diplomacy, the battle field, and support 
from the community (Hamzah, 2014: 545–46). 
During the training, Hasan Tiro transferred the ideology of independence and 
explained the history of Aceh to his followers. He explained to the new members that 
armed forces alone could not make Aceh independent, but that international diplomacy, 
with support from the people in Aceh would make independence possible. For this 
reason, Hasan Tiro ordered the trained young people to return to Aceh not to declare 
war, but to pass on the ‗ideologi Acheh meurdeka‘ or independence-based ideology to 
the people (Abdurauf, 2010). In fact, the return of trained young personnel from Libya 
to Aceh escalated the conflict, and in 1989, freshly trained GAM combatants once again 
started an offensive action by attacking the military and police posts in Pidie, North 
Aceh and East Aceh. Hasan Tiro regretted this action, as he said, ―Ka dipuebuet pue 
yang hana lon youe‖ or ―they did what I have never ordered‖ (Hamzah 2014: 552). 
The second period of diplomacy was from 1991 to 1997. If, in the first period, 
Hasan Tiro had been actively approaching Islamic countries, in the second period, on 6 
August 1991, upon his return from Tripoli, he registered GAM on behalf of the Aceh 
Sumatera Liberation Front (ASNLF) to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO) based in The Hague. Aside from actively making contact with 
foreign embassies in Stockholm, from 1991 to 1997, through NGO channels accredited 
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by the Human Rights Council in Geneva (such as Liberty, which is based in London), 
Hasan Tiro argued for the legitimacy and legal status of Aceh as a nation state. On 23 
August 1991, Hasan Tiro presented the case of Aceh at UN Social and Economic 
Assembly and one year later, 29 January 1992, Hasan Tiro asked the UN to conduct a 
referendum in Aceh with two options, namely becoming independent or being 
integrated with Indonesia (Hamzah, 2014: 423). As an Islamic scholar, Hasan Tiro 
sometimes presented himself at various Islamic conferences and he used these forums to 
transmit his idea concerning Islamic values and the liberation movement (Abdullah, 
2010).   
During 1997–2004, Tiro was no longer active in diplomacy because of his 
deteriorated health due to strokes, and this condition had decreased GAM‘s participation 
in international forums, where GAM hitherto had been represented by Hasan Tiro and 
Yusuf Daud. On the other hand, both Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah were less 
involved and lacked diplomatic experience. According to some internal sources within 
GAM, Zaini Abdullah was less interested in diplomatic activities from the start, and as 
for Malik Mahmud, he could not be fully involved in diplomacy since he was based in 
Singapore while Hasan Tiro lobbied in Europe (Daud, 2010). However, the new 
Acehnese refugees, who left for Malaysia in the early 1990s, were actively pursuing 
diplomacy and advocacy by approaching UN agencies and other human rights NGOs to 
monitor the situation in Aceh. Besides actively assisting refugees from Aceh in 
Malaysia, GAM leaders disseminated their propaganda through various publications, 
such as Suara Aceh Merdeka, in which most of the publication was addressed to the 
Acehnese community to evoke Acehnese nationalism and anti-Indonesian sentiments. 
After Suharto‘s regime collapsed, the demands for independence and a 
referendum increased in Aceh. One of GAM‘s strategies to revive the combatants‘ spirit 
and to raise collective support from the Acehnese was through propaganda that Aceh‘s 
independence was just ―sibak rukok teuk‖, or ―just a cigarette away‖, an expression to 
show how independence would come shortly. Unlike the previous period when 
diplomacy was mostly conducted through international forums, the diplomacy under 
Malik Mahmud‘s reign utilized mass media that focused on human rights violation in 
Indonesia. In addition to this, GAM‘s representation in Denmark, Norway, the USA, the 
Netherlands and Malaysia also carried out an intensive campaign.  The key issues used 
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by GAM to justify their diplomacy or propaganda were human rights violations and the 
right to self-determination. Since 1998, GAM‘s diplomacy mostly worked parallel with 
the advocacy activities of civil society groups and NGOs based in Aceh and Jakarta. 
These NGOs and civil society groups were greatly supported by international NGOs 
focus on human rights including the Human Rights Watch, Forum Asia, SUARAM, 
Amnesty International, TAPOL, and the International Forum for Aceh (IFA). On 17 
August 2003, GAM succeeded in opening an embassy in the Republic of Vanuatu, and 
Nurdin AR was assigned by Malik Mahmud as the first GAM ambassador (Hamzah, 
2014: 575)   
 
4.3 Infeasibility of Victory 
When martial law was declared in 2003, the GAM combatants were, according to 
themselves, feeling distraught about the infeasibility of achieving independence because 
their military capacity had been weakened (interview with Saiful, former GAM 
combatant in Southern Aceh, 2007). In addition, there were not only countries that 
supported the Aceh independence movement, but many countries understood 
Megawati‘s decision for martial law to protect the Indonesian state from insurgency. As 
explained in the readiness theory, GAM‘s leaders seemed to believe that the conflict 
was dysfunctional and perceived that they could not reach victory using the current 
strategies. As the failure of the current strategies became clearer, the motivation for 
GAM to end the conflict and enter the peace talks became stronger.  
 After six months of martial law, the Indonesian military claimed to have 
successfully reduced GAM‘s military force and reported that 1,100 GAM members had 
been killed between May and October 2003, and 485 weapons had been confiscated 
(Serambi Indonesia, 27 October 2003). Furthermore, TNI headquarters claimed that 
thousands of GAM members had been arrested or had surrendered, even though human 
rights observers reported that most of the supposedly killed GAM members were young 
civilian men who lived in the villages (Human Rights Watch, 2003). At the end of a 
military emergency period, the TNI Commander in Chief, General Endriartono Sutarto, 
claimed that out of 8,000 GAM members, 1,963 were killed, 2,100 were captured and 
1,275 surrendered (Serambi Indonesia, 5 May 2004). The posse approach from the 
military and police had isolated GAM guerrillas from access to ammunition, food, and 
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medicine. Nevertheless, the military operation did destroy GAM‘s middle rank structure 
and GAM became divided into smaller groups. In addition, the author also received a 
testimony from a former combatant that if the Helsinki peace talks failed, most of the 
guerrillas would leave the battlefield and would surrender or cross the border to 
Malaysia (Saiful, 2010). 
 The international trend after the 9/11 was the global war against terrorism. 
Terrorism received more attention than human rights-related issues. Thus, although the 
military operation was reported to have caused human rights violations, Megawati was 
confident to gain support and justification for her military solution in response to the 
conflict in Aceh. Moreover, to justify the military approach and to gain international 
support, the GoI labelled GAM a terrorist group. Although this label was used by 
Indonesian officials during Megawati‘s visit to the USA just after the 9/11 tragedy, the 
US government refused to label GAM as a terrorist movement (Sidney Jones in the 
interview with Reuters, 7 July 2002).   
 The first statement labelling GAM as a terrorist organisation was actually made 
by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who was at the time the Coordinating Minister for 
Security and Political Affairs in Megawati‘s cabinet. He stated that GAM‘s acts were 
acts of terrorism and that the Indonesian security forces had been instructed to be pro-
active in preventing and stopping them. For the GoI, as stated by Minister Yudhoyono 
(Serambi Indonesia, 5 July 2002), the question was ―Do the US, and the West, talk with 
terrorists?‖ Therefore, labelling GAM as a terrorist organization was considered by 
Sidney Jones (a terrorism analyst from the International Crisis Group) to be an indicator 
of the government‘s military plan for military operations, since the GoI had become 
frustrated with the slow progress of the peace talks with GAM.  
 By labelling GAM as terrorists, the GoI tried to relate its policy to the global war 
against terrorism (Reuters, 7 July 2002).  The stigmatization of GAM‘s actions by the 
GoI strongly impacted GAM elites after Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah were 
arrested for a few days in Stockholm, in 15–17 June 2004, and charged with ―violations 
of international law‖ (Tempo.Co, 16 June 2004).  However, on 19 June 2004, the local 
court in Stockholm rejected a request to detain them (ScandAsia, 19 June 2004).  
 After the key leaders were arrested, GAM slowly changed its military and 
political tactics (Kivimäki, 2004). First, GAM became more selective in targeting their 
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military attacks and minimized the impact on civilians. Second, although it was still not 
a collective decision, several GAM elites started to re-evaluate their struggle for 
independence and prepare for alternative solutions (Abdullah, 2010). Nevertheless, 
GAM elites realized that they could not make any sudden dramatic decision in changing 
their political goal from independence into other options without any internal turbulence 
or loss of their pragmatic bargaining position in front of Indonesia. Although GAM was 
politically and militarily weak, the leaders would not surrender easily without any 
bargaining with the Indonesian government (Abdullah, 2010). Later in 2004, after the 
election changed the domestic political setting, Yudhoyono, as the new leader, sent out 
the signal for dialogue, which GAM leaders perceived as a way out from a war they 
could not win. The strong reconciliation signal from the new leaders and a series of 
secret informal meetings between GAM and Farid Husain had shed some positive light 
on the hope that a negotiated solution was possible with the GoI (Husain, 2007).       
 The author finds that the GoI and GAM had different motivations to start the 
Helsinki talks: the GoI considered the cost of conflict and the risk of continuing the 
conflict, while GAM‘s pragmatic motivation considered the view that winning was 
becoming infeasible and that the GAM forces had been weakened during the martial 
law era. Notwithstanding the various motivations to end the conflict, both parties were 
ready for negotiation. Two days prior to the tsunami on 24 December 2004, there was a 
conditional agreement between the GoI and GAM in which both parties agreed to 
accept a preliminary invitation from the mediator, Martti Ahtisaari, to participate in an 
informal meeting on 8 January 2005 (The Jakarta Post, 28 August 2009). However, the 
meeting was postponed until 27 January 2005 because in the meantime, a tsunami had 
devastated Aceh. Soon after, this tsunami provided moral pressure on both parties to 
negotiate and implement the agreement.  
 
Table 4.1 Factors that made the GoI and GAM agree to negotiate 
 
 The CoHA Helsinki Process 
GoI 
The perception of the cost of conflict 
when human rights violations increased, 
political instability and the strengthening 
The perception of the cost of conflict in 
various aspects: humanitarian crisis, high 
cost of military operation, and national 
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of GAM, while, at the same time, the GoI 
was facing a multi-dimensional crisis.  
 
The perceived risk of continuing the 
conflict that could create more domestic 
crisis, such as IDPs, human rights 
violations, armed violence, and 
international pressure after the East Timor 
tragedy.  
instability.  
 
The perception that continuing the 
conflict was harmful for Indonesia‘s 
economic development as it required 
stability. 
 
The perception that the conflict would not 
bring any permanent solution or that a 
genuine victory was infeasible.  
GAM 
Feasibility of winning and motivation for 
peace talks as a medium to achieve the 
goal. 
The perception of infeasibility in 
achieving independence. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The author suggests that the peace processes during the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU 
accord were both driven by new Indonesian leaders. Yudhoyono and Wahid had similar 
perceptions regarding the approach to end the long dispute in Aceh. They believed that 
military means would never solve the problem and it that there was a high socio-
political price to pay. In addition to that, human rights violation was one of the 
government‘s main concerns, especially after the referendum crisis in East Timor in 
1998 where the GoI had been labelled a human rights violator. This label had made 
Indonesia‘s position difficult in international circles, and this position had affected the 
foreign aid intended for Indonesia. For example, at the time when Indonesia faced an 
economic crisis in 1998 when the currency rate of the rupiah plunged to IDR 12,000 per 
USD 1 (where previously it had only amounted to IDR 2,000 per USD 1) as a condition 
of the foreign loans, the government was requested to commit to the protection of 
human rights.  
After the Suharto era, one of the important agenda items for the subsequent 
presidents was to improve the image of Indonesia among the international community, 
and one of the approaches was to settle the domestic problems through democratic 
means and to respect the principles of human rights as per the global norm. In addition, 
Wahid and Yudhoyono believed that settling the conflict in a more democratic manner 
was not only good for Indonesia‘s image but also cheaper than any military operation. 
103 
 
The high cost of the military operation also became the reason for Habibie to re-
evaluate the GoI‘s policy in East Timor.  
 Nevertheless, GAM found that the multi-dimensional crisis faced by the 
Indonesian government was the ripe moment to strengthen their struggle for 
independence: fight hard while the ‗enemy‘ is weak.  For GAM, independence was ‗just 
a cigarette away‘, or sibak rukok teuk. This reveals how confident GAM was about 
Aceh‘s independence. Most people in Aceh believed this massive propaganda where 
GAM claimed that their struggle for independence was supported by many countries. 
The perception that Indonesia would fall apart and that Aceh‘s struggle could gain 
international political support like East Timor (or former Soviet republics) made GAM 
elites argue that the peace talks were a medium for propaganda to invite more 
international intervention in Aceh. From the analysis of the precondition for the 
Helsinki MoU and the CoHA process, it can be concluded that during the precondition 
for the Helsinki MoU process, the conflicting parties were more ready for the 
negotiation and had the same motivation to end the conflict than during the CoHA. 
 This section concludes that in the CoHA context, GAM‘s readiness for 
negotiation could not be explained by the readiness theory alone when the perception of 
ripeness was seen as the ripe moment for struggling for GAM‘s goal rather than for a 
mutual solution. Rather, it was a motivation for ‗victory‘ instead of ending the conflict. 
As Pruitt (2005: 7) states, ―negotiation will only start if there is some degree of 
readiness from both sides, and, hence, some degree of ripeness. The greater the 
readiness and ripeness, the more likely it is for a negotiation to occur.‖ GAM‘s 
motivation in the CoHA was an anomaly since the perception of ripeness did not come 
from the three aspects of conditions as mentioned by Pruitt (2005), which include the 
perception of conflict not being won, the perceived cost of conflict, and the perceived 
cost of continuing the conflict.  
 GAM‘s position changed dramatically in the Helsinki peace process when the 
leaders felt that they could not gain independence through international support. The 
impossibility of winning the war had led GAM to submit to the Helsinki peace talks. 
While GAM had different motives for entering the peace process in the CoHA and 
Helsinki MoU, the GoI had similar motives in both cases, in consideration of the cost of 
the conflict and its impact at the national and international level.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION DURING THE CoHA  
AND HELSINKI PROCESSES 
 
5.1 Introduction: Optimism for the Success of the Negotiations 
The readiness theory states that the main reason for a party to enter negotiation is when 
they are optimistic that they can reach a mutually acceptable agreement with the 
opponent. In addition, this sense is not only important when they enter the negotiations 
but it is also necessary during the negotiation process, otherwise the process is destined 
to fail.   
This chapter further presents the answer to the second research question 
concerning the factors that prevented both parties from reaching a full agreement in the 
CoHA and the cause that led the conflicting parties to agree to sign a full settlement in 
the Helsinki MoU. The analysis focuses on the negotiation and the mediation context 
during the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU, and includes the pre-negotiation phase in both 
peace processes.   
5.2 The First Negotiation Process: Geneva Peace Talks   
The first negotiation started with the Bavois agreement on 27 January 2000 and ended 
with the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 9 December 2002. Between 
2000 and 2002, various arrangements to stop the violence and conflict were agreed 
between the GoI and GAM leaders: a Humanitarian Pause (12 May 2000), a 
Commander-to-Commander Agreement (10 February to 18 March 2000), and Agreeing 
to the Autonomy Law as starting points for discussions (10 May 2002). All the 
negotiation processes indicated the development of negotiation topics, which were 
initiated, ranging from humanitarian concern and security arrangements to political 
dialogue.  
Accordingly, this thesis mainly focuses on the CoHA as the last part of the first 
peace process. The main objective of the CoHA was to create an atmosphere that was 
conducive to the peace process. As the conflict management approached, the CoHA was 
not a final agreement that mentioned specifically and clearly the permanent solution, but 
a beginning of the process towards a full political settlement that started from an ―all-
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inclusive dialogue‖. Accordingly, the next section explains the dynamics of the CoHA 
process and this analysis is divided into two main parts, the first of which focuses on the 
pre-negotiation process, while the second focuses on the negotiation and mediation 
processes (HDC – Aceh Review 2003). 
 
5.3 The Pre-Negotiation Process: A Winding Road towards the CoHA  
The initiative for dialogue with GAM was a response from the dynamic situation in 
Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto (Syahputra, 2000). The early initiative came 
from Syamsuddin Mahmud, the Governor of Aceh in 1993–2000, with permission from 
President Habibie. In mid-1999, the Governor sponsored three student activists 
(including the author) to open channels of communication with GAM leaders in 
Malaysia, Thailand and Sweden. This mission was then followed by five Acehnese 
leaders who had emotional ties or relations with Hasan Tiro to visit GAM‘s 
headquarters in Stockholm (Serambi Indonesia, 3 July 1999). The purposes of these 
visits were to probe possible dialogue between the people in Aceh and GAM‘s leaders 
to find common solutions for Aceh. Unfortunately, only three student activists 
succeeded in communicating with GAM leaders, and to make matters worse, the GAM 
leaders in Sweden refused to meet with five Acehnese leaders.  
A further serious step in the negotiation process was taken by Abdurrahman 
Wahid after he was elected as President of the Republic of Indonesia on 20 October 
1999. Wahid became the first president of Indonesia since Sukarno who initiated an 
open dialogue with the insurgency group, and in doing so, he became the leader who 
built the foundation for peace in Aceh. Since Wahid understood that he did not have any 
direct links to contact the GAM leaders, he utilized his party, Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, (PKB, or Nation Awakening Party) to approach ulamas (or Muslim scholars) 
and student activists in Aceh (interview with Afdhal Yasin, an informant of President 
Wahid‘s in Banda Aceh, 2000). Wahid, who was the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia established by his own grandfather, 
realized that ulamas were the important element in Aceh society. They had been playing 
a significant role for hundreds of years in social politics, such as becoming advisors or 
judges in the Sultanate system. The ulamas were also front-liners during the colonial 
war and their role continued after independence in 1945 when they enjoyed political 
106 
 
hegemony until 1959. Later on, the role of ulamas was gradually taken over by 
technocrats and academics (Kell, 1995). 
Besides the ulamas, Wahid also approached student activists in Aceh. After the 
referendum movement in November 1999, these played an important role in Aceh and 
led the public protest against the GoI. This group consisted of key players with 
connections among the conflicting parties in Aceh, including GAM, ulamas, conflict 
victims, the government, the business sector, journalists, international NGOs, and other 
international representatives. Wahid believed that the ulamas and student activists could 
be the counterbalance to GAM in Aceh (personal interview with Wahid, in Jakarta, 
1999).  
If Jusuf Kalla had Farid Husain as the operator, connector or communicator on 
the ground, Wahid had Afdhal Yasin who played the same role as Husain to transmit the 
reconciliatory signals from the GoI to GAM and the people in Aceh. In March 1999, 
through facilitation by the activists, the ad interim of the State Secretary, Bondan 
Gunawan, visited GAM‘s military commander Teungku Abdullah Syafi‘ie, and 
conveyed the message from Wahid that the GoI was ready to open the dialogue with 
GAM. The initiative for dialogue also received support from civil elements who 
established a task force called Tim-21, or ―Team of 21‖ to support the implementation 
of the peace talks. The team, which represented various groups, actively approached 
Wahid, military commanders and GAM leaders to take immediate action for peace 
talks. Wahid finally assigned Ambassador Hasan Wiradjuda, the head of Indonesia‘s 
permanent representative at the UN-Geneva, to start communications with Hasan Tiro 
in Stockholm (Abdullah, 2010).  
 
5.3.1 Preliminary Meeting: Precondition for Formal Negotiation 
The preliminary meeting between Hasan Tiro and Hasan Wiradjuda was conducted in 
Geneva on 27 January 2000 and facilitated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a non-
government organization (NGO) based in Geneva. The meeting focused on the possible 
peace talks between the GoI and GAM. Further meetings continued for less than six 
months, and, finally, both parties agreed to start the humanitarian dialogue. During the 
short preliminary process, both parties discussed and agreed on several issues. The first 
was to control their military and stop violence to give space to humanitarian actions in 
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Aceh. Second, for security reasons involving GAM, the peace talk process would be 
conducted in Geneva with the HDC as the mediator, in which at first GAM insisted that 
the UN or state actors should take on this role (Abdullah, 2010). Third, both parties 
introduced the head of the negotiating teams, Hasan Wiradjuda as the head of 
Indonesia‘s negotiators and Zaini Abdullah as the head of GAM‘s negotiators.  
In fact, due to the lack of knowledge concerning GAM‘s internal dynamics, 
Wahid and the HDC had already approached Husaini Hasan (MB-GAM), who was 
excluded from GAM, before they met Hasan Tiro. Wahid‘s delegation, through Romo 
Nitiyudo Wachyo met MB-GAM and offered a special region for Aceh such as 
Kelantan in Malaysia, but Husaini Hasan (2013) proposed Aceh as an independent 
Islamic State. President Abdurrachman Wahid responded to this proposal by 
implementing Islamic Law or Shariah Islam in Aceh under the special autonomy 
scheme.  
The HDC then replaced Wahid‘s initiative, and continued to communicate with 
MB-GAM. In January 2000 when Martin Griffith, the Director of the HDC, visited MB-
GAM twice in Stockholm; according to MB-GAM‘s spokesperson Syahbuddin 
Abdurrauf (2010) the HDC invited MB-GAM to discuss the peace plan in Aceh. MB-
GAM responded positively and supported this plan. During the meeting with the HDC, 
Husaini Hasan also suggested that the latter should involve Malik Mahmud and Zaini 
Abdullah in the negotiation process, beside the elements from civil society, such as 
Teungku Ibrahim Panton (Ulama/religious leader), Muhammad Nazar (SIRA), Otto 
Syamsuddin (NGO), Dr. Harun Ali (intellectual and academician), and Ghazali Abbas 
who represented politicians/leaders (Hasan, 2014). 
However, MB-GAM‘s position was slightly different from GAM, which could 
not decide directly whether or not to negotiate with the GoI before consulting with their 
members and commanders in the field.  Nevertheless, both groups (GAM and MB-
GAM) came to Geneva in February 2000, and the HDC conducted separate meetings 
with them. In general, both agreed to negotiate with the GoI but with different 
requirements. MB-GAM proposed to have Acehnese representatives involved in the 
peace negotiation including religious leaders, civil society groups, and activists (Daud, 
2011). This was different from GAM, which considered itself as the representative of 
the people in Aceh and felt that the involvement of other parties ought to be 
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recommended by the negotiators‘ teams, the GoI and GAM. In addition, GAM 
requested that HDC no longer engage MB-GAM in the negotiation process since they 
claimed that the Malik Mahmud group was the only legitimate GAM organization 
representing Aceh, which had been mandated by Hasan Tiro and was followed by all 
the commanders in Aceh (Abdullah, 2010). 
Most of the preliminary negotiations from February until May 2000 were 
conducted confidentially and the HDC used shuttle mediation between Aceh, Jakarta, 
Stockholm and Geneva. The HDC also conducted field assessments, met stakeholders in 
Aceh and Jakarta, identified the interests of the GoI and GAM, and sought advice from 
experts. All of this input and information was drafted by the HDC as the initial 
agreement that focused on humanitarian actions as the precondition for formal 
negotiation: ―… to provide for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population 
of Aceh, security modalities for this aid, a reduction in the levels of violence and 
tension and the promotion of confidence-building measures‖ (http://www.hdcentre.org). 
In their design, the humanitarian agreement was an approach to assist both parties 
before they started formal dialogues. Nevertheless, GAM perceived the preliminary 
process as meaning that the GoI had recognized GAM as the representative of Aceh. 
With this recognition, the GoI only had two options: either a military approach until 
GAM surrendered, or the GoI and GAM would agree to enter into political dialogue to 
negotiate a permanent solution for Aceh, be it ―autonomy‖ or ―independence‖ (Tiba 
2003).    
 
5.3.2 The Dynamic Options for Solution  
Since 1999, in line with the decentralization programme, the GoI had offered special 
autonomy and Islamic law, or shariah Islam, as the solution for Aceh. The GoI was 
optimistic that Aceh would accept this offer, especially since the majority of the 
Acehnese were Muslims. Historically, Islamic law was also the key issue for the 
insurgency movement in the 1950s. However, GAM and some civil society groups 
rejected these proposals and argued that autonomy was not the answer for the problems 
in Aceh due to the fact that the Acehnese conflict was not simply an economic issue, but 
a problem of human rights violations, ethnic identity and the right to return to its former 
sovereignty (Syahputra, 2000). In relation to the implementation of Islamic law, GAM 
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argued that was not the issue of the current conflict in Aceh. According to GAM‘s 
perspective (Syahputra, 2000), the shariah issue was part of an intelligence scenario to 
perceive Acehnese as fundamentalists or radicals, and, at the same time, to undermine 
Western support for Aceh.  
GAM‘s rejection of the special autonomy that included Islamic law was also 
related to historical reasons. First, GAM and most of the Acehnese had been 
disappointed with the GoI since 1959 when the Special Region, or Daerah Istimewa, 
was granted to Aceh for more sovereignty in managing educational, religious, cultural 
and customary affairs, but this was never implemented. Second, the people in Aceh 
were deprived, as all the natural resources were exploited and taken to Jakarta. Thus, the 
GoI was perceived by the Acehnese as the new colonial regime that had simply 
continued the Dutch colonial administration. Consequently, GAM learned from the past 
and assumed that the special autonomy and Islamic law were merely a political trick, 
and that the GoI never intended to implement these, and, as such, the offer was simply 
to calm Aceh down and not to solve any problems (Syahputra, 1999).   
Even though GAM refused the special autonomy and Islamic law, the GoI was 
still motivated to engage in communications with moderate groups in Aceh, such as 
intellectuals, ulama organizations, some women‘s organizations as well as politicians in 
the local parliament. During the communication process, the more moderate groups, 
such as Balai Sura Ureung Inong Aceh or Aceh Women‘s Council believed that special 
autonomy was a realistic solution to resolve the conflict in Aceh (personal interview 
with Naimah Hasan, woman activist, in Banda Aceh, April 2000). Although there were 
more societal groups that supported the autonomy option, most of them were based in 
Banda Aceh and they did not dare to show their political stand too openly because they 
did not want to be considered by GAM or other hardliner groups as the GoI‘s agents.  
 
5.4 Negotiation and Mediation Process   
5.4.1 Process Leading to the CoHA 
On 12 May 2000, the GoI and GAM signed the first historical agreement, a Joint 
Understanding of Humanitarian Pause for Aceh. The Humanitarian Pause focused on 
three agendas: delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Aceh, provision 
of security modalities for humanitarian assistance and reduction of violence and tension, 
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and promotion of confidence-building measures towards a peaceful solution to the 
conflict in Aceh. The agreement effectively started on 2 June 2000. To evaluate, 
monitor, and review the implementation of the agreement, the GoI and GAM 
established a Joint Forum. In relation to the implementation of the agreement, two 
committees were involved, namely a Joint Committee for Security Modalities (JCSM) 
and a Joint Committee for Humanitarian Action (JCHA). The GoI and GAM together 
selected the members for these committees.  
To monitor compliance and any violation of the agreement, the HDC invited 
independent monitoring teams (Humanitarian and Security) from international 
backgrounds, such as the Philippines, Germany and other countries. In early September 
2000, Hasan Wiradjuda proposed to the HDC that they commence political dialogue 
and invited GAM to prepare for a political proposal for Aceh. The GoI threatened to 
withdraw from the negotiating table if GAM was not willing to start a political dialogue 
for a permanent solution for Aceh (Waspada, 5 September 2000).  
GAM then made a positive response to the GoI‘s proposal and both parties 
entered into a political dialogue in January 2001, after they closed the second phase of 
the Humanitarian Pause. To start the political dialogue on 6–9 January 2001 in Geneva, 
the HDC facilitated a problem-solving workshop in which the agenda included causes 
of conflict, and assessment of practical actions and possible solutions, which included 
democratic process, human rights, security, and economic and social transformation 
(HDC Internal Review, 2003). After four days of the problem-solving workshop that 
was assisted by William Ury, both parties agreed to move towards a security 
arrangement and political dialogue under the provisional understanding. Several steps 
followed this provisional understanding, publicly known as the moratorium phase, 
which included several actions: security arrangements to allow for a moratorium on 
violence, meetings among field commanders, and the creation of a framework for a 
process of democratic consultations with participation by the Acehnese. To support 
implementation of this agreement, the HDC facilitated a Joint Council that was 
responsible for reviewing the progress of implementation, for addressing the issues 
through the democratic consultation process and for ensuring adherence to the 
agreement. 
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Based on the HDC report (Internal Review 2003), in the following months, both 
parties continued the implementation of the agreement, which included Joint Council 
meetings and field commander meetings. In February 2001, the HDC released a joint 
statement, which initiated a road map for the peace process ahead: ―to use the NAD law 
as a starting point for (political) discussion‖ and ―to have a period of confidence-
building in which they would cease hostilities and then move towards democratic 
elections in Aceh 2004‖. GAM proposed a ceasefire as the first step towards political 
solution with the presence of international observers in Aceh. Between July and mid-
August 2001 was the critical time for the peace process when both parties were facing a 
deadline in proceeding with the democratic consultation process as the starting point for 
a permanent political solution.  
The second Joint Council meeting was conducted from 30 June to 1 July 2001 in 
response to the increased violence and the political crisis in the GoI during the process 
of Wahid‘s impeachment. The HDC noted that both parties reaffirmed their 
commitment to continue the peace process on security arrangements, but that the 
Indonesian delegation required two matters: first, to involve GAM‘s Army Chief, 
Teungku Abdullah Syafi‘e, and second, GAM should promise and provide a security 
guarantee for the ExxonMobil operation that had been stopped in the last few months 
due to threats from GAM. GAM refused to accept these conditions and argued that they 
did not want to take the risk of presenting Teungku Abdullah Syafi‘e since they did not 
trust TNI or the police to refrain from arresting him (Serambi Indonesia, 2 July 2001). 
In relation to ExxonMobil, GAM claimed that they were not responsible for the 
company‘s security and charged TNI with the responsibility. GAM also asked the GoI 
to provide protection instead because Indonesian troops were present in the ExxonMobil 
area (Serambi Indonesia, 2 July 2001). 
On 15 July 2001, the GoI withdrew Indonesia‘s representative to JCSM and they 
expected GAM to do likewise; however, GAM refused. Moreover, political instability 
in the GoI after the impeachment of Wahid directly affected the situation in Aceh when 
the local police arrested and imprisoned six of GAM‘s delegates on the Joint 
Committee. At that time, the HDC was not only incapable of protecting GAM‘s 
negotiators but also lost political support and commitment to the peace process from the 
GoI. During this crisis, the peace process in Aceh was in ‗moribund‘ condition, which 
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led to an increase in violence. The situation changed after Megawati replaced Wahid as 
President of Indonesia in August 2001. Megawati decided to continue the peace process 
and she actually released GAM‘s negotiators.  
During the critical situation, to improve the effectiveness of the peace talks that 
would focus on political dialogue, the HDC invited a group of dignitaries, known as the 
Wise Men, consisting of General (retired) Anthony Zinni (USA), Surin Pitsuwan 
(former Foreign Minister of Thailand), Budimir Loncar (former Yugoslavian 
Ambassador to Indonesia), and Bengt Söderberg (former Swedish diplomat). Progress 
was made in the negotiations by early September 2001, when the  GoI submitted a draft 
of an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. The HDC subsequently adopted the draft 
as a basis for further dialogue. In addition, the GoI had proposed guidance for full 
settlement based on freedom and democracy that could be achieved through four steps. 
First, autonomy should be accepted as the final solution. Second, during the transitional 
period from conflict to peace, there would be a cessation of hostilities, an intensive 
confidence-building process, and post-conflict reconstruction project to normalize 
socio-economic life in Aceh through government and international aid. Third, a 
consultative forum of ‗an all-inclusive dialogue‘ should be established to involve GAM 
and civil society in achieving a negotiated peaceful settlement for the problems in Aceh 
based on the Autonomy Law. Fourth, a general election should be held in Aceh and 
GAM should be able to participate in the national election in 2004 (Sastrohandoyo, 
2003). 
In January 2002, GAM agreed to consider the special autonomy as a starting 
point and agreed to drop independence as the reference, on condition that the GoI did 
not publish in the media that GAM had abandoned independence (HDC Internal 
Review, 2003).   
 
5.4.2 Starting Political Dialogue 
The substantive dialogue was conducted in May 2002 and the parties agreed to use 
autonomy as the starting point. To support the on-going negotiation, on 3 December 
2002 in Tokyo, the Japanese government hosted the Preparatory Conference on Peace 
and Reconstruction in Aceh, which was attended by 16 countries and five international 
organizations. The conference showed the participants‘ support and commitment to 
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peace talks and the post-conflict reconstruction in Aceh. In December 2002, after 
receiving input from international actors (such as Japan, the EU, and the US), both 
parties were ready to sign a cessation of hostilities as the first step to create a peaceful 
atmosphere before both entered the political process (HDC Internal Review, 2003).  
After a number of amendments to the draft, the GoI and GAM finally signed the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 9 December 2002 in Geneva. In general, 
this CoHA focused on four sectors: 
1. Security, which included cessation of hostilities and armed fire, identification of the 
demilitarization zone, demilitarization, relocation of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(TNI), disarmament of GAM, and reformulation of the Special Police Force (Mobile 
Brigade) to regular policemen. 
2. Humanitarian efforts, which included humanitarian aid to IDPs. 
3. Reconstruction, which included rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure 
and buildings that had been damaged by armed conflict. 
4. Civil reform, which included managing the dialogue or all-inclusive dialogue to 
strengthen the democratization process in Aceh (CoHA document, 2002).  
Both parties agreed to implement the arrangement in the CoHA, which included 
monitoring and maintaining the security situation under the Joint Security Committee 
(JSC) mandate that was supported by 144 personnel who represented the GoI, GAM and 
the HDC. The JSC (led by Major General Thanungsuk Tuvinun from Thailand) was 
responsible for identifying and establishing peace zones, to rehabilitate and reconstruct 
the conflict affected areas, and to start the demilitarization process after a period of 
confidence building. In the agreement, the JSC acted as the party guarantor for 
implementation of the agreement. This important role was usually played by a state 
actor, but the GoI rejected the HDC proposal to involve a state actor as the third-party 
guarantor.
10
 
Regarding demilitarization, the GoI and GAM agreed to complete the process in 
five months (9 March to 9 July 2003) by the following steps: reformulation of TNI and 
the police from an offensive to a defensive position, and the placement of GAM‘s 
weapons in a selected place by GAM and the HDC. Before the demilitarization step, 
there was a confidence building phase (9 December 2002 to 9 March 2003) in which 
                                                 
10
 The HDC had sent one proposal to Jakarta to involve European countries as observers. 
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neither party was allowed to act aggressively in any way that could escalate tension 
(CoHA document, 2002). 
 
5.4.3 Positional Bargaining   
Even though on 10 May 2002 GAM had agreed to use autonomy as the basis for their 
future political arrangement, on the same day GAM released a political statement to the 
media concerning their position and that GAM would never stop the struggle for 
independence, and that the final decision on the special autonomy would be determined 
by the Acehnese people in ‗all-inclusive dialogues‘ (GAM Press Release, 10 May 
2002). GAM argued that the Autonomy Law could not be used as a political 
compromise because the name of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (or NAD, which replaced 
the name Province of Aceh) that was stated in the Autonomy Law was not logical or 
rational. Nanggroe means Negara, or State, so for GAM, this meant Province of State 
of Aceh Darussalam. Based on its name, the  GoI should therefore have given state 
authority to Aceh, or otherwise erase Nanggroe from Act 18/2001 (Tiba, 2003). 
Concerning political reasons, GAM argued that the Autonomy Law could not 
accommodate GAM‘s political interests as they could not have a governor or other 
formal political positions in Aceh. Based on the Autonomy Law, those positions were 
only eligible for the Indonesia citizens who are loyal to the Indonesian government and 
Pancasila (the state ideology of Indonesia).  GAM interpreted the law as a means to 
systematically eliminate their role within Acehnese society. And, for this reason, 
autonomy as the political solution could not be accepted by GAM (Tiba, 2003).    
Additionally, GAM agreed that the share of revenue from natural resources 
included 80% from forestry, fisheries and general mining, and another 70% from gas 
and oil that would be reduced to 50% after 8 years (Tiba, 2003). This was a significant 
offer from the GoI compared to the previous share in which Aceh only received 1%. 
However, GAM questioned if the GoI had the capacity to implement this offer when the 
impact of the economic crisis since 1998 had almost bankrupted Indonesia. In the last 
two years, 1999–2001, Indonesia had an annual deficit in the budget of IDR 54.7 
trillion, or almost USD 5.4 billion per year (Tiba, 2003). Accordingly, the GoI would 
not be able to commit to the implementation of the Autonomy Law, especially the 
articles relating to economic compensation.  
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Moreover, GAM also questioned who would estimate the total benefit from the 
oil and gas, Aceh or the GoI. GAM argued that the Autonomy Law did not cover any of 
those questions and did not provide transparency concerning the management of these 
resources either, which could lead to new conflicts in the future (Abdulgani, 2010). Past 
experience had influenced GAM‘s position concerning autonomy as they believed that 
under certain conditions, the GoI could easily change or cancel the Autonomy Law 
when the law ran contrary to a higher law (lex superiori derogat legi inferiori) or in the 
future, the government could ratify a new law that would annul the Autonomy Law, 
according to the principle of lex posteriori derogat legi priori (Abdulgani, 2010). 
GAM also proposed that the 2004 election must give an opportunity to the 
Acehnese to decide their final political option and whether they would vote for 
autonomy or independence. GAM expected the GoI to accept their ideal as the 
democratic solution and to help Indonesia overcome its problem. GAM described the 
multidimensional crisis in Indonesia as being like a big ship facing a storm on the 
ocean, and that the only way to save the passengers‘ lives was to let them use lifeboats – 
in other words, the GoI must let the provinces separate themselves from Indonesia, 
otherwise all of them would sink into the ocean together (Tiba, 2003).  
The significant differences between the GoI and GAM indicated that neither 
party was able to reach a similar platform for political settlement, because during the 
process, they had adopted an offensive position, in which whatever ideas came from one 
party were perceived as a trick by the other. The HDC also failed to build a common 
interest, and both parties insisted on their inflexible positions, autonomy versus 
independence. Instead of building trust, the HDC applied a long-term approach, lasting 
for almost one year and a half, from humanitarian dialogue to issues of substance. The 
whole negotiation process is defined as a positional bargaining that is frequently used as 
an opening strategy when the parties first meet. In this strategy, the GoI and GAM 
negotiated on the basis of their own interests by using threats, inflated demands, and 
binding commitment as the tactics, although this strategy usually produced an 
unsatisfying outcome (e.g. with deadlock situations or poor compromises that would not 
satisfy the interests of the GoI and GAM as agreed in the CoHA).  
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5.4.4 HDC: Obstacles as Facilitators 
In considering the mediation theories developed by Kressel (1972), Touval and Zartman 
(1985), the HDC‘s strategy and tactics applied in the Aceh peace process could be 
classified as directive behavior, in which it played an active role in encouraging the GoI 
and GAM to find a solution, especially during the negotiation process on humanitarian 
issues. According to Bercovitch (1991), the goal of this behavior is to change the 
parties‘ perception of cost, consequence and benefits. Nevertheless, it has been found 
that this active strategy can only produce effective mediation provided it is applied by 
the well-experienced mediators since the strategy affects trust, relationships and the 
perceptions of the conflicting parties.  
 Compared to the role of the CMI during the Helsinki peace talks that was only 
responsible for mediating the parties around the peace table, the HDC was involved 
since the pre-negotiation process that included assessing the issues, bridging 
communication among the parties, designing the frame of dialogue and looking for 
funding support. Established in 1999 in Geneva, Switzerland, the HDC‘s mission was to 
support a just and lasting peace through humanitarian dialogue and informal diplomacy. 
Aceh was the first international peace project of the HDC under the concept of the New 
Prevention that had expanded the limit of humanitarian action from alleviating the 
consequences of war to creating the conditions for peace. Based on the New Prevention, 
the HDC‘s mandate was to prevent the horrors of war (Aceh Initiative, Internal Review, 
November 2003). When the HDC was actively involved as the facilitator of dialogue in 
the beginning, the HDC did not have any official status from the government. However, 
the HDC took this risk as an advantage for manoeuvring with less Governmental 
oversight (HDC Internal Review, 2003). Further, the HDC‘s role quickly changed to 
that of a mediator during the Humanitarian Pause when it sought to transform 
communication in search of a mutually acceptable solution between the GoI and GAM.  
One of the key obstacles faced by the HDC during their involvement in the 
peace process was building trust between the GoI and GAM. One year after the peace 
process started, the HDC realized that it was impossible to build a joint commitment 
between the conflicting parties, since the GoI and GAM could not change their 
perception of each other. GAM could still not trust the Government due the relationship 
of long conflict between Aceh and the GoI, and continued to perceive the GoI as a neo-
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colonialist government, while, at the same time, the hardliners inside the GoI classified 
GAM as an enemy of the state that needed to be destroyed.  
One of the strategies that had been used by the HDC to avoid the deadlock of the 
peace talks and to change the perception of GAM was to invite a negotiation expert 
named Professor William Ury, in early January 2001. Professor Ury helped GAM to 
understand their interests and advised them to be more realistic in pursuing their goals 
through democratic means. In addition, to strengthen the HDC‘s position as the 
mediator, the HDC created a group of Wise Men in mid-July 2001. According to the 
HDC Internal Review (2003), the role of the Wise Men was to assist and support the 
HDC and advise the conflicting parties in the search for a political solution. The Wise 
Men were also expected to improve the leverage of the HDC, while simultaneously 
attracting wide support from the international community for Aceh, including political 
and financial support for the peace process, either during or after the peace talks. In the 
HDC Internal Review (2003: 31) it was stated: ―The Wise Men shielded the HDC from 
facile and inaccurate criticism, increased its credibility, concentrated the minds of the 
parties and assisted with access to senior political level.‖ In addition, besides 
establishing the Wise Men group to strengthen the international pressure on the GoI and 
GAM to commit to the signed agreement and also to support the DDR process, the 
HDC worked closely with various governments including the EU, the US, Japan, 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Norway.  
The long process from the Humanitarian Pause towards the CoHA had increased 
the pessimism from the parties and other groups since the agreement that had been 
signed could not be implemented fully and had not decreased the violence. This 
condition created distrust in both parties towards the HDC, including the incapability of 
the HDC to protect GAM‘s negotiators from the arbitrary action of the GoI, when, on 6 
July 2001, the police arrested six GAM negotiators in Banda Aceh for subversive 
activities, and another member was arrested in August. In fact, the HDC staff were 
harassed and threatened by the police, and, on 10 July 2002, the HDC was accused of 
espionage by Major General Djali Yusuf, Chief Commander for Aceh. He requested 
that the HDC stop their activities and leave Aceh within two days since the HDC had 
failed as facilitator, and were close to GAM and supporters of a referendum (HDC 
Internal Review, 2003). 
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The fragile trust and the tensions during the peace talks led the HDC to 
implement the shuttle diplomacy tactic between ―two rooms‖. All the negotiations were 
conducted indirectly through the HDC, and before the CoHA was signed, the parties 
never met face-to-face for almost eight months until they came to Geneva to sign the 
agreement on 9 May 2002. During that time, the GoI had initiated a meeting with 
GAM‘s leaders, but GAM was unwilling to meet them (HDC Internal Review, 2003). 
The most critical moment was when HDC was able to lead the GoI and GAM into 
political dialogue and both parties agreed to accept the provision in the CoHA that 
included disarmament, all-inclusive dialogue and elections. But unfortunately, the 
agreement failed to match the interpretations between the parties of the mechanism of 
implementation. 
Along the CoHA process, in an internal review (2003), the HDC noted two 
contentious issues that they faced. The first constituted the permanent political solution 
for Aceh when the GoI and GAM insisted on their respective positions of special 
autonomy and independence. However, both parties agreed in the CoHA to review the 
special Autonomy Law with the participation of civil society in Aceh, and GAM agreed 
not to continue their struggle for independence, while, at the same time, GoI agreed not 
to state autonomy as the permanent solution for Aceh. The second issue comprised 
demilitarization of GAM when they accepted the term ―placement‖ of weapons rather 
than weapons ―storage‖. Although the GoI and GAM had agreed in the CoHA on these 
issues, these issues were actually not solved completely, and, thus became one of the 
factors that led to the failure of the CoHA implementation. 
 
5.5 The Helsinki Peace Process  
The Helsinki peace process for the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) started on 28 
January 2005. It ended seven months later when the representatives from the GoI and 
GAM signed the MoU on 15 August 2005. This MoU constitutes a comprehensive and 
sustainable solution, which ended one of the longest violent conflicts in the history of 
Southeast Asia. During the Helsinki peace talks, both the GoI and GAM delegations 
negotiated about six main topics (Awaludin, 2008). The first one, self-government, was 
proposed by GAM as the ―fictional independence‖ in which Aceh would become a self-
governing state in all matters but foreign affairs, aspects of external defence, and 
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elements of taxation (Kingsbury, 2005; Abdullah, 2010). The second one covered 
political participation, including provincial and local elections. The third one concerned 
the economic arrangements, which included revenue sharing.  The fourth one pertained 
to amnesty and the agreement concerning the definitions of those covered. The fifth one 
dealt with the security arrangements, including the DDR processes, and the last, the 
external third-party monitoring.   
 
5.5.1 Pre-Negotiation: The Road to Helsinki 
The pre-negotiation process started almost one year and a half before the first round of 
peace talks was conducted in Helsinki. At the time, the GoI was the party that took the 
initiative for this process. This section divides the pre-negotiation process into two 
phases: the first one was during the Megawati presidency, especially after the CoHA 
collapsed (from May 2003 to mid-2004), and the second one was during the Yudhoyono 
presidency (October to December 2004). The first phase of pre-negotiation came from 
personal initiative rather than from government policy. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and Jusuf Kalla were among those who believed that the conflict in Aceh could be 
solved through dialogue rather than a military approach. 
When Megawati declared martial law in May 2003, Kalla as the Coordinating 
Minister for Social Welfare and Yudhoyono as the Coordinating Minister for Political 
and Security Affairs at the time were still trying to find a better settlement through 
holding dialogues. With the unofficial approval from Megawati, Kalla delegated his 
trusted friend, Farid Husain, to identify GAM‘s links and approach them to learn about 
the possibility for future peace talks. During this phase, the conciliatory signal that was 
sent out by Kalla to GAM did not receive any feedback. This situation then changed 
after Yudhoyono and Kalla came to power and promised to settle the conflict in Aceh 
with dignity within three years. To realize this promise, Yudhoyono and Kalla shared 
responsibilities in which the President was responsible for protecting the peace process 
from being sabotaged by hardliners in the military, and the Vice President was 
responsible to secure a peace plan from political attack from politicians in parliament 
(Ali, 2008). 
Moreover, it is important to note that once Yudhoyono and Kalla were in office, 
they contributed to the optimism of successful negotiation and were capable of building 
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fundamental trust with GAM though their ‗informal representative‘, Farid Husain. From 
the very start, Husain was directed by Kalla to approach GAM to identify their true 
leader, the actual problem in Aceh, the expected solution and the possible solution for 
negotiation. Accordingly, Husain patiently approached GAM to build personal relations, 
an emotional bond, and trust. He presented himself according to his true profession, a 
medical doctor, rather than a government employee. He showed concern for people‘s 
well-being, health, and other related matters (The Jakarta Post, 8 September 2005). For 
Kalla, the pre-negotiation process, as a back-channel dialogue, was crucial to building 
early consensus. If necessary, Kalla even suggested that 50% of the problems should be 
discussed and resolved before the formal peace talks started (Antaranews, 8 April 
2007). Aside from approaching the GAM leaders in Aceh and Europe, Yudhoyono and 
Kalla changed the government‘s view on GAM from a terrorist group to an equal 
partner in finding the solution for Aceh. Kalla cautioned that in the peace process, it is 
important to respect the dignity of the opponent and that wars sometime occur because 
dignity is overlooked (Husain, 2005).  
Slowly but surely, Husain was able to build trust and confidence among those 
who were outside of GAM‘s inner circle in Aceh and Jakarta. Thus, he did not manage 
to reach those in the inner circle in Sweden (i.e. those who made all the final decisions 
for GAM) until he met a Finnish businessman, Juha Christensen, in December 2003 in 
Jakarta. Although Christensen had initially promised Husain that he could arrange a 
meeting with GAM leaders in Sweden, by February 2004, Christensen had failed to 
arrange the meeting. By way of compensation, Christensen suggested that Husain 
should meet Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland and presently the 
chairman of the Crisis Management Initiative based in Helsinki. In his meeting with 
Ahtisaari, Husain explained the conflict in Aceh and the autonomy that was being 
offered as a solution. According to Husain, Ahtisaari listened attentively to his 
explanation and further suggested that the GoI ought to offer something to make GAM 
interested in holding a dialogue (Husain, 2005). This meeting was important, as it 
constituted the second contact that had invited Ahtisaari to become involved in the 
peace process in Aceh when previously, in late 1999, Husaini Hasan from MP-GAM 
had earlier contacted Ahtisaari‘s administration to provide international assistance for 
Aceh (Kivimäki, 2010). There was no commitment or any other concrete action after 
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the meeting between Ahtisaari and Husain, as Husain was not officially part of the 
government representatives until late 2004 when Yudhoyono and Kalla came to power. 
Then the peace agenda became clearer, and Kalla instructed Husain to arrange intensive 
contacts with Ahtisaari and invited him to be the mediator between GAM and the GoI.  
The back-channel dialogue between Kalla‘s team and GAM‘s members in Aceh 
and Malaysia initially focused on economic compensation and a political solution. Kalla 
argued that peace means compromise, and that compromise means concession, in which 
economic compensation plays an important part in resolving the conflict (Schulze, 
2007). In his proposal, Kalla offered thousands of hectares of land and state-owned 
plantation areas that would be handed over to GAM. GAM would hand over 1,000 
weapons to the GoI to compensate for amnesty (ICG, 2005). However, Yudhoyono and 
Kalla were still optimistic that GAM would re-establish the dialogue if the GoI could 
offer a dignified and equitable solution, as Kalla stated:  
 
First, I believe the issue in Aceh is a matter of justice – justice of the economic 
sector since it started. Not a matter of ideology. Second, based on my 
experience, I am optimistic that as long as we have direct communication the 
conflict can be resolved. Third, if the conflict continues, there will be more 
victims. I believe there must be dialogue with a dignified and equitable solution. 
(Kalla, 2004, as cited in Husain, 2007: 3) 
 
Kalla tried to resolve the problem domestically by approaching GAM 
commanders in Aceh. However, he later realized how cohesive GAM was when the 
commanders in the jungle or negotiators in prison would not make any deal with the 
GoI and suggested that Husain talk to their leaders in Sweden instead. All of the 
political decisions must be made by those in Sweden, specifically by Malik Mahmud, 
Zaini Abdullah and Zakaria Saman (Kompas, 11 January 2005). This compliance of the 
combatants reflects the cohesiveness of the party, which was very useful during the 
peace process because the leaders were supported by their party (Assefa, 1987; 
Zartman, 1996). 
During the pre-negotiation process, GAM leaders were seen to be more passive 
than the GoI; they were more inclined to wait and respond to the signals that were 
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offered by the GoI. Even though direct communication could not be developed 
effectively between Jakarta and Stockholm, Christensen played an important role in 
transmitting the GoI‘s signal to GAM leaders in Stockholm. The result of the long pre-
negotiation process was realized on 23 December 2004 when Christensen wrote to 
Husain that the parties had agreed to re-establish the peace talks with Ahtisaari as the 
mediator (Husain, 2007: 66–67). On 24 December 2004, Christensen sent the 
preliminary invitation to GAM‘s leaders for a meeting on 8 January 2005 and stated that 
the peace talks would be conducted at the end of January. Christensen proposed a 
conditional agreement before the tsunami devastated Aceh on 26 December 2004 
(Husain, 2007:68). 
 The Helsinki peace talks were the result of a pre-negotiation process that took 
one year and a half. During the long process, the conciliatory signals that were sent by 
the GoI to GAM were an important approach in building trust for both parties and 
contributed to the improvement of optimism at the negotiating table. As stated by 
Yudhoyono, GAM‘s response was encouraging compared to the previous peace talks 
(Koran Tempo, 30 January 2005).    
 
5.5.2 Preparation for Peace Talks: A Comprehensive Plan 
This thesis finds that the proper preparation for the peace talks was one of the important 
factors for reaching the agreement. This included the composition of the negotiator team 
and their attitude, the dress code, and the design concept and process of the negotiation 
proceedings. Kalla‘s role was dominant in this concern; he focused on all the details and 
aspects that could make the negotiation successful. Kalla selected an Indonesian 
negotiation team dominated by members from Sulawesi and Acehnese rather than 
Javanese. This was to avoid GAM‘s dislike of the ethnic Javanese who were stigmatized 
as ―Javanese neo-colonials‖ (Ali, 2008). The negotiators were also non-foreign ministry 
officers, which was favorable for two reasons. First, Kalla wanted direct negotiations 
that were fast, without any blockage caused by a formal diplomacy style – the team was 
to be flexible without any manoeuvres in negotiations with GAM. Second, he wanted to 
emphasize that the peace talks were not a foreign affair, but a domestic concern since 
the negotiation team was not represented by the foreign ministry officers.  
123 
 
The negotiation team was led by Hamid Awaludin, the Minister of Law and 
Human Rights, and included Sofyan Djalil, the Minister of Information. Another team 
to support the negotiation team was led by the Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law 
and Security, Widodo AS. The three ministers were involved in the delegation teams. 
Kalla provided the negotiators with a clear mandate, action plan and negotiation targets 
with comprehensive and concrete offers to GAM. These included that GAM recognized 
Aceh as the province with special autonomy under Indonesia; they must stop the 
insurgency and surrender the weapons with the conditions agreed by the GoI; whilst the 
GoI offered amnesty to GAM members (Awaludin, 2008). 
 
Table 5.1 The GoI‘s position proposed by Kalla for the Indonesian delegation in peace 
talks (Awaludin 2008: 34) 
 
Issue GoI GAM Solution 
Political Indonesian unity Independence Special autonomy 
Economic Welfare for all Aceh resources for 
Acehnese 
Share revenue, 70% oil 
and gas belong to Aceh 
Religious Considered in 
Constitution 
Secular, back to 
Islam 
Islamic law with local 
regulations 
Military/Weapo
ns 
Surrender 
unconditionally 
Keep the weapons Surrender the weapons 
Governmental Based on the existing 
Autonomy Law 
Play an important 
role in the 
government 
Participate in elections 
GAM‘s welfare Plantation and 
compensation fund 
Obtain maximum 
results 
Negotiation 
 
The Indonesian negotiators had the authority to make the agreement directly 
with GAM, as long as both parties agreed on the solutions proposed by the GoI. Should 
the agreement go beyond the solution offered by the GoI, the Indonesian negotiators 
must then consult the GoI. In his letter to the President, dated 25 January 2005, Kalla 
noted that the peace talks to be conducted in Helsinki on 28–30 January were informal 
meetings and suggested that the Indonesian negotiators focus the dialogue on substantial 
topics and not on the ceasefire agreement as the temporary solution.  
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One of the important ―rules of the game‖ of Kalla that were to be followed by 
the Indonesian negotiators was to treat GAM negotiators as equal friends in the  
dialogue and not to perceive them as rebels. Kalla further insisted that the negotiators 
show the seriousness of the GoI through the color and motifs of the dress code 
(Awaludin, 2008: 25). He suggested that the negotiators look into the eyes of GAM‘s 
members to show their willingness. In his book (2008), Awaludin took note that Malik 
Mahmud had a good impression of the GoI after he looked into Awaludin‘s eyes in the 
first round of negotiation in January 2005. 
Furthermore, in strengthening the peace plan, Yudhoyono and Kalla 
consolidated the negotiator teams with the Ministries, TNI, the police, Members of 
Parliament, and prominent figures. From the consolidation meeting, Yudhoyono and 
Kalla wanted to make sure that all of the decisions made at the negotiating table must be 
followed by others, aside from the consolidation meeting, which anticipated the spoiler 
group within the government as had happened during the CoHA. During the preparation 
time, Kalla was optimistic that the negotiations were to be conducted in five rounds and 
by August the GoI and GAM would reach a peace agreement (Awaludin, 2008: 42).  
To further support the government‘s motivation to end the conflict, Kalla invited 
the Ambassadors of the US, United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, and the Charge d‘affaires 
of Libya to attend a meeting on 10 January 2005. In this meeting, the GoI explained the 
situation in Aceh and their expectation for international participation to support their 
peace plan (Ali, 2008). Another follow-up meeting was held in Stockholm on 19 
January 2005 when the Foreign Minister of Sweden, together with other ambassadors 
met GAM leaders and encouraged them to accept the GoI‘s invitation for peace talks. 
The ambassadors convinced them that the peace talks were urgent with the 
consideration of special autonomy and Indonesia‘s integrity (Ali, 2008). Malik 
Mahmud, as a representative of GAM, then agreed to start the dialogue and offered a 
ceasefire, ―…the GAM/ASNLF11, would like to reconfirm its commitment on 26 
December 2004, for an unconditional ceasefire throughout Aceh for an undefined 
period‖ (GAM press statement, 15 January 2005).       
                                                 
11
   GAM started to use the Aceh Sumatera National Liberation Front (ASNLF) in the early 1980s as the 
official name at the international level. In the beginning of the movement in 1976, GAM was called Aceh 
Merdeka, or Independent Aceh. In the early 1980s, Aceh Merdeka was referred to by Jakarta as Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka or Aceh Independence Movement. The additional word of Gerakan or ―Movement‖ by 
Jakarta refers to taking action against the government.     
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All the preparatory aspects indicated the GoI‘s motivation and optimism for a 
negotiation process; the clear direction and action plan assisted the Indonesian 
negotiators in performing their duty to ―not swim in an endless sea‖ (Awaludin, 2008: 
60). 
 
5.5.3 The Influencing Condition: the Tsunami as a Strengthening Factor 
This thesis further discovered that the occurrence of the tsunami also strengthened the 
optimism of the GoI that negotiations with GAM would affect a joint agreement 
alongside the GoI‘s re-motivated first round of peace talks on 28–30 January, which had 
focused on post-tsunami reconstruction. The impact of the tsunami in Aceh on 26 
December 2004 influenced the perception of Indonesia‘s hardliners concerning the 
conflict in Aceh, which exerted moral pressure on the GoI and GAM, and also 
consolidated international support. The important contribution from the impact of the 
tsunami was the implementation of a peace agreement in which hundreds of agencies 
working in Aceh also supported the post-conflict programs.    
 The tsunami devastated the lives of more than 170,000 people and Aceh 
suddenly gained serious attention and solidarity from the national and international 
communities. This disaster had given moral, political, economic and social imperative 
opportunities to the government to end the conflict and Aceh‘s status changed from 
being a dangerous zone to a devastated zone (Ali, 2008; Weizenegger, 2007). A year 
before the tsunami, most of the national polling indicated that 50% of Indonesians 
supported the military operation in Aceh. But their perception changed after the tsunami 
in that both the Indonesians and Acehnese opposed the military solution for Aceh 
(Weizenegger, 2007). The disaster accelerated the peace plan initiated by Yudhoyono 
and Kalla, and drew sympathy from the hardliners who had criticized the process prior 
to the disaster. 
Indonesia‘s National Development Planning Board, or Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional, estimated that the tsunami damaged 95% of Aceh‘s Gross 
Domestic Product, and forecasted that the total cost requested for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction was 3.6 billion Euros (Bappenas Report on Aceh, 2006). The government 
realized that without support from international actors, they would not be able to rebuild 
Aceh (BRR and Partners Report, December 2005). Most Acehnese believed that the 
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tsunami was the catalyst that drove Aceh towards peace as the entire world directed 
their attention to Aceh. This disaster also changed GAM‘s image from the organization 
associated with terrorism by the hardliners in the GoI, to that of a partner in rebuilding 
Aceh. At that moment, Yudhoyono declared the earthquake and tsunami as a ‗national 
disaster‘ and he sent a message to GAM‘s leaders to seize this historical moment to join 
and unite once more in building Aceh‘s future (Waspada, 2 January 2005).  
The quick response and seriousness from the GoI after the tsunami had 
strengthened GAM‘s motivation to end the conflict and increased their optimism and 
trust in Yudhoyono and Kalla (Husain, 2007). Responding to this situation, GAM 
announced to the public that they unilaterally pledged a ceasefire. On 12 January 2005, 
Malik Mahmud responded to Yudhoyono to re-build Aceh together and stated that 
GAM was ready to meet the the GoI‘s representatives. He stated that it was ―to ensure 
the success of the ceasefire and reduce the suffering of the Acehnese people‖ (Tempo 
Magazine, 7 January 2005). This statement was later followed by GAM‘s commanders 
in Aceh through their military spokesperson, Sofyan Dawood, who said, ―God willing, 
I‘m sure. This (tsunami) is the opportunity for us. Remember, this time the whole world 
is looking at Indonesia‖ (Tempo Magazine, 26 January 2005). 
On 8 January 2005, in the meeting between the Crisis Management Initiative 
(CMI) and GAM‘s leaders, Ahtisaari explained that with or without GAM, the tsunami 
had made Aceh belong to the international community and that all attention was turned 
towards Aceh‘s recovery. If GAM refused to have a peace dialogue with the GoI, GAM 
would not only lose its role in the reconstruction of Aceh, but also in the international 
community (Ali, 2007). Furthermore, the tsunami affected the battlefield in Aceh. For 
GAM, the tsunami had an impact on their survival in the jungle when the logistic 
distributions from the coastal areas were devastated. Additionally, approximately a 
hundred GAM prisoners who were jailed in the coastal areas had perished. Another 
2,698 security personnel from the GoI stationed in the coastal areas were killed or 
missing and an estimated USD 121 million worth of weapons and equipment were lost 
(Weizenegger, 2007). Responding to this situation, the Coordinating Ministry of 
Security, Law and Politics reformulated the priority of the military operation in Aceh in 
that the security forces should stop their attack on GAM, and instead protect the people 
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from GAM‘s interference, and TNI and the police were also ordered to support and 
assist in humanitarian actions (Media Indonesia, 26 January 2005).   
The optimism of both parties was also influenced by the presence of larger 
groups for humanitarian action – at least 430 national and local NGOs, 124 international 
NGOs from 50 countries, dozens of foreign, UN and government agencies, and foreign 
military were participating and operating in the relief efforts (BRR and Partners Report, 
December 2005). To support the GoI in reconstructing Aceh, on 12 January 2005, 19 
main donor countries in the Paris Club offered Indonesia an immediate moratorium of 
payment, while they considered other forms of debt relief (Economist, 5 February 
2005). Aside from the attention paid to post-tsunami recovery, on 28 December 2004, 
the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan contacted HDC Director 
Martin Griffiths to initiate a new dialogue between the GoI and GAM, but neither party 
responded to the HDC. Nonetheless, this act indicated how international attention paid 
to Aceh had become stronger, not only affecting the post-tsunami situation but also the 
peace process. For the GoI, the international limelight was utilized to influence GAM to 
accept their peace plan. On the other hand, for GAM, the international presence in Aceh 
had brought GAM under international protection while the martial law status continued. 
Both parties realized how important international support was to not only rebuild Aceh 
but also to assist the peace process when the international community insisted that the 
GoI and GAM guarantee the safety of their international staff who worked in Aceh and 
take measures to protect them. As stated in the media by former US President Bill 
Clinton, peace was needed in Aceh for the international workers (Waspada, 22 February 
2005). 
On the other hand, allowing many international agencies to work in conflict-torn 
Aceh was an indicator of the high level of confidence in the Indonesian government of 
the support of the international community regarding the unity of the Indonesian state, 
and indeed, the GoI believed that international agencies would not give any political 
support that would influence or strengthen the position of GAM. From all the 
international agencies working in Aceh, only the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was requested to stop operating in Aceh in March 2005, because 
the UNHCR mandate is not relevant in the context of Aceh since there are no political 
refugees in Aceh, only internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to the disaster, as stated 
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by the Spokesperson of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa  
(Tempo.Co, 19 March 2005). In addition, it was noted by the GoI that UNHCR was 
actively helping the Aceh refugees to obtain political asylum in Malaysia. 
 
5.5.4 The Negotiation and Mediation Process: Reciprocity of Optimism  
The Helsinki peace talks took up a total of 24 days and five rounds, which started on 27 
January and ended with the signing of the full agreement on 15 August 2005. The 
greatest achievement in the peace negotiation was when GAM dropped their claim for 
independence in the second round, and accepted special autonomy as the political 
solution for Aceh. This had been rejected by GAM in previous peace talks. The factor 
that made the GoI and GAM agree to sign the agreement for special autonomy as the 
basis for full settlement was the conviction held by both parties that it was the only way 
to end the conflict (Husain, 2007). Furthermore, the concession – making for the 
agreement was the result of working trust – an element of optimism – in which both 
parties were confident of the reciprocal effect of their mutual concessions. The 
optimism of the parties in the Helsinki peace talks was not a sense or feeling that merely 
emerged; it was processed from the motivation to end the conflict that encouraged the 
readiness for negotiation. 
This section seeks to explain optimism, as one of the factors that made the GoI 
and GAM sign a full agreement, in the context of the negotiation and mediation process. 
Accordingly, optimism was found to be derived from four processes:  
1. Working trust as the basis of negotiation; 
2. Negotiation Strategy: self-government, between autonomy and independence; 
3. The Mediator: directive behavior and a clear dialogue frame; 
4. The Back-Channel Approach: heart-to-heart negotiation. 
 
5.5.4.1 Trust as the Basis of Negotiation 
As explained earlier, optimism should be the main sense of parties throughout the 
negotiation process, and concession-making is likely to be built when both parties trust 
each other (Kelman, 2002). Trust affects the optimism for success when one party is 
confident that the other party will also make concessions (Pruitt, 2005). In the literature, 
trust is defined as a ―psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
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based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another [party]‖ 
(Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). Many scholars argue that trust could determine the result of 
negotiations, as stated by Lewicki and Tamlinson (2003:191), ―trust reduces uncertainty 
over future outcomes, simplifies decision processes, and provides us with peace of 
mind‖. His analysis provides several explanations concerning the importance of trust in 
negotiation. First, when the respective parties believe that they can trust each other, this 
motivates them to negotiate and make concessions. Second, when trust has been 
developed by both parties, they can move forward to essential negotiations in 
developing the formal agreement. Third, when both parties trust one another, the 
―imperfections‖ of the agreement can be covered by the motivation for peace.   
From the outset, the GoI believed that the key to the success of the negotiations 
was to build trust with GAM before they sat around the negotiating table. In the 
Helsinki peace talks, the process of building trust started long before the negotiations 
began, with most of the effort coming from the GoI by way of Farid Husain. Husain 
believed that he could be accepted by GAM as a trusted person as he was concerned 
about the problems faced by GAM; therefore, they believed that Husain had the 
capacity to solve the conflict. Husain argued that this factor was one of the reasons that 
made GAM agree to negotiate, and that the Helsinki peace talks were initiated due to 
the foundation of trust. One of Husain‘s approaches was to listen attentively to the 
disappointment of the Acehnese with the GoI and to show his empathy for them, while 
trying to assure GAM that the new presidency (under Yudhoyono) was markedly 
different from the previous one, as it had been established by direct vote through a fair 
election process (Husain, 2007). Husain further explained their strong motivation to end 
the conflict, as promised during Yudhoyono‘s electoral campaign. As admitted by 
Malik Mahmud, the trust built by Husain through personal contacts with GAM resulted 
in the reciprocal process for building trust, motivation and optimism for the GAM 
leaders (Husain, 2007: 141 - 142).  
 
At the end we realized that Kalla had the willingness to solve the conflict in 
Aceh through negotiation…We felt this was serious…We felt this as a change 
in approach, and we saw Kalla‘s seriousness…We were more optimistic after 
Christensen confirmed that Ahtisaari was ready to mediate the negotiation. After 
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Kalla became Vice-President, our optimism increased and we were confident 
that Kalla was the right person who could bring a solution for Aceh. (Malik 
Mahmud. Prime Minister of GAM)        
 
When the the GoI‘s delegation entered the peace talks, the trust-building process 
that was started during the pre-negotiation continued in the negotiation process. One of 
the approaches, as suggested by Kalla, was that the Indonesian negotiators committed to 
respecting the dignity of GAM and perceiving them as an equal party. The GAM 
leaders recognized a striking difference between the Helsinki peace process and the 
previous one, especially in the way the GoI‘s representatives approached them during 
the Helsinki peace talks, which gave them optimism for a more dignified settlement. In 
one interview with Suomen Kuvalehti, a Finnish magazine, on 7 February 2005, Malik 
Mahmud stated:  
 
―This is the first time we met each other face-to-face and, frankly speaking, 
privately. It‘s really important. We feel that the Government of Indonesia 
seriously looks at us as friends… Indonesia now has a new government and we 
hope the situation is different. We believe there are people in the government 
who want to end the conflict‖. (Husain, 2005: 75). 
 
The statement above reflects the strong motivation and optimism from the GoI 
being reciprocated by GAM. According to Lewicki and Tomlinson (2003), greater trust 
between the GoI and GAM would affect their willingness to share information that 
would lead them to reach full agreement to settle the root cause of the conflict and end 
the fight. However, trust was not the only factor that encouraged optimism, especially 
from the GoI‘s side, as the stalemate condition of GAM had a significant impact on the 
negotiation process as well. Without the stalemate of GAM, the full agreement would 
most probably never have been signed. 
 
 
 
131 
 
5.5.4.2 Negotiation Strategy: Self-Government, between Autonomy and 
Independence  
As explained in the section 4.2.4 dealing with pre-condition, the second peace process 
was a ripe moment in that GAM had acknowledged the infeasibility of winning. The 
stalemate of GAM was not only considered from the military aspect as the impact of a 
one-year military operation, but also from the failure of GAM‘s leaders to achieve 
international political support. As implicitly stated by Malik Mahmud, the Helsinki 
process was the last bastion for GAM leaders in case the negotiation process failed, in 
which case they were determined to return to Aceh and fight to the death (Husain, 
2007). The stalemate condition had significantly affected GAM‘s orientation, which 
was clearly indicated when they dropped the idea of independence and accepted 
autonomy as the political solution for Aceh. The scaling down of GAM‘s goal was 
undisputed by the combatants and members in the field since Stockholm had 
persuasively shared this idea with them. 
Although they were facing a stalemate, GAM entered the negotiating table in 
Helsinki with the proposal of a 15-year ceasefire in Aceh during which the GoI could 
continue developing Aceh. However, at the end of the 15-year period, the GoI should 
hold a referendum for the Acehnese to make up their mind about their political future, 
namely the option between separation from or unity with Indonesia (Abdullah, 2010). In 
addition, GAM offered three proposals to the GoI (Kingsbury, 2006: 36–37), which 
were similar to what the GoI and GAM had agreed on during the CoHA meeting:  
1. End of hostilities – to establish Aceh as a peace zone where GAM and the GoI 
should demobilize their military forces. The peace zone must be controlled by an 
international power. 
2. Political parties and elections – this included the release of all GAM prisoners and 
permission for those staying abroad to return to Aceh. At the same time, all the 
elements in Aceh would have the right to establish local political parties and run for 
election to Parliament and for the position of Wali Nanggroe (Head of 
Province/Governor). The election should be monitored by international presence.        
3. Formal Acceptance – this included the request from the national parliament to 
legalize self-government for Aceh. Furthermore, the parliament of Aceh would draft 
the constitution of Aceh that must be approved by the Wali Nanggroe and two out of 
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three parliamentary members. The international community should be the guarantor 
of the implementation of the constitution for Aceh.      
 
Not surprisingly, the end of hostilities programme or ceasefire was rejected by 
the GoI, whose focus was on a substantive solution by way of the special autonomy as a 
basis of negotiation. Nevertheless, the GoI‘s position could be understood since they 
believed that a ceasefire agreement would never bring about a permanent solution for 
Aceh unless the substantive problems were solved.   
Henceforth, GAM moved and proposed the self-government as the frame of 
negotiation to replace the term of special autonomy. This term was accepted by the GoI 
based on the reason that self-government is similar to special autonomy. The term self-
government was proposed by GAM‘s advisor, Damien Kingsbury, who argued that 
special autonomy implied a status quo and that GAM should have preferred the term of 
self-government to replace the special autonomy (Suara Pembaharuan, 23 February 
2005). GAM assumed that self-government did not only give a broader sovereignty but 
also internally impressed that Aceh would have its own government (Abdullah, 2010). 
The term of self-government was also a way out and covered the middle ground 
between ―autonomy‖ and ―independence‖ since GAM leaders did not want to lose face 
when they accepted the GoI‘s proposal on autonomy, while at the same time, the leaders 
reneged on their promise that ―independence was just around the corner‖ or that 
―independence was just a cigarette away‖ (sibak rukok teuk ka meurdeka); after all, they 
had often claimed that their struggle was supported by 31 countries in the world 
(interview with Ismail Syahputra, GAM spokesperson, in North Aceh, 2010).  
Although GAM‘s position indicated that they had taken away the assertion for 
independence from the negotiating table, GAM leaders gave a different explanation to 
the public in their statement on 23 and 25 February 2005, namely that GAM had never 
aborted the demand for independence in the Helsinki MoU, but that it was just not 
brought up at the negotiating table as a response to the humanitarian crisis in Aceh 
(Abdullah, 2010).  Furthermore, GAM mentioned that both parties should agree to a 
compromise prior to the commencement of the dialogue because the negotiation was 
needed to create a peaceful space for humanitarian action. Nevertheless, in the third 
round of peace talks, 12 April 2005, Malik Mahmud stated clearly that GAM would not 
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talk about independence and would prefer to discuss self-government instead 
(Awaludin, 2008).    
 In fact, the term of self-government proposed by GAM did not change the scope 
of the special autonomy that was proposed by the GoI, including Aceh‘s sovereignty in 
domestic matters except foreign affairs, external defence, national security and fiscal 
matters. Even though the concept of self-government itself was a part of autonomy, 
autonomy is broader – should it be a house, then self-government would be one of the 
rooms within it, according to Augusto Willemsen Diaz.
12
    
After the second round, GAM further focused on self-government, which 
included local political parties, the recognition of Acehnese symbols such as a flag, 
granting passports to residents, and the protection of Aceh‘s special rights from 
legislative erosion (Awaludin, 2008). Among the various issues, security and politics 
almost brought the peace talks to a deadlock. GAM proposed that 4,000 government 
troops remain in Aceh because, according to them, in provinces bigger than Aceh, the 
number was less than 6,000, whilst the Indonesian delegation proposed 25,000 troops 
(Djuli, 2007). At the end, both parties accepted the proposal by the mediator that the 
number of troops to remain in Aceh would be 9,200 police officers and 14,700 TNI. 
Another issue was the establishment of local political parties. GAM insisted that one of 
the substances of self-government was to allow Aceh to have its own political parties 
and that this proposal was non-negotiable. For GAM, the local political parties could be 
an alternative to armed struggle in that they could be the channels for GAM and the 
Acehnese as a means for articulation in the political system.   
Local political parties were a crucial issue inasmuch as the GoI negotiator 
reacted strongly, and argued that establishing local political parties would later 
strengthen separatism (such as in the Basque region and Quebec), and that GAM could 
twist back to its ideological struggle for independence (Serambi Indonesia, 29 July 
2005). The GoI then offered a compromise that GAM leaders would have the 
opportunity to run for election through existing political parties and Kalla obtained 
commitment from nine existing major parties to accommodate GAM as a candidate in 
the upcoming local elections (Awaludin, 2008). GAM, however, rejected this offer and 
                                                 
12
The statement was made by Augusto Willemsen Diaz at the morning session of 28 September 1991. 
Because of Diaz‘s opinion, the term autonomy was added next to the word self-government in all relevant 
provisions of the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Meeting. 
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argued that the local political parties would not only reflect their interests but also the 
democratization in Aceh (GAM statement,15 July 2005). Finally, after a discussion in 
the last round, the GoI and GAM agreed to having local political parties with national 
characteristics; in other words, the local political parties must follow the same rules of 
the game as the national ones.   
Aside from establishing local political parties, most of GAM‘s demands were 
easily accepted by Indonesia‘s negotiators. Their head, Awaludin, said that in practice, 
GAM‘s demands for self-government had been applied since 1999 through Act 44/1999 
on the Implementation of the Special Province of Aceh, subsequently revised in Act 
18/2001 on the Special Autonomy for Aceh. Thus, at the time, referring to regional 
autonomy in which self-government meant regional empowerment applied at the district 
level, beyond what had been demanded by GAM, which focused on the provincial level 
(Awaludin, 2008). For the  GoI negotiators, a discussion on the basis of self-
government or the special autonomy made the negotiation process easier since the Law 
of Local Government (Undang-undang Pemerintahan Daerah) had improved the 
function and authority of local government. In general, the GoI‘s negotiators easily 
agreed to GAM‘s demands because most of them had already been accommodated in 
the Law concerning Local Government (18/2001), which included customary law and 
traditional structure, natural resources and revenue sharing, the Wali Nangroe 
Institution, regional symbols and emblems to  reflect the privileges and specificity of 
Aceh, and Islamic Law. 
GAM focused on Act 18/2001 concerning the Special Autonomy, as the basis of 
a political solution that was proposed by the GoI during the CoHA in 2002 (Awaludin, 
2008). However, GAM missed the changes and improvements made in the model of 
autonomy in Indonesia since 2003. In addition, the GAM leaders also lacked 
understanding of the concept of autonomy; one of GAM‘s negotiators acknowledged 
that they did not have enough time to learn about autonomy or self-government and 
associated matters (Abdullah, 2010). There was no legal expert who fully understood 
the amendment of Indonesia‘s constitutional law inside the GAM delegation since their 
legal expert, Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, had been one of the victims in prison when the 
tsunami devastated Aceh in 2004. The lack of capacity concerning the substance of the 
models of autonomy meant that the GAM negotiators only focused on the term of self-
135 
 
government while the content of self-government remained similar to that of special 
autonomy. 
The capacity of GAM in the negotiation process pertaining to the basis of 
autonomy was different from the Indonesian negotiators who were more prepared and 
well-informed concerning the key issue of the peace talks, which was that of special 
autonomy. In fact, Awaludin himself was the Minister of Justice and Human Rights of 
Indonesia and a Doctor of Law who fully understood the legal aspects. The Indonesian 
team studied all of the subjects related to the topics in the Helsinki MoU including the 
legal aspects. When self-government was proposed by GAM, the Indonesian negotiators 
studied Act 18/2001 concerning the Special Autonomy for Aceh and came to the 
conclusion that the self-government proposed by GAM was similar to that of special 
autonomy, which covered special sovereignty for Aceh in respect of the economic 
sector, Islamic law, security and justice (Ali, 2008).   
However, the gap in capacity between the GoI and GAM negotiators caused it to 
become less dynamic in bargaining, and as a consequence, optimism and trust had led 
both parties to make concessions more easily from round to round of the negotiations. 
Trust had opened the opportunity for direct negotiation, which was classified as a 
principle of negotiation. Scholars such as Pruitt (1986), Fisher, Ury and Patton (1991), 
consider this strategy as a ―problem-solving workshop‖, ―integrative bargaining‖, 
―interest-based bargaining‖ or even ―win-win bargaining‖. It enabled the GoI and GAM 
to find similar basic interests to explore the substance of each goal that could be used to 
develop a mutually agreeable solution. When the GAM leaders agreed to drop their 
struggle for independence and accept the special autonomy under the new term ―self-
government‖, the GoI also agreed to accommodate GAM‘s political interests through 
local political parties, as long as the GAM proposal did not go against the constitution 
(Awaludin, 2008).  
 
5.5.4.3 The Mediator: Directive Behavior and a Clear Dialogue Frame   
The role of the mediator of the Helsinki peace talks, Martti Ahtisaari, was important. 
Ahtisaari entered the negotiating table with a clear agenda, and from the very outset, he 
clearly informed both parties about the frame of the peace talks. For Ahtisaari, it was 
important that the parties fully understood what they would like to negotiate in Helsinki, 
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and relate this to the agenda of the peace talks. In the first invitation letter, he explained 
explicitly that the peace talks would be based on the framework of the special 
autonomy, which included as listed by Awaludin (2008: 72): 
● Amnesty and GAM participation in politics; 
● GAM integration into society and participation in post-tsunami reconstruction 
activities; 
● Security guarantee for GAM members who return to society; 
● Termination of civil-emergency status and cessation of military operations; 
● Involvement of a third party to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement 
when it was agreed; 
● Respect for democracy and human rights; 
● The agreed time frame for the implementation of the agreement.  
As an experienced mediator in Namibia, Yugoslavia, South Africa and Northern 
Ireland, and having been the former President of Finland, Ahtisaari had high credibility 
and the proper leverage to effectively manage the peace talks between the GoI and 
GAM, and to ensure realistic discussions and open-minded concessions. The GoI and 
GAM were aware of Ahtisaari‘s reputation and commitment to peace, which increased 
their respect and desire to find a mutually agreeable solution rather than to obtain 
victory at the negotiating table. The most important event was when Ahtisaari requested 
that GAM must drop any reference to independence or a referendum at the negotiating 
table and that these topics were not to be negotiated at any stage in the peace talks. He 
often spoke firmly and was even considered to be rude by the negotiators (Husain, 
2006). Despite this unequivocal stance, it helped the GoI and GAM create ―interest-
based bargaining‖. There was a time when Ahtisaari expelled a GAM negotiator from 
the meeting room and refused their return if they continued to talk about independence. 
He promised that GAM would never achieve their dream because he would use all his 
strength to influence Europe and the world to oppose their struggle for independence 
(Awaludin, 2008). His assertiveness to keep the negotiation process on track indicated 
his optimism that the special autonomy could be the instrument for conflict resolution, 
which was also the reason he agreed to mediate the peace talks (Husain, 2007).  
With a clear agenda including the scope of negotiation, the CMI initially 
targeted that the negotiation would be conducted until July, and that with or without any 
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result, the negotiation should finish. One cannot negotiate forever, said the CMI 
spokesperson, Maria-Elena Cowell (2005), and with the limited time and funds 
available, it is expected that eagerness will be generated from both parties to reach a 
compromise. Furthermore, to avoid the negotiation process from public polemics in the 
media that come from outside the negotiating table (as had happened during the CoHA), 
Ahtisaari requested discipline from both parties, along with the assurance that they 
would not make any press statement before anything was agreed upon. He argued that 
the media could sometimes disrupt the process by creating news that could affect the 
public or put pressure on the negotiators. His concept for the negotiation process was 
―nothing is agreed before everything is agreed‖, which meant that neither of the 
conflicting parties could claim any victory during the peace process, and, that agreement 
would not be published until both parties had signed.
13
 In other words, this principle 
also required conflicting parties to negotiate for a comprehensive agreement on the final 
political settlement rather than on small issues with temporary solutions. 
 Ahtisaari combined a formal and informal negotiation approach, in which both 
parties sometimes talked directly to each other without a mediator present to provide 
space for them to discuss matters based on common interests and willingness. To him, 
the ownership of the peace process belonged to the GoI and GAM, and not to the 
mediator – ―if you can make yourself useless and unnecessary in a peace process, that‘s 
the best thing you can do‖ (Ahtisaari, 2006). When both parties faced any deadlock 
situations, his team would approach the GoI and GAM and talk to them informally until 
similar perceptions were reached. He managed to avoid deadlock when both parties got 
stuck with the terms of special autonomy or self-government, by proposing a third term 
that combined both, namely ―self-government within Indonesia‖.  
As the former President of Finland, Ahtisaari had good connections in Brussels 
to involve the EU to support the peace process in Aceh. In the last round of peace talks, 
the EU participated as the observer and later the GoI and GAM agreed to invite the EU 
with ASEAN to monitor the implementation of the agreement. One of the observers 
who participated in the last meeting was General Peter Feith from the Netherlands, who 
was later assigned as the Head of the Monitoring Mission in Aceh. Ahtisaari realized 
that the role of the third party as the guarantor was crucial since previous peace 
                                                 
13
 This principle was first announced in Helsinki, in January 2005. 
138 
 
processes had failed due to the lack of credibility from the HDC as the guarantor of the 
agreement. He stated that an NGO should not monitor the peace agreement, but he also 
understood that the UN involvement in the case of Aceh was very sensitive since the 
government did not want Aceh to become another East Timor (Accord, 2008). He 
believed that the EU, as a great actor in world politics, could contribute to the 
implementation in Aceh, and that neither of the parties (and least of all the GoI as the 
state actor) would violate the agreement because of the need for foreign investment and 
its international reputation (Merikallio, 2006: 56).   
 One of the EU‘s bases as the guarantor in the DDR process, as stated in 
European Security Strategy, was that the EU ―has a political and moral responsibility to 
act to avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by violent 
conflicts‖. In its 2003 European Security Strategy, it identified the need to address the 
challenges of regional conflict and failed state. Another basis that supported the CMI 
was Council Regulation No. 381/2001 concerning the Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
(RRM). The European Commission then allocated 4 million Euros under the RRM 
budget to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in 
Aceh, and to help former GAM members reintegrate into civilian life. Even so, the 
strong motive that prompted the EU member states to be involved in Aceh was the 
―tsunami effect‖ rather than any other issues, because the conflict in Aceh was of minor 
importance for the EU (Herrberg et al,2009). To support the mission of the DDR 
process, the EU allocated 9 million Euros from its budget and 6 million Euros from EU 
member states and participating countries. To make the DDR process more effective, 
Ahtisaari invited military experts to design the mechanism of the DDR process in Aceh. 
However, Ahtisaari understood that there are bound to be potential spoilers in 
every peace process and so he always tried to anticipate or respond quickly. During the 
third peace round, he received a report from GAM about the escalating abuse of human 
rights by Indonesian soldiers. After clarifying the report, he met President Yudhoyono 
in Jakarta in May 2005 and told him to get rid of the worst offenders, and to punish or at 
least transfer them (Morfit, 2006). Yudhoyono, who was committed to the peace 
process, listened attentively to Ahtisaari‘s report and understood that this situation could 
affect the peace prospects. Yudhoyono was to prove his willingness not only at the 
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negotiating table, but also outside, and he decided to reduce the number of the 
hardliners inside TNI.  
During the mediation process, Ahtisaari played an active role in encouraging the 
GoI and GAM to make concessions. He often explicitly pressurized one or both parties 
to focus on the agenda that was agreed upon, and sometimes even reprimanded the 
parties strongly for changing their attitude and behavior. He used the tactic of offering 
self-government within Indonesia as a mutual solution that pushed the GoI and GAM 
towards flexibility in respect of local political parties. The ‗directive behavior‘ strategy 
applied by Ahtisaari was to change the parties‘ perceptions of cost, benefit, and 
consequence. 
 
5.5.4.4 Back-Channel Approach: Heart-To-Heart Negotiation 
Another important factor that contributed to the optimism for successful negotiation was 
the back-channel approach that occurred during the Helsinki peace talks, either between 
Farid Husain and the GAM commanders in the field or between Juha Christensen and 
GAM leaders. Based on the previous peace process, Yudhoyono and Kalla initially 
advocated that the peace process should be addressed on three fronts – Jakarta, Aceh 
and Helsinki – as success in Helsinki and Aceh did not neccessarily mean success in 
Jakarta since the meaning of ―success‖ sometimes differed between the GAM leaders 
and the hardliners in the GoI (Djalal, 2006: 93). In order to strengthen the peace talks in 
Helsinki, Yudhoyono and Kalla believed that they should talk to people who could 
determine the outcome of the negotiations (Husain, 2007), including approaching and 
communicating with GAM‘s commanders on the battlefield, Muslim religious leaders 
(ulama), as well as formal and informal leaders. Through Farid Husain, the GoI wanted 
to gain support for the peace talks in Helsinki whilst collecting input from people on the 
ground. A similar role was played by Christensen who travelled to Indonesia on the 
side-lines of the peace talks, visited GAM and SIRA prisoners in Java, and talked to 
prominent leaders and NGO activists in Aceh. During these back-channel 
communications, Christensen and Husain explained the progress of the negotiation 
process and showed their optimism for successful negotiations to encourage the people.
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Besides meeting with these people, Kalla requested that Husain and Christensen 
arrange a meeting in Jakarta with the GAM advisor Damien Kingsbury, an Australian 
scholar who was concerned about the politics in Indonesia. Since the peace talks started, 
Indonesia‘s delegation perceived that Kingsbury played an important role for GAM in 
that his input often influenced their views at the negotiating table. Ahtisaari held a 
similar perception as he stated that the advisor was often more orthodox than the 
negotiators themselves – ―holier than the Pope‖ (Merikallio, 2006). However, 
Kingsbury‘s significant input was self-government, which was used as the basis to 
replace the term of special autonomy. The meeting between Kalla and Kingsbury was 
conducted on 22 March 2005 at the Vice President‘s residence. During the meeting, 
they discussed alternative solutions for Aceh and both agreed to find a dignified 
solution so that no party would lose face (Husain, 2007).  
 Aside from the formal meetings, Awaludin and Husain frequently 
communicated with Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah to convey their friendly 
intentions, which could not be expressed around the negotiating table.  The informal 
communication between the two leading negotiators was effective in building a 
common understanding between the interests of the GoI and GAM, and more 
importantly, to clarify some critical points that had arisen during the formal peace talks. 
Kalla believed that during the peace talks both parties had emotional arguments, and 
that this situation needed an informal or friendly approach to cool down the tension 
(Awaludin, 2008). There were critical moments when a few issues were negotiated 
outside of the negotiating table. As quoted by Christensen in ―To See the Unseen‖ 
(2007: 66):   
 
―When the negotiation faced a dead end, Farid Husain could solve it. In the 
negotiation process, there is always an official agenda and an unofficial 
agenda. Farid Husain and I became persons who acted as icebreakers or fixers. 
Farid Husain and I were always thinking one-step ahead. So the process 
towards peace could be continued‖. (Christensen, 2007: 66) 
 
Husain and Christensen were the key communicators during the back-channel 
meetings. Since the second round, every time the peace talks faced thorny issues, 
141 
 
Husain would invite Malik Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah for dinner and they would 
discuss the issues, make clarifications and try to see eye to eye about various issues, to 
reach a mutual understanding concerning the special autonomy, self-government, or 
local political parties. Husain actively observed the moments that might potentially 
cause failure in the formal negotiation and anticipated them through personal 
approaches made outside of the negotiating table. His experience during the pre-
negotiation phase, in which he managed to approach important people related to GAM 
leaders, enabled Malik Mahmud to trust him. Husain was able to build personal 
connections with GAM. As stated by Ahtisaari, the negotiation needed people like 
Husain and Christensen to do what they do (Husain, 2007) and both of them have saved 
the negotiation from a dead end as reported by The Jakarta Post (9 August 2005): 
 
―The final test for Farid Husain was to act as a trouble-shooter to save what 
could be a historic deal. As the talks were almost deadlocked on 15 July, he 
disappeared from the ambassador‘s house where the delegates rested or were 
chatting with journalists. It turned out he had gone to the city to meet a GAM 
representative. The next day, the party had an accord‖. (The Jakarta Post, 9 
August 2005) 
 
Malik Mahmud also admitted the importance of the back-channel meetings that 
had enabled the negotiation process to proceed (Husain, 2007) and increased the 
optimism of all parties involved in the process. As explained earlier, the ―track two‖ 
personal diplomacy by Husain and Christensen had started one and a half years before 
the formal talks began and their personal connection had aided both parties to express 
their interests and positions outside of the negotiating table. 
 
5.6  Conclusion  
The readiness theory states that the perception of ripeness influences the readiness for 
negotiation, but that the perception is worthless without motivation and optimism from 
the conflicting parties. The perception of conflict is that a stalemate will initiate the 
motivation of the parties for dialogue. From the two peace processes in Aceh, this 
current research found that the Helsinki MoU was riper since the motivation and 
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optimism from both the GoI and GAM were stronger compared to the previous peace 
process. The Helsinki peace process succeeded in transferring motivation into optimism 
for both parties to find a mutual solution. Since the peace process started, the GoI was 
more motivated than the GAM leaders, who only came to Helsinki out of respect for 
Ahtisaari‘s invitation (Djuli, 2012). The GoI‘s motivation then became the key element 
to start negotiations, which was reciprocated by GAM. In contrast, the first peace 
process by the CoHA lacked preparation and failed to build trust as one of the important 
elements for improving the optimism of the parties for a successful negotiation. Later, 
these were the key factors that made both parties agree to sign a full settlement in 
Helsinki in 2005. 
 Optimism and trust were products from the processes of precondition both in the 
CoHA and Helsinki process and they were shaped in the pre-negotiation process. The 
optimism of the GoI and GAM was influenced by the existing condition, domestic 
political setting as well as the international trend. It was found that there was close 
causality between these conditions and factors that cultivated motivation and optimism 
from both parties in the peace talks, which determined the outcome of the peace 
process. Moreover, the characteristics of the third party became an important factor that 
affected the effectiveness of the peace talks in that Ahtisaari succeeded in bringing 
optimism to both parties through his status as the former president by using his leverage 
to put pressure on the GoI and GAM to reach peace rather than victory. The 
characteristics of his approach contrasted with those of the HDC (the new NGO without 
any experience or leverage to pressure both parties), which was compounded by their 
lack of trust and optimism.     
 Besides the factors above, the Helsinki process was also well prepared for by the 
GoI, especially during the pre-negotiation process when the GoI sent a very strong 
reconciliatory signal to the GAM leaders. They encouraged GAM to begin negotiations 
with the political process that would transform GAM‘s goal for independence to a 
cooperative solution. Kalla as ―the team leader of field operations‖ identified the main 
problem of GAM and designed the negotiation process based on a cooperative 
agreement (Husain, 2007). The GoI also attracted GAM through several approaches, 
which included the perception of change in redefining GAM as a partner for peace 
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rather than an enemy and showed commitment through a willingness to negotiate a 
peaceful solution for Aceh. 
 This thesis further discovered that the conditions of the parties that affected their 
perception of readiness before the peace talks started had contributed to the success of 
negotiation. In the Helsinki peace talks, the tsunami had increased the motivation and 
optimism of both parties and attracted support from international actors. The previous 
peace process, however, did not have any particular event to strengthen the optimism of 
either party. Instead, the ―economic disaster‖ that subjected Indonesia to a 
multidimensional crisis had enhanced GAM‘s motivation to break free from Indonesia, 
which directly affected their optimism in the peace talks. Nevertheless, the failure of the 
CoHA also contributed to the Helsinki peace talks when the GoI insisted that the 
negotiation should focus on conflict resolution rather than a ceasefire agreement since 
the previous one had been unable to bring both parties together for a substantive 
dialogue. Both parties learned that once the motivation to end the conflict and optimism 
for successful negotiation had improved, they were both ready to focus on interest-
based bargaining rather than positional bargaining, as had been practised in the CoHA 
process. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE OUTCOME OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the outcome of the agreement that focused on the 
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki and the 
CoHA. As mentioned earlier in Chapters 4 and 5, to assess the success of the 
negotiation outcome and durability of peace, the issue of whether or not the agreement 
was actually effective in reducing violence and resolving the conflict will be considered. 
The effectiveness of reducing violence could be measured by first, the success of the 
disarmament-demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process that included the number 
of incidents and casualties; second, the commitment of both parties to implement the 
agreement; third, the length of time an agreement lasts; fourth, the implementation and 
adherence to the agreement by the parties involved; and fifth, the improvement in trust 
building by both parties.  
This chapter examines the last research question concerning the reasons why the 
CoHA had failed, while the Helsinki MoU was able to yield a successful outcome and 
create durable peace. This question can be resolved by looking at the readiness theory 
that mainly explains that the durability of an agreement is affected by the condition of 
whether the factors that produced the motive to end the conflict continue after the 
agreement is signed, and whether the optimism for the utility of the peace agreement is 
managed by both parties. Furthermore, motivation and optimism are explained in two 
phases: conflict management and conflict resolution. The conflict management 
provisions focus on the ceasefire or security arrangement, which includes 
demobilization, decommissioning and reintegration (DDR). On the other hand, the 
conflict resolution provisions mainly focus on political transformation, which includes 
elections and establishment of new laws. Conflict management is crucial because it 
forms the basis for conflict resolution. The motivation to end the conflict can be 
reflected in the way the DDR process was implemented. The success of the DDR 
process impacted on the parties‘ optimism to reach a permanent solution in the conflict 
resolution phase. However, the motivation and optimism must be addressed according 
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to the existing political environment in which the parties should consolidate support to 
make the peace durable. 
To organize the answer to the research question, motivation and optimism are 
explained according to four scopes of analysis: first, the mechanism within the 
agreement that includes the DDR process and the role of the third-party guarantor; 
second, the political process in implementing the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU; third, 
the domestic political condition; and fourth, the post-agreement condition. In each scope 
of the analysis, the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU are compared. 
 
6.2 Mechanism within the Agreement and the Party Guarantor 
Some scholars (Fortna, 2003; Hartzel, 1999) have stated that a fine peace agreement 
should provide deadlines and guidelines that include structural provision that determine 
what is to be achieved and the procedural provision, which further determines how 
peace is to be durable because without a proper mechanism within the agreement, peace 
would be impossible to reach. Fortna (2002: 213) argues that the mechanism within an 
agreement ―can affect the durable peace more likely by changing the incentives to break 
a ceasefire, by reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and by preventing 
accidental violations from triggering another round of fighting. If this argument is 
correct, the content of ceasefire agreements should affect whether peace lasts. 
Individually and collectively, these measures should be associated with more durable 
peace, all else equal‖. 
 
6.2.1 CoHA: The Failure to Build Commitment, an Unclear Mechanism and the 
Weaknesses of the Third-Party Guarantor 
The failure of the security arrangements had started since the peace process in 2000, as 
indicated by the continuing violence and human rights violations and the internal 
refugee (IDP) problem. Between 1999 and 2003, most of the perpetrators of violence 
were called Orang Tak Dikenal (OTK), or ‗the unknown perpetrators‘. This title 
indicated the weakness of the agreement to stop the conflict and protect people. Many 
human rights violations reports received by the NGOs and media showed that the so-
called ‗OTK‘ gave impunity to the actors committing violence in Aceh. Deeper 
investigations carried out by humanitarian activists and NGOs stated that victims or 
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people actually knew who the violators were, but remained silent to ensure their safety. 
Although they could identify the perpetrators of violence, there was no guarantee that 
justice or sanctions would be enforced from the security committee at the negotiating 
table.  
Table 6.1 Data on human rights violations during the peace talks  
(Source: Coalition Of Human Rights NGOs, Aceh, 2001) 
 
Cases 
Humanitarian 
Pause I 
Humanitarian 
Pause II 
Moratorium 
Armed clashes 17 57 4 
Killings 47 211 36 
Mistreatment 56 480 116 
Arrests 25 340 27 
Sexual assault - 2 - 
Burnt houses/shops 516 516 184 
 
Negotiation phases 
Humanitarian Pause I: 2 June 2000 – 2 September 2000 
Humanitarian Pause II: 15 September 2000 – 15 January 2001 
Moratorium: 15 January 2001 – 15 February 2001  
 
The peace process became more difficult after President Abdurrahman Wahid 
issued Presidential Instruction Number 4 in April 2001 to handle the crisis in Aceh. The 
presidential instruction formed a comprehensive approach towards resolving the 
problem in Aceh, encompassing the economic, political, cultural, social, peace and legal 
sectors. Although the instruction gave support to steps to be taken to resolve the 
problem through dialogue, the implementation of this instruction was through a 
strengthened security approach – Operasi Keamanan dan Pemulihan Hukum (OKPH), 
or the Security and Law Enforcement Operation.  
The GoI‘s policy, which combined the dialogue and the security approach, was 
strongly rejected by the Acehnese and GAM who perceived it to be inconsistent with 
the commitment to settle problems peacefully (Serambi Indonesia, 25 April 2001). In 
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July 2001, the regional police, under the authority of OKPH, arrested five GAM 
negotiators in front of HDC personnel. The five negotiators were charged with 
subversion. The security force action was very bizarre indeed from the viewpoint of the 
ethics of diplomacy. In November 2012, the Presidential Instruction was revised by 
Presidential Instruction Number 7 that focused more on the security approach, including 
law enforcement. However, the law enforcement that was embedded in the OKPH did 
not change the situation in that numerous cases of violence towards the people 
continued without any state protection.  
 
Table 6.2 Human rights violations after Presidential Instruction No. IV/2001  
(2001–2002) (Source: Coalition of Human Rights NGOs, Aceh) 
 
District Killings Arrests Abductions Torture 
Violence 
against 
women 
Total 
East Aceh 60 13 10 116 15 214 
North Aceh 120 48 10 51 - 229 
West Aceh  31 19 1 17 - 68 
Central Aceh 214 - 16 18 - 248 
South Aceh  53 36 4 14 - 107 
Pidie 68 73 10 39 - 190 
Greater Aceh  46 47 2 12 - 107 
Total 592 236 53 267 15 1163 
 
The escalating conflict and violence reflected the lack of motivation and 
optimism from both sides concerning the agreement implementation. The 
implementation of military operation while the peace talks were still taking place 
indicated that the GoI was not optimistic about what had been agreed at the negotiating 
table, and neither was GAM as it was reported that they kept on consolidating and 
strengthening their military capacity. Under these conditions, the CoHA that was signed 
on 9 December 2002 had the objectives as written in Article 1, Objectives of the 
Cessation of Hostilities and All Acts of Violence: 
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1. To proceed to the next phase of the peace process, as mutually agreed on 10 May 
2002 in Switzerland; 
2. To continue the confidence-building process with a view to eliminating all kinds of 
suspicion and creating a positive and cooperative atmosphere, which will bring the 
conflict in Aceh to a peaceful conclusion; 
3. To enable provisions to end hostilities, and cease all acts of violence for the peace 
process to proceed to the next phase, i.e. the delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction assistance. 
Regarding the process of demilitarization, article 3 of the CoHA stated: ―… (b-
vii) to design and implement a mutually agreed process upon demilitarization.‖ 
Regarding this last task, the Joint Security Committee (JSC) will designate what will be 
called Peace Zones. After these particular zones have been identified, GAM will 
designate placement sites for its weapons. Two months after the signing of the COH and 
as confidence grows, GAM will begin the phased placement of its weapons, arms and 
ordinance on the designated sites. The JSC will also decide on a simultaneous phased 
relocation of TNI forces which will reformulate their mandate from a strike force to a 
defensive force... ‖. 
However, as in the ceasefire agreement, the CoHA failed to implement security 
arrangements, which included the cessation of hostilities and ceasefire, identification of 
the demilitarization zone, relocation for TNI, disarmament of GAM, and reformulation 
of the Special Police Force (BRIMOB) to regular policemen. In addition, this agreement 
further strengthened the distrust of both parties since each of them interpreted the CoHA 
based on their own interests. When the peace zone was to be implemented, the GoI and 
GAM had a different interpretation of the meaning of ―peace zone‖ that stated ―…to 
separate the forces of both parties with sufficient distance to avoid contact or 
confrontation. Forces of both parties will refrain from operations, movements, activities 
or any provocative acts that could lead to contact or confrontation with each other‖ 
(Article 4.b). GAM interpreted ‗peace zone‘ as a zone without military presence or 
special police force (BRIMOB), because in the eyes of GAM and the common villagers, 
the presence of the military or special police forces could create an atmosphere of 
intimidation for people. Nevertheless, the GoI argued for the presence of military 
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personnel in the peace zone to protect the people from GAM or other criminal actors 
who were committing acts of extortion or other forms of intimidation. 
The CoHA only succeeded in decreasing the violence in the first two months 
after it was signed. The HDC reported that between December 2002 and March 2003 
(prior to the agreement) the average number of civilians killed per month had dropped 
to 12 compared to 87, only 9 members of GAM were killed compared to 102 per month, 
and only 4 TNI/POLRI members were killed compared to 45 per month. However, the 
number of acts of violence increased and continued in the following months, and 
according to a TNI source, 50 people were reported to have been killed in the first three 
weeks of April 2003 (Serambi Indonesia, 13 April 2003). The local NGO Coalition for 
Human Rights reported (2004) that during the CoHA period, 1,311 agreement violation 
cases were reported, which included murder, torture, kidnapping, extortion, and other 
impunity cases. 
The lack of a clear mechanism and/or specific guidance for investigation or 
punishment was found in the security articles without any clear procedure for the way 
disarmament and demobilization would be conducted. The HDC (as the third party 
guarantor, together with the GoI and GAM) never resolved or outlined the disarmament 
mechanism. In many cases, the disarmament procedure should be discussed during the 
negotiation process, and it was too risky to be implemented without a common 
understanding or commitment from the conflicting parties. GAM avoided storing their 
weapons under TNI control and TNI responded by not relocating their troops as agreed 
in the CoHA (Tiba, 2003). Even the HDC and the monitoring team of the Joint Security 
Council did not have a baseline figure concerning how many of GAM‘s weapons must 
be stored, and what would happen to the weapons after they had been stored. In January 
2003, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, claimed 
that GAM utilized the agreement to consolidate and increase their combatants from 
3,000 to 5,000 while acquiring new arms, which increased their weapons from 1,800 to 
2,100 which included M-16s, AKs and RPG-7s (Serambi Indonesia, 3 January 2003). 
Malik Mahmud stated that more than USD 10 million had been spent by GAM on 
weapons, and in addition, GAM spokesperson Sofyan Dawood argued that the weapons 
had been used to protect the Acehnese (Serambi Indonesia, 8 November 2002). TNI 
then reacted by increasing three organic infantry battalions in Aceh from 600–650 to 
150 
 
1,000 soldiers (Serambi Indonesia, 3 January 2003). In mid-April 2003, Major General 
Djalil Yusuf, The Chief Commander for Aceh, or Panglima Komando Daerah Militer 
Iskandar Muda (KODAM) in Aceh, revealed that the number of TNI troops in Aceh had 
been increased to 26,000 (Kompas, 5 April 2003).  
Aside from the improved military capacity, TNI argued that the peace process 
was used by GAM to strengthen their political position and establish a shadow 
government that covered the hierarchy from the governor level down to the village level 
and that they ruled as the local administration. To support their activities, GAM 
collected funds through extortion, also referred to as pajak nanggroe (tax treatment). 
The Acehnese people and the business sector in Aceh were targeted for this pajak 
nanggroe. TNI and the police reported that GAM extorted through intimidation or terror 
and that since 2000, GAM had been reported to have collected 20% from the allocation 
for development funds of the villages in Aceh, and that during the Humanitarian Pause, 
GAM had taken 50–75% from aid programmes. Furthermore, during the CoHA, GAM 
had ‗taxed‘ 15–30% from international NGOs that worked in Aceh and collected IDR 
35 million from villagers to buy weapons (Schulze, 2004: 65).  
Escalating tension between TNI and GAM had destroyed all the trust that had 
been built since the CoHA was signed, and wrecked the plan for the first placement of 
weapons that had been planned for early April 2003 (HDC Internal Review, 2003). 
During the implementation of the CoHA, the DDR processes, as the basis of the peace 
transition, were not fully implemented.  
 
Table 6.3 Summary of the CoHA after five months of implementation 
(Based on ELSAM: Briefing Paper No 2, dated 3 April 2003) 
Commitment  Responsible 
party 
Outcome 
To cease the hostilities and all forms 
of violence directed against each other 
and civilians in Aceh. 
 
To control their respective forces on 
the ground, both TNI/POLRI and 
GAM. 
 
To control the groups that did not 
share their objectives but claimed to 
Indonesian 
Military Chief  
 
GAM 
Commander 
 
In January 2003, the media reported 
complaints from the business sector, 
including store owners, travel agents 
and contractors, about extortion by 
GAM and TNI/POLRI at checkpoint 
posts along the way from Banda Aceh 
to Medan.  
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be part of their forces. 
To guarantee that neither party would 
increase their military strength, which 
included redeployment of forces, 
increase in military personnel or 
military equipment into Aceh. 
 
The GoI 
including TNI 
and POLRI and 
GAM 
Commander 
 
There is a report about rolling of TNI in 
Aceh when the existence of the new 
troops was not balanced by withdrawing 
the previous troops. 
 
Another report stated that GAM had 
smuggled weapons into Aceh and added 
to the number of combatants. 
To reformulate the mandate and 
mission of the Mobil Brigade of the 
Indonesian Police, called BRIMOB. 
 
The GoI  and 
Indonesian 
Police 
Headquarters 
Aceh Regional Police or Kepolisian 
Daerah Aceh argued that they were not 
informed yet about this provision. The 
estimated amount of the BRIMOB was 
12,000 personnel in Aceh. 
It was reported that GAM had shot three 
BRIMOB personnel in Simpang Leubue 
Cot, Kuta Makmur, Bireuen. 
Both parties would allow civil society 
to express their democratic rights 
freely. 
 
The GoI 
including TNI 
and POLRI 
 
GAM and GAM 
Commander 
Acts of intimidation and terror 
perpetrated against civilian society were 
still reported by human rights NGOs.  
 
The peace rally held by the activists was 
forcibly disbanded by BRIMOB on 9 
January 2003 resulting in four casualties 
The forces of both parties would 
refrain from operations, movements, 
activities or any provocative acts that 
could lead to contact or confrontation 
with each other. 
 
The GoI 
including TNI 
and the POLRI 
 
GAM and GAM 
Commander 
Both parties were still performing 
operations, including sweeping. 
 
KODAM Iskandar Muda trained three 
battalions of his troops. 
 
GAM inaugurated the new Commanders 
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Relocation of the TNI forces, which 
would reformulate their mandate from 
an offensive to a defensive position, 
while GAM would start the phased 
placement of its weapons, arms and 
ordinance. 
 
The GoI 
including TNI 
and the POLRI 
 
GAM and GAM 
Commander 
TNI was still at the level of formulating 
the concept of relocation of troops. 
Meanwhile, the armed conflicts 
continued, for instance in the Sub-
districts of Trumon, South Aceh, on 16 
February 2003. The impact was that 
both parties refused to implement the 
agreement and accused the other party 
of not committing to the CoHA. 
To identify demilitarized zones, such 
as schools, mosques, health 
institutions and public places, bazaars, 
market-places, food stalls, 
communication centres,  including bus 
terminals, taxi-stations (taxicab 
stands), ferry terminals, public roads, 
river transportation services and 
fishing ports. 
 
Not specified 
 
The TNI/BRIMOB posts were still 
established in some of the designated 
peace zones.  
To design and implement the process 
of demilitarization. 
 The GoI 
including the 
TNI and the 
POLRI 
 
GAM and GAM 
Commander 
The demilitarization process should 
have been launched since 11 February 
2003, but it was never implemented. 
The mechanism offered by the JSC was 
rejected by both parties. 
 
 
6.2.2 The Weaknesses of the Third-Party Guarantor 
Besides the lack of motivation from conflicting parties to end the conflict and the lack 
of clarity concerning the mechanism for implementing the agreement, the failure of the 
CoHA was also due the weakness of the JSC, which had no strong mandate to monitor 
and facilitate a dispute settlement mechanism when the agreement was violated by the 
parties. In practice, the JSC was almost fully dependent on the willingness of the GoI 
and had no authority to take a decision if one party (the GoI or GAM) rejected the 
decision with a ―veto system‖. To keep conflicting parties involved in the process, the 
HDC made an ‗equilibrating (balancing) policy‘ in writing verification reports. The 
reports tried not to accuse one party concerning their acts but the HDC and its team used 
persuasive approaches to change the attitudes of the parties in the field (HDC Internal 
Review, 2003). As a consequence, the JSC and HDC lost trust and respect from the GoI 
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and GAM that perceived the JSC as ineffective, irresolute, biased and disrespectful. On 
14 April 2003, Amien Rais, as Head of the People‘s Consultative Assembly, stated that 
the HDC was just a small ―pea-sized‖ (ecek-ecek in Indonesian) NGO and suggested 
that the government leave them since the HDC had no capacity to be a mediator 
(Serambi Indonesia, 18 May 2003). 
The lack of understanding from the international team of the local situation, lack 
of coordination with other institutions, language problems and limited representations of 
international observers had affected the effectiveness of the JSC in the field. The 
passive monitoring approach made it awkward for the JSC to respond to violations of 
the agreement, and disappointed many people. The credibility and neutrality of JSC 
personnel who came from ASEAN countries were also criticized by GAM, who argued 
that the concept of non-intervention among ASEAN countries meant that the military 
personnel from ASEAN could not work objectively because some countries, for 
instance the Philippines and Thailand, had also experienced unresolved separatist 
problems (Serambi Indonesia, 3 February 2003). 
In practice, the JSC could only report findings and assigned responsibility 
without imposing sanctions on the parties that had committed extortion or shown other 
provocative behaviour. The JSC was also unable to handle or counter the spoilers 
inasmuch as most of them were driven by hardliners from high-ranking military 
commanders. The insufficient understanding of the situation was over-estimated when 
the HDC believed that TNI Commander General Endriartono Sutarto and the Chief of 
Police General Da‘i Bachtiar could control the lower ranking troops in the field and 
prevent spoiling of the peace within the Indonesian military, while in fact, the Megawati 
presidency was dominated by nationalists and conservative military elements who 
rejected the peace process with GAM from the outset. This is also the reason why the 
representatives of TNI had been given a limited mandate to control the military 
commanders in the field, even the representative order to remove the roadblocks 
without permission from higher TNI commanders.  
The weakness of the JSC was a reflection of the weakness of the HDC as the 
third-party guarantor for implementation of the agreement. The HDC, as an NGO, had 
no leverage or authority to apply sanctions for any violation from the provisions of the 
CoHA. According to the GAM negotiators and based on their experience, the HDC 
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could not give a guarantee for GAM members if the process of disarmament and 
decommissioning was finished (Tiba, 2003). GAM wanted to settle the political issue 
first, before surrendering their weapons to the JSC, and requested the HDC to ensure the 
weapons were not confiscated and seized by TNI after being stored.  
All of these conditions accumulated, and on 17–18 April 2003, the GoI proposed 
a Joint Council meeting in Tokyo that was called for as a last-ditch effort to save the 
CoHA when GAM had failed to meet the deadline for placement of their weapons in 
January 2003. The HDC, with limited capacity, tried to put pressure on both conflicting 
parties to work with the Government of Japan, which was willing to facilitate a Joint 
Council Meeting in Tokyo (17–18 May 2003). Actually, this meeting was postponed for 
a few weeks for technical reasons; GAM rejected the plan of meeting in Tokyo and 
proposed to conduct the meeting during the weekend in Geneva instead, without 
offering any clear reason, and the HDC was not able to mediate GAM‘s request to the 
GoI (Sastrohandoyo, 2003). The meeting in Tokyo was the last meeting, and in the 
following hours, Megawati declared martial law in Aceh.  
The research found that one of the key conditions that could affect the 
motivation and optimism of the GoI and GAM for implementing the agreement was the 
role of a third-party guarantor, such as the AMM or JSC. This role is important since the 
parties would have shown more optimism for implementing the DDR plan if they had 
felt more secure under the monitoring of an outside guarantor that had political power to 
verify or implement demobilization. Whenever the guarantor (such as the JSC) failed to 
take action, the parties became demotivated to implement what they had signed. The 
credibility of the third party (such as the AMM) would affect the successful 
implementation of the agreement when they could enforce the settlement and guarantee 
that neither side was dishonest (Fortna, 2003). Contrary to the JSC, the AMM had the 
capability to control the behavior of the GoI and GAM in minimizing the violent 
incidents and also monitor the compliance of the agreement to demobilize. In addition, 
the AMM succeeded in preventing misunderstandings by setting up direct 
communications and clear guidance in the CoSA (Commission on Security and 
Arrangements) meetings that were followed by both parties.   
As a new NGO, the HDC had no experience as a guarantor because this role had 
previously and usually been played by the state actor. The implementation of a peace 
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agreement requires a credible third-party guarantor, and when the HDC failed to 
implement the CoHA, it also lost the credibility to facilitate the peace talks. During the 
CoHA, the performance of the JCS could be concluded to have made no complete 
analysis of spoilers and ways of handling them; to have no coercive capacity against 
them, have little capacity for positive inducement, and only have the ability to set norms 
and procedures (Huber, 2004). However, as a new NGO, the HDC was expected to 
improve its image at the international level as a successful NGO in conflict resolution 
but without fully strengthening its own capacity for assisting implementation.  
 
6.2.3 The Helsinki MoU: The Role of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and 
the DDR Processes 
A few months after the Helsinki MoU was signed, the violent conflict in Aceh 
decreased significantly compared to the previous time where 20–30 deaths occurred 
each month in Aceh. The decrease in violence did not only indicate the motivation and 
commitment, but also the improvement of mutual trust of the parties to apply the 
agreement. 
 
Table 6.4 Pre- and post-MoU incidents and impacts during 2005 
(Source: World Bank/DSF Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1–31 December 2005) 
 
 
 
The high motivation and commitment from both parties to end the conflict was 
supported by the presence of the third party as the guarantor in implementing the 
agreement. To support the process, especially to monitor the commitment for the peace 
agreement, the GoI and GAM agreed to invite the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to 
monitor the demobilization of GAM and the decommissioning of its armaments (5.2.a 
of the Helsinki MoU); and to monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and 
non-organic police troops (5.2.b of the Helsinki MoU). 
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The AMM is a civilian mission within the framework of the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) whose personnel include EU member states (130 
personnel) and five participating ASEAN countries (96 personnel); this mission was the 
first ESDP operation in Asia. The combination of AMM personnel between EU and 
ASEAN was very important to eliminate the negative perception of the dominance of 
Western countries in Aceh. Moreover, the personnel from ASEAN have a better 
understanding of the Asian cultural and military traditions in Indonesia (Ponto, 
2013:74).   
Specifically, the commitment and motivation to end the conflict could be 
identified during the DDR process that had been agreed in the Helsinki MoU: 
1. GAM undertakes to demobilize all of its 3,000 military troops (4.2); GAM 
undertakes the decommissioning of all arms, ammunition and explosives, and 
commits to handing over 840 arms (4.3); the decommissioning of GAM armaments 
will begin on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages and concluded 
by 31 December 2005 (4.4); 
2. The GoI will provide weapons collection points and support mobile weapons 
collection teams in collaboration with GAM (5.9); 
3. Immediate destruction will be carried out after the collection of weapons and 
ammunition (5.10). 
The number of organic military forces to remain in Aceh after the relocation amounts to 
14,700. The number of organic police forces to remain in Aceh after relocation amounts 
to 9,100 (4.7).     
To conduct the process, the AMM facilitated representatives from both parties in 
a Commission on Security and Arrangements (CoSA) to settle the dispute concerning 
the implementation of the agreement. The CoSA is an important forum to build trust 
between the GoI and GAM, and also determine how the Helsinki MoU would be 
implemented. During the AMM mission, the CoSA conducted 44 meetings when the 
AMM and the senior representatives from the GoI and GAM discussed and took 
initiative through consensus to settle many crucial issues that had not been mentioned 
clearly in Helsinki (Ponto, 2013: 132). The CoSA meetings established an effective 
mechanism for dispute settlement that was held at the district and provincial levels. All 
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the dispute settlement mechanisms were based on the mechanism that was agreed on in 
Helsinki, which included: 
1. As a rule, eventual disputes concerning the implementation of this MoU will be 
resolved by the Head of the Monitoring Mission, in dialogue with the parties, and 
with all parties providing the required information immediately. The Head of the 
Monitoring Mission will make a ruling, which will be binding on the parties (6.1.a); 
2. If the Head of the Monitoring Mission concludes that a dispute cannot be resolved by 
the means described above, the dispute will be discussed together by the Head of the 
Monitoring Mission with the senior representative of each party. Following this, the 
Head of the Monitoring Mission will make a ruling that will be binding on the parties 
(6.1.b); 
3. In cases where disputes cannot be resolved by either of the means described above, 
the Head of the Monitoring Mission will report directly to the Coordinating Minister 
for Political, Law and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the political 
leadership of GAM and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis 
Management Initiative, with the EU Political and Security Committee informed. 
After consultation with the parties, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Crisis Management Initiative will make a ruling, which will be binding on the parties 
(6.1.c). 
During the disarmament and demobilization process, both parties committed to 
use the ―cash-and-carry‖ model, which meant that for each 300 of GAM‘s weapons 
disarmed 10 TNI battalions would be demobilized. As stated in the MoU:  
 
The relocation of non-organic military and non-organic police forces will begin 
on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages in parallel with the 
GAM decommissioning immediately after each stage has been verified by the 
AMM, and concluded by 31 December 2005 (4.6).  
 
During the peace talks, GAM argued that they would not surrender the weapons 
to TNI, because they did not consider themselves as a surrendering party in Helsinki, 
but as a party working with the GoI in search of a mutually acceptable solution. Hence, 
to save face for GAM, the GoI agreed that GAM could surrender their weapons to the 
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AMM without a large presence of TNI. The weapons were cut into three pieces at the 
appointed square; GAM could keep one piece of the weapon and the other two pieces 
would be transferred to the AMM and TNI. On 31 December 2005, GAM completed 
handing over the weapons with a total of 1,018 arms. From this number, 840 were 
accepted and destroyed and 178 were disqualified. The GoI also completed their 
withdrawal of troops from Aceh with a total of 31,681 non-organic security forces being 
redeployed.  
 
Table 6.5 Weapons decommissioning and relocation by phase (2005) 
 
 
To support the disarmament process, the GoI allocated 526 billion rupiah 
(approximately 50 million USD) for TNI‘s withdrawal from Aceh. Some analysts 
believed that the withdrawal fund was compensation for TNI from its economic benefit 
in Aceh, and would be similar to what TNI would have managed if the conflict had 
continued (McCulloch, 2002). However, the full control of Yudhoyono‘s government 
over the military was able to marginalize and dismiss the conservative officers, and 
made implementation of the DDR process in Aceh possible without any turmoil. In 
addition, the military commitment was not only present when the negotiations started in 
Helsinki but almost throughout the whole peace process. First of all, General Sutarto 
had committed to supporting government policy from the beginning to settle the conflict 
through dialogue. Secondly, the representative of TNI with the full mandate had made a 
commitment since the fourth round of peace talks in Helsinki and continued in the 
CoSA meetings. Thirdly, the soldiers on the battlefield obeyed the military commanders 
(Ponto, 2013: 278). 
On the day the agreement was signed in Helsinki, TNI commander General 
Endriartono Sutarto with a full team of high ranking military officers, visited Aceh. 
According to the TNI commander, the purpose of his visit was to ensure that the 
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soldiers obeyed the peace agreement, ―because the deal without being followed by 
implementation in the field is of no use‖ (Kompas, 16 August 2005). The full support 
from the military side impressed the international actors concerning the compliance of 
TNI under Yudhoyono‘s presidency and helped rebuild the image of TNI as a 
professional army after the case of East Timor. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The GoI–GAM incidents by months 
(Source: National Violence Monitoring Update: 1 Jan 2005 – 31 July 2006) 
 
In relation to the reinsertion and reintegration process, the GoI committed to a 
general amnesty for all GAM members, except for criminal cases.
14
 The amnesty was 
legalized through Presidential Decree No. 22/2005 and was in keeping with what was 
agreed in Helsinki, namely that the GoI would, in accordance with constitutional 
procedures, grant amnesty to all persons who have participated in GAM activities as 
soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU. (3.1.1). 
Furthermore, by September 2005, the GoI had released 1,424 political prisoners and 
detainees in Aceh and 463 in Java (Serambi Indonesia, 23 September 2005).   
In October 2005, the local government distributed daily living allowance to 
3,000 former GAM members (IDR 750,000 per person/month or approximately USD 
                                                 
14
Article 3.1.1. of the Helsinki MoU states that ―The GOI, in line with constitutional procedure, will give 
amnesty to all persons who were involved in any GAM activity as soon as possible and not more than 15 
days since this MoU is signed‖ (http://www.cmi.fi/files/Aceh_MoU.pdf) 
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75). Furthermore, to support larger programmes on integration, the Governor of Aceh 
established the Reintegration Agency, or Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA), one of whose 
missions was to empower the livelihood sector for groups of victims and combatants. 
Along with the more stable condition, many GAM leaders and members who lived 
overseas returned to Aceh. The return of the number of GAM members to Aceh 
indicated the strengthening of trust between GAM and the GoI.  
 
6.2.4 Post-Agreement Dialogue 
The mission of the AMM was accomplished on 15 December 2006 while many 
elements in Aceh society believed that its presence was still needed for at least one year 
to facilitate dialogue between Jakarta and Aceh. Kalla and his colleagues Farid Husain 
and Juha Christensen then invited Interpeace to take the role of facilitating the dialogue 
between representatives of the GoI and former GAM leaders. As stated by Pieter Feith, 
―Interpeace is not a sub-division of the AMM or continuation of it. They have a 
different mandate and their structure is smaller than the AMM‖ (Serambi Indonesia, 15 
December 2005).  
Interpeace, an international NGO led by President Martti Ahtisaari, focuses on 
human rights monitoring and the reintegration process. At a later stage (2008–2009), the 
author himself was entrusted to manage the Interpeace programme in Aceh. Interpeace 
had actively facilitated monthly meetings between Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi 
(FKK) Desk Aceh, or Coordination and Communication Forum-Desk Aceh, and the 
former GAM leaders. The FKK was part of the Coordinating Ministry for Political 
Affairs, Security and Law (known as Menkopolhukam) and had a mandate to accelerate 
the implementation of the Helsinki MoU. After Interpeace discontinued its work in 
Aceh, the CMI continued the facilitation role under the programme Aceh Peace Process 
Support (APPS) and assigned the retired Major General Jaakko Oksanen, as Deputy 
Head of Mission (AMM) to facilitate the dialogue between the GoI and former GAM 
leaders during 2012–2013.  
The role of the third party in post-agreement is very important, especially in 
facilitating the dialogue between the former conflicting parties. However, the 
implementation of the agreement required a much longer period than the DDR process, 
and the two sides still needed to establish communication so that the agreement that had 
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been signed could be interpreted and implemented together. Some important issues that 
were facilitated by Interpeace (and subsequently by the CMI) included the 
establishment of local political parties, a sharing mechanism for the oil and gas in Aceh, 
independent candidates in the local elections of 2012, and the reconciliation process. 
The dialogue was more informal and closed to the public. 
 
6.3  Political Processes in the CoHA and the Helsinki MoU 
The durability of peace is determined by the political process as the core substance of 
agreement on ways to address the governance issues on power sharing that include 
election, autonomy system, and political amnesty. All of the issues in the political 
process are encouraged to eastablish a democratic post-conflict environment, which will 
prevent the probability of the recurrence of violent conflict. In this phase, the political 
process includes transitional election to establish the new authority, to promote basic 
human rights, and the constitution-making process (Sisk, 2003). 
 
6.3.1 The CoHA: Short Life of the Agreement 
As a partial agreement, the CoHA only focused on security arrangements, which did not 
indicate a clear mechanism for political settlement. Instead, the basis of political 
settlement was formulated by ―acceptance of the NAD Law as a starting point‖ that 
created a polemic in its implementation as GAM interpreted the Autonomy Law as the 
first thing to be discussed, but not as a permanent political solution (Tiba, 2003).  
Without any clear direction for the conflict transformation in the CoHA, GAM 
interpreted the ―all-inclusive dialogue‖ and ―elections‖ as part of the referendum 
process. Most of the Acehnese in the villages believed that the future results of the 
CoHA implementation would achieve independence for Aceh. Even GAM stated to the 
Acehnese that peace zones as an indicator of independence were imminent with the 
support of the UN (Tiba, 2003). Misperception and misinterpretation of the CoHA was 
a part of the failed trust-building process while the CoHA also did not mention clearly 
or in detail the timing and manner of the placement of GAM‘s weapons, the mechanism 
for the all-inclusive dialogue, or the proper definition of election. In the last meeting, 
which was conducted in Tokyo on 17 May 2003, GAM tried to make a concession by 
terminating their struggle for independence, and placing their weapons according to the 
162 
 
CoHA schedule (HDC Internal Review, 2003). The GoI exerted pressure and requested 
that GAM declare publicly and explicitly their concessions under the joint statement in 
the following draft:  
 
―GAM fully accepts the special autonomy provided by the Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam Law within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia, and, consequently, agrees not to seek independence for Aceh…in this 
regard, GAM is committed to drop the armed struggle, to disband the Tentara 
Nasional Aceh and to participate in the political process as stipulated in the 
CoHA‖. (Hadi 2003: 42)  
  
 However, GAM rejected this draft statement and argued over the required 
parameters of the CoHA, and they were not ready to declare their position publicly. 
GAM walked out from the next session of negotiation, and the negotiation ended, as 
stated by HDC in its release on 18 May 2003:  
 
―The Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), with the help of 
the international community, has been engaged in last-minute efforts to bring 
the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) together in 
an attempt to resolve their immediate differences and avert a resumption of 
conflict … Those efforts were, unfortunately, unsuccessful‖. (HDC Statement 
on Aceh, www.hdcentre.org) 
 
Crisis in the DDR process and the ambiguities of the CoHA prevented the GoI 
and GAM to enter into a political settlement and this affected the level of motivation 
from both parties. From GAM‘s side, political settlement would precede the 
disarmament process, and, within the CoHA context, GAM felt insecure about handing 
over their weapons before a basis political solution was agreed upon (Kamaruzaman, 
2003).  
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6.3.2 The Helsinki MoU 
As planned from the very beginning, the Helsinki peace talks tried to find a 
comprehensive solution for Aceh in which the special autonomy became the basis of 
conflict resolution that covered various aspects:  
1. Political status and governing of Aceh 
2. Human rights institutions 
3. Amnesty and reintegration into society 
4. Security arrangements 
5. Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM, to be supervised by the EU and ASEAN) 
6. Provisions for dispute resolution 
 
Although the 71 articles in the Helsinki MoU did not bring any significant 
extension to the existing special Autonomy Law of 2004, for GAM it was a concession 
that enabled Aceh to have more sovereignty to be formulated under the new law (Law 
on the Governing of Aceh). To prevent polemic and controversy concerning the 
Helsinki MoU related to the term of self-government, the Indonesian negotiator 
explained to the public that what both parties had agreed on in Helsinki had been 
accommodated in the special Autonomy Law and other laws, such as Wali Nanggroe, or 
the recognition of local symbols. Therefore, it can be said that the Helsinki MoU was 
the special Autonomy Law with a few new clauses‖ (Kompas, 6 September 2005). Only 
a few articles in the Helsinki MoU were found to be new, such as the one concerning 
local political parties (1.2.1); Aceh‘s right to set a different interest rate to the Central 
Bank (1.31.), and the requirement that national laws affecting Aceh must be approved 
by the province‘s legislature (1.1.2.c). Moreover, the core of the Helsinki MoU 
principle is that 
 
―Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs … except in the 
fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal 
matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution‖. 
(1.1.2.a) 
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After the successful DDR process, on 11 July 2006, the government endorsed 
the Law on Governing of Aceh No. 11 of 2006, known as LoGA, the basic law in 
implementing the Helsinki MoU. Through the presence of this LoGA, Aceh was 
recognized as a territory with authority that was different from other regions, with 
specific and special characteristics, as stated in the following: 
 
―Aceh is a province constituting a legal social unit having unique characteristics 
and granted with a special authority to manage and administer its local 
governance and social interests...‖. (LoGA Article 1, Verse 2) 
 
Furthermore, the LoGA accommodated key articles of the Helsinki MoU, which 
included: 
1. General: The Government (pemerintahan) of Aceh is to regulate all public sectors 
except those that are the authority of the central government, which includes foreign 
affairs, defence, security, justice, monetary affairs, national fiscal affairs and certain 
functions in the field of religion (article 7). 
2. Economic: Aceh is to receive 70% of oil and gas revenue, 80% of forestry, fishery, 
mining and geothermal energy revenue (article 181), an additional 2% of DAU 
(General Allocation Funds) for 15 years and 1% for the following 5 years, and 
mining enterprises must establish Community Development Funds (article 159). 
3. Political: Local political parties (article 257), independent candidates for first 
elections only (article 256).  
4. Law: A Human rights court is to be established (article 228), as well as a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission based on existing regulations (article 229), and the right 
to implement shariah law (article 125). 
5. Security: The role of TNI is to protect state unity and sovereignty (article 202). 
6. Socio-cultural: Wali Nanggroe is to be established as a non-political non-government 
institution (article 96). 
7. Subsequent required regulations: 
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● At least four national government regulations 
● Three presidential decrees 
● At least 58 provincial and 35 district qanuns (regulations) 
In December 2006, the first local election was held in Aceh after the peace 
agreement had accommodated GAM‘s political interest by introducing the new model 
called independent candidacy, an election system that could accommodate candidates 
from outside of the political parties. This model was new to Indonesia‘s political 
system, but was implemented peacefully in Aceh when the former GAM members and 
activists who had previously been labelled ‗enemies of the state‘ won the election and 
later became part of the government.  
The success of the first local election after the MoU was signed also showed the 
democratic development in Indonesia in that the GoI was willing to accept any winner 
in a free and fair election in Aceh. There were about 2.1 million voters and 80% of them 
were registered (Serambi Indonesia, 7 January 2006). The observers reported few 
insignificant acts of intimidation and interference, and interestingly enough, TNI and 
former combatants consistently followed the rule. TNI was fully neutral and did not 
intervene in the election, whilst at the same time, GAM combatants were also able to 
transform themselves into political cadres (Serambi Indonesia, 12 December 2006). 
In fact, there was no significant difference between Daerah Istimewa and the 
Special Region that was legally established in Aceh before and the special autonomy. 
Considering the Indonesian constitution, namely Act 44/1999 regarding the Special 
Province of Aceh, Act 11/2006 regarding the Special Autonomy for the Aceh Special 
Region, and Act 11/2006 regarding the Government of Aceh, all of the laws recognized 
Aceh as a territory with special authority. In addition, compared to other territories, 
whether in specific or special characteristics, Aceh was considered to be an ethnic 
identity that was entitled to the privilege, which needed to be framed within the special 
autonomy concept, ―Aceh has authority within all sectors of public affairs except the 
governing functions that belong to the national government, such as foreign affairs, 
external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, as well as justice and 
freedom of religion‖ (Act 11/206 1.1.2-a). 
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Considering the achievement in the implementation of the Helsinki MoU, the 
present thesis argues that this was followed by the fact related to the type of agreement, 
which indicated greater readiness of the parties to settle the conflict. When the GoI and 
GAM had greater motivation and optimism, they were able to sign a full agreement that 
produced political settlement as agreed in Helsinki. In contrast, in the previous peace 
process in the CoHA when the GoI and GAM were not fully motivated for peace, the 
negotiation merely came to a partial agreement that concerned the cessation of 
hostilities, a euphemism for ceasefire since TNI did not agree to the term. 
 
6.4 Domestic Political Condition  
6.4.1 Central Coalition during the Implementation of the CoHA  
When the peace process started in early 2000, Wahid‘s agenda for Aceh was supported 
by broader political elites in the GoI, and Wahid also strengthened this support through 
civil society groups in Aceh, such as religious leaders, NGOs, and student movements. 
The central coalition for peace during Wahid‘s presidency was led by his inner circle, 
which included the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Alwi Shihab), the State Secretary 
(Bondan Goenawan), Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono), and the Minister of Human Rights Affairs (Hasballah M. Saad). However, 
most of the ‗members‘ of the central coalition came from outside of the government 
circle, consisting of human-rights democratic activists who were based in Jakarta or 
Aceh, journalists, and also civil society groups in Aceh, which meant that the peace 
agenda lacked support from both the military and the politicians.  
During the pre-negotiation process, Wahid‘s people from the ‗dove side‘, such 
as the State Secretary Bondan Gunawan, Afdhal Yasin, and his own relatives, namely 
Hasyim Wahid and Lily Wahid, were intensively opening the diplomacy channel with 
GAM that was mediated by peace activists and ulamas in Aceh. During Wahid‘s 
presidency, whenever the peace talks faced a crisis, the central coalition actors would 
approach both sides to keep their commitment to the peace agenda; even Wahid‘s 
people had frequently facilitated meetings between Aceh‘s unofficial delegations and 
the ministers who were involved in the peace process in Aceh. During these meetings, 
the delegation asked the ministers to keep their commitment to peace.   
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The human rights and other humanitarian issues were the main platform that 
unified the ―dovish‖ parties, but conversely, human rights issues made the ―hawkish‖ 
parties uncomfortable when they argued that the human rights issues were utilized by 
GAM for propaganda to gain sympathy from the international community (Serambi 
Indonesia, 25 January 2001). Even more, the hawkish parties then claimed that the 
peace activists in Aceh had close connections with GAM (Serambi Indonesia, 15 March 
2001). This condition left most of the Acehnese in a difficult position because those 
who were considered hawkish and associated with those who criticized the GoI‘s policy 
could be considered rebel supporters. In contrast, those who accepted and supported the 
GoI‘s proposal on the special autonomy could be condemned as traitors by GAM. 
Between 1999 and 2004, some peace activists and Acehnese leaders were reportedly 
killed or had disappeared. These included Nashruddin Daud, who was a member of the 
national parliament, Djakfar Siddik, who was a human rights activist, Professor Dayan 
Dawood and Professor Safwan Idris, both of whom were rectors at universities, and 
dozens of other individuals who were imprisoned.  
The dovish parties in the GoI became weaker since Wahid also confronted the 
Islamist elites in parliament, Poros Tengah or the Central Axis, who had brought Wahid 
to power. This condition led to a political situation in which Wahid was not able to 
secure his policy in parliament since his party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) or the 
National Awakening Party, had only 12% of the seats in parliament. With the lack of 
political support both in parliament and from military generals, the peace agenda could 
not be fully implemented in Aceh since the negotiated agreement could not be 
coordinated with the higher security rank and political actors in the GoI. Furthermore, 
the hawkish parties perceived Wahid‘s policy to be too soft and the peace talks had 
equated GAM‘s position with that of the GoI, and it was not acceptable for the hawks to 
be sitting at the same table as the rebel group (Gatra, 25 April 2003).  
After the impeachment of Wahid, the hawks succeeded in strengthening the 
spirit of nationalism in protecting the unitary state, or Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia (NKRI). For this reason, the hawks perceived that the negotiation with GAM, 
the rebel group, was useless due to the failure of the peace talks to reduce the conflict, 
while at the same time, GAM‘s capacity was improving significantly since the peace 
process had started in 2001 (Serambi Indonesia, 3 October 2002). From 2001 to 2003, 
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when the peace talks were conducted, TNI perceived that GAM had the opportunity to 
move freely within the community, to recruit new combatants and cadres in the villages, 
most of whom came from the conflict areas and had direct experience as victims.  
Furthermore, the presence of the HDC as the mediator was perceived by the 
hawks as a foreign intervention in a domestic problem and they argued that Aceh‘s 
problems must be resolved domestically, and that it was a mistake to conduct peace 
talks in another country (Waspada, 4 March 2002). Learning from East Timor, the 
international mediator would only strengthen the bargaining position of the rebels. 
Although President Megawati had the motivation to continue the peace talks, she 
insisted on discussing the political settlement on the basis of the special autonomy. 
Megawati‘s stand on the special autonomy approach was influenced by Indonesian 
hawkish parties. They assumed that GAM would never accept Jakarta‘s proposal and 
argued that the military operation was the rational option for Megawati, as GAM was 
trying to keep the peace talks going longer to buy time to strengthen their military and 
organizational capacity. The same perception of GAM‘s inconsistency was shown by 
media polling when 61% of respondents assumed that GAM would not seriously 
implement the agreement that had been signed (Kompas, 9 December 2003). 
Furthermore, to support the military option, Megawati re-established the 
Komando Daerah Militer, or the Territorial Military Command of Iskandar Muda that 
was based in Aceh. The government, through Hari Sabarno, Minister of Home Affairs, 
argued that an armed group like GAM should be countered by armed forces, and, even 
if the government was to use diplomacy, it should be parallelled with a military 
approach (Tempo Magazine, 11 May 2003). This argument had strong support from 
some members of parliament who favored the military option for Aceh (Media 
Indonesia, 10 May 2003). Similarly, public opinion shared this perception of the 
situation in Aceh, as shown through media polling in which 44% of respondents agreed 
that a military operation was needed. However, two out of three respondents hoped that 
the peace talks would continue (Kompas, 20-21 November 2002). 
 
6.4.2 Civil–Military Relationship and Military Reform 
The research found that a civil–military relationship was an important factor in 
understanding the central coalition figure since there was a close relationship between 
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new leaders with the military reform that influenced the central coalition figure in the 
two peace processes. Although military reform was one of the agenda items that needed 
to be implemented by the GoI during the transition to democracy, each presidency after 
Suharto faced different issues in dealing with this reform. This partly explains the 
approaches taken by the Habibie, Wahid, Megawati and Yudhoyono presidencies that 
affected their peace agendas in Aceh.       
During Suharto‘s era, the military and police fell under one commanding force 
called Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, (ABRI), the Indonesian Armed Forces. 
At that time, ABRI was the guarantor of domestic stability and played an important role 
in central parts of the political process. This concept was called dwi fungsi or dual 
function.  Many active and retired generals were represented in parliament and had a 
position in the civil administration, as well as in Suharto‘s cabinet. To cover the 
deficiency of military budgets, Suharto had agreed for the military to be involved in 
business activities and hold the key positions in state- owned businesses. During the 
Suharto era, 60–65% of the military expenses was received from military businesses, 
which included the travel industry, manufacturing, financial sector activities, logging, 
and other sectors, which were all under the control of several yayasan, or foundations of 
the police, navy, air force, and army (Widoyoko, Indonesia Corruption Watch, 2003).  
The initiative for military reform was first announced by the Habibie presidency 
through the Chief Commander of the Indonesian Army, General Wiranto during an 
Armed Forces Day celebration on 5 October 1999. The military-reform proposal 
referred to the New Paradigm or Paradigma Baru, ―the most important step is the 
withdrawal from day-to-day politics‖, as stated by General Wiranto (Suara Merdeka, 8 
March 2003). Major General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the Chief of Staff for 
Political and Social Affairs, and Major General Agus Widjojo were the architects of the 
New Paradigm and led a team of 36 members. The main idea of the New Paradigm was 
to transform the military into the guardian of the nation. The military should only focus 
on external defence (Tempo, 15 October 2000). 
The new paradigm consisted of four ideas. First, the military role was not to be 
in the forefront of all national affairs. Second, the previous military role in occupying 
political positions was changed into influencing politics from a distance. Third, this 
influence was to be exerted indirectly rather than directly. Finally, fourth, the armed 
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forces acknowledged the necessity that the military was granted the right to formulate 
its own reform agenda of role-sharing with other national forces (Tim KontraS, 2005: 
26). The concepts of military reform were focused on the reform of the ―dual function‖ 
of TNI and bringing them to the professional and neutral forces. TNI agreed to reduce 
their representation in the legislative body from 75 to 38 seats at the national parliament 
and by 10% of the seats at the local level. To show this commitment, General Wiranto 
announced that the military would keep their neutrality during the general election of 
1999, and separated their formal ties with political parties, especially GOLKAR 
(Kompas, 24 January 1999). These steps were crucial to avoid the politicization of TNI 
by political parties.      
The next step of the reform was to separate the military and the police force, 
which had been unified under one institution; they were to be separated institutionally 
and authoritatively based on their own functions. In the past, there were overlapping 
roles and functions between TNI as the actor for national defence and the police as the 
actor for security and law enforcement. The decision for separation was ratified by 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), or the People‘s Consultative Assembly, 
through Parliamentary Decree No VI/2000. The MPR stated that the ―dual function‖ 
had distorted and overlapped the role and function of TNI and POLRI, which affected 
the Indonesian democratic process.  
In relation to the accountability of human rights violations in the past, TNI 
argued that what they did was a political decision from the government to counter the 
separatist movement and solve the problem in rebellious areas. TNI opposed the Human 
Rights Court for human rights violation cases that occurred during the implementation 
of the DOM. Although the GoI ratified Act 26/2000 to establish a Human Rights Court 
to deal with human rights violations in the past and as an effort to prevent impunity 
cases in the future, in fact no human rights case in the past had been brought to trial
15
 
other than the case of the Teungku Bantaqiah massacre that occurred in 1999.
16
 
                                                 
15
 According to the report of the Independent Commission on Human Rights Violation Investigation 
(1999), there were 7,000 cases during the period 1989–1999. This commission was established by 
government mandate.  
16
The government held a connectivity Judicial District Court (PN) Banda Aceh on 24 April 2000 to 
prosecute the accused members of the Army and a civilian who were directly involved in the massacre of 
Teungku Bantaqiah on 23 July 1999. 
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The public perceived that the political elites and the parliamentarians made no 
serious attempt to bring the human rights cases to court, even though they did not react 
when some cases were solved internally at a Martial Court based on Act 31/1997 
(Kontras Report, 2002). Ironically, in the case of the assassination of the Papuan 
activist, Theys Eluay, in Papua in 2001, the Chief of Army Ryamizard Ryacudu 
portrayed the perpetrators, members of Komando Pasukan Khusus – Kopassus, or 
Special Forces Command, as heroes (Tempo.Co, 23 April 2003). The assassination was 
carried out while the GoI was trying to settle the conflict in Papua through dialogues in 
which Eluay was one of the key figures in the peace dialogue.  
In the new concept, TNI identified several potential threats related to their duty 
and responsibility in the defence sector, which included international terrorism, 
separatist movements and radicalism based on ethnicity or religion. In the case of Aceh, 
TNI argued that the military should play an active role in defending territorial integrity. 
This concept was supported by political elites in the GoI, especially during the 
Megawati presidency that assumed that only the military force could protect national 
unity. During the years of 1999 to 2001, TNI added two more KODAM or Military 
Territory Commands. In contrast, the civil society groups proposed that the elimination 
of KODAM should be part of the military reform. However, they rejected this proposal 
because the territorial units (such as KODAM) were the frontline institutions to 
integrate TNI and the people in an effort to consolidate the total defence strategy. For 
TNI, the territorial structure could protect Indonesia from disintegration, as experienced 
by Yugoslavia, when KODAM was argued to be able to detect the early symptoms of 
every potential threat, both internally and externally. KODAM could also play a pivotal 
role in the war against terrorist groups. However, many analysts perceived that 
KODAM had been used by the military to secure financial independence of TNI from 
the civilian control mechanisms; consequently, this could back up the TNI influence in 
the political arena (Husodo, 2008; Widoyoko, 2003). 
Between 1999 and 2004, the military reform to uphold democracy fluctuated. 
Wahid claimed support from General Wiranto during the election and asked General 
Wiranto to resign from his position as Chief Commander in May 2000 for which he was 
compensated with a cabinet position as the Coordinator Minister of Security and 
Political Affairs. When Wahid started his presidential office, he also initiated the 
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military reform in his cabinet and appointed Admiral Widodo A.S., a Navy General, as 
the Chief Commander to replace Wiranto, a position that had been dominated by the 
army since Suharto‘s era. Wahid also appointed a civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, a 
professor of political science, as the Minister of Defence, the first civilian minister since 
the early 1950s. In relation to human rights issues, Wahid established a Human Rights 
Tribunal in late 1999 to investigate the East Timor massacre during the referendum 
process. Later, to accelerate civilian supremacy over the political realm, Wahid removed 
Wiranto from the cabinet and argued that Wiranto had been responsible for the East 
Timor massacre in 1998. Furthermore, he accused Wiranto of being the major obstacle 
to implementing further military reform since Wiranto was part of the old regime.  
To support the implementation of the new paradigm, Wahid appointed a 
progressive General named Agus Wirahadikusamah to a strategic position as 
Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command, or Komando Strategi Angkatan 
Darat (KOSTRAD). In doing so, Wahid undermined the position of Wiranto‘s loyalists 
or other conservative generals who were implicated in the internal conflict between the 
reformists and conservatives within TNI. The conservatives then succeeded in 
dominating the internal positions of TNI, and thereby affected the on-going reform. As 
a consequence, implementation of the reform agenda never materialized, including the 
audit of the military business foundations. However, Wahid‘s policy towards Aceh 
reflected the dynamic military reform. This could be seen in 1999 when Wahid refused 
a military proposal to re-establish KODAM in Aceh. He perceived that the proposal 
would interrupt his agenda to find a peaceful solution. Some analysts (Kingsbury, 2003; 
Haramain, 2004) stated that TNI sabotaged Wahid‘s agenda, and worked behind the 
scenes with Wahid‘s political opponents, and the conflict between the President and the 
Parliament provided an opportunity for TNI to receive support from the politicians in 
the name of national unity.  
The rejection from TNI of Wahid‘s radical steps prompted Wahid to announce 
to the Assembly that his Vice President Megawati would take charge of the internal TNI 
affairs. To avoid political turbulence, since mid-2000, Wahid used a compromise 
approach to the military elites, such as removing controversial generals that had been 
promoted by him. However, Wahid terminated the reform agenda on KODAM as a 
territorial structure, revised his moderate approach to separatist groups, and allowed a 
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security approach to be involved in Papua and Aceh. This condition indicated that the 
hawks dominated the security policy in Indonesia, which later became even stronger 
when Megawati replaced Wahid.  
The Megawati presidency was noted as being the period when the military 
hardliners met the nationalist politicians‘ interests in protecting the national unity. 
However, Megawati and the military found themselves in a ‗mutual symbiosis‘ situation 
in which Megawati needed the military as her ‗ally‘ in the government since she did not 
trust any civilian politicians outside her party. On the other hand, the conservative 
generals needed a political patron who could avoid the radical military reform. The 
involvement of the conservative generals in the political arena influenced Megawati‘s 
policy on security affairs. 
 
6.4.2.1 Civil–Military Relations in the Context of the CoHA  
Although the democratization processes in Indonesia indicated that the military would 
step out of the political system, TNI‘s role was still dominant during the 1999–2004 
period for several reasons. First, the military process had never gone to the reformist 
generals but to the conservative ones such as Ryamizard Ryacudu, who were at the top 
of the military hierarchy preventing the new paradigm from being transmitted across the 
ranks or even implemented on the ground. Second, the pervasive internal conflict based 
on ethnicity or religion, and separatist movements in Papua, Maluku, Kalimantan, Aceh 
and Riau, had driven the GoI to turn back to the security-first approach since the soft 
approach was perceived as ineffective.  
The third reason was the quality of the civilian movements. There were at least 
three axes among civilian politicians during the 1999–2004 period: the Nationalist 
group led by Megawati and her Democratic Party PDI-P, the Islamic group that was led 
by Wahid and Amien Rais, and Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) that claimed to be part of 
the old regime. In fact, all of those groups were looking for military support to 
strengthen their political power and only one year after the end of the authoritarian 
regime, Megawati and Wahid approached General Wiranto separately. Both of them 
lobbied the TNI to give political support for the presidency election in 1999. As 
explained by Wahid to Mietzner: 
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―You still can‘t become President in Indonesia without having the political 
support of the military. They‘re out of the bureaucracy, and all that, but that‘s 
nonsense. Nonsense! They‘re still strong, and Wiranto will support me to 
become President.‖ (Wahid in 1999, as cited in Mietzner, 2006: 17) 
 
The quality of the civilian politics affected the pragmatic bargaining position 
between civil society and the military in Indonesia, while the political in-fighting among 
the elites had led to the erosion of public confidence in the civilian leadership and 
further attracted the retired military generals as ‗mature‘ political actors to enter the 
political arena, either at the local or national level. In the 2004 direct election, the retired 
general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the most democratic election since 1953 with 
a significantly popular mandate. 
The fourth aspect was an intra-civilian conflict in the post-Suharto era. 
Megawati, who had learned from Wahid‘s mistake, understood how important it was to 
approach the military generals as political allies in order to keep the political symmetry 
among other groups of politicians, especially the Islamic group, inside or outside of 
parliament. Megawati who had been approached by the conservatives since she was 
Vice President used the military to secure her mandate. Since the beginning of her 
presidency, Megawati took a different approach from that adopted by Wahid, and 
allowed the active generals to join in with her presidency. This included bringing in 
Lieutenant General Hendropriyono, who was accused of human rights abuses in the 
Lampung tragedy back in 1989, as Kepala Badan Intelijen Negara – BIN, that is to say, 
as the Head of the State Intelligence Agency. TNI was somehow behind the government 
policy in Aceh and this was proven when Megawati launched the Territorial Military 
Command in Aceh, a policy that had been postponed by Wahid during his term in 
power. She also believed that negotiation through international mediation would not 
bring any political solution to Indonesia, since TNI preferred a military operation, while 
at the same time, GAM rejected special autonomy as the only solution.     
The fifth aspect was the change in the internal conflicts and the geopolitical 
setting, which led to the involvement of TNI as the protector of national unity from the 
separatist movements, especially in Aceh. Megawati and some Members of  Parliament 
considered that the soft approach applied by Wahid had been a political blunder, which 
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gave the separatist movements more space and time to expand their influence on the 
local and international communities (Serambi Indonesia, 6 June 2002). The re-
involvement of TNI in Aceh created the impression that TNI was the only force capable 
of protecting Indonesia from disintegration, and thereby increased the political influence 
of TNI. Furthermore, the change in geopolitical constellation after 9/11 had created the 
opportunity for TNI to be involved in the war against terrorism when international allies 
terminated international isolation for TNI, and the US embraced TNI as a strategic 
partner in Indonesia, the biggest Muslim country in the world. Megawati decided to get 
the military involved in the counter-terrorism unit that had previously consisted 
exclusively of police units, which now meant that the military was responsible for 
internal security and justified TNI to maintain the existence of KODAM as territorial 
commands.  
 
6.4.2.2 Civil Military Relations in the Context of the Helsinki MoU 
The civil military relations in the political setting during the Helsinki peace process 
were different from the previous peace process and became more complex when 
Indonesia moved from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. The Helsinki peace 
process indicated that Indonesia had embraced democracy. Besides the direct election 
that produced a leader by popular mandate, civilian control over the military indicated 
an improvement in the level of democracy in Indonesia when Yudhoyono, as a retired 
general, succeeded in consolidating military support for the peace agenda and assigned 
two retired military generals – Admiral Widodo AS, the former Chief of Army, and his 
deputy, Usman Djaja Basjah – to be involved in the negotiation process.  
In addition, Yudhoyono also protected the peace process from the hawkish side 
when he removed General Rymizard Ryacudu, who had actively criticized the peace 
process from the very beginning and had refused to negotiate with GAM as a separatist 
movement (Kompas, 17 July 2002). Earlier (in mid-2004), General Ryacudu had been 
promoted as the Chief of Army by Megawati, but Yudhoyono, who replaced Megawati, 
rejected this promotion and appointed General Endriartono Sutarto instead, until the 
entire decommissioning and disarmament process in Aceh was completed on 31 
December 2005 (Detiknews, 13 September 2005). Unlike Ryacudu, Sutarto supported 
the peace process in Aceh. He was also committed to following the peace agenda. 
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General Sutarto warned the military not to act against government policies; otherwise 
they must leave TNI (Detiknews, 8 April 2005). Replacing Ryacudu
17
 and his 
conservative allies with moderate generals at the beginning of the Yudhoyono 
presidency period had influenced and secured the government agenda in respect of the 
security issues, especially for Aceh, and had indirectly strengthened the dovish side.  
Yudhoyono was noted as being one of the intellectual generals who introduced a 
―New Paradigm‖ in the army doctrine. However, unlike Wahid, Yudhoyono‘s approach 
to military reform was implemented carefully and avoided sensitive areas to reduce the 
controversy, especially concerning the case of human rights violations in Aceh and East 
Timor. In addition, Yudhoyono was also less enthusiastic about reforming the territorial 
command structure as planned by Wahid (Beeson, 2007). Yudhoyono preferred to focus 
on increasing military capacity as professional soldiers through programs which 
included collaboration with the US to improve the skills and capacity of the army, and 
to allocate a higher budget for the welfare of soldiers. He also renewed arms and 
assigned professional commanders who respected human rights and adhered to the 
government‘s political decisions.    
During his presidency, Yudhoyono adopted several approaches to consolidate 
his power. In the first year, he focused on strengthening his political control over the 
military rather than pushing for internal reform. This approach succeeded in smoothly 
replacing the hardliners and conservative generals from the army leadership and 
improved the military‘s discipline towards the government policy for Aceh (Mietzner, 
2006). Aside from the replacement approach, in respect of the military reforms 
achieved, the passing of the Armed Forces Act was completed in 2004, the extraction of 
non-elected military members from Parliament was completed (including the faction 
from MPR), and the subordination of the military courts to the Supreme Court was 
partly completed. 
 
6.5 The Dynamics of GAM‟s Position 
The central coalition between the doves and the hawks inside Aceh and GAM was 
relatively less dynamic than the GoI. At the beginning of the peace process, Aceh and 
                                                 
17
 General Ryamizard Ryacudu was dismissed as Chief of Army Staff by Presidential Decree No. 
6/TNI/2005 (Kompas, 18 February 2005). 
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the GoI had the same interests concerning humanitarian issues that were used as the 
basis for the dialogue. When the peace process started, the small number of hawkish 
personnel inside GAM agreed to sit at the same table as the GoI delegation despite 
initially arguing that there was no reason to open a dialogue with the ‗enemy‘ since the 
problem in Aceh could only be solved by international actors (Tiba, 2003). Thus, the 
central coalition of peace was based on humanitarian issues between the GoI and GAM. 
However, at a later stage this coalition broke at the end of 2002 when both parties 
entered the political dialogue and the hawkish parties dominated the Megawati 
presidency. The political dialogue made both parties commit to their position when 
GAM insisted on holding on to their independence option and rejected the GoI‘s 
proposal for special autonomy. However, in considering the negotiation process, the 
research could not clearly distinguish between the doves and the hawks from both sides 
in that both agreed to hold the peace talks, while remaining committed to their non-
negotiable proposals at the same time. 
 
6.5.1  GAM‟s Position during the CoHA 
Since the hawkish parties in Jakarta gave a strong reaction to the failure of the 
agreement and accused GAM of being the responsible party, GAM also responded that 
the peace process could not reach a permanent solution since the GoI had used double-
standard agendas, in that while agreeing to negotiate with GAM on the one hand, they 
had launched security operations in Aceh since 2000 on the other hand. (Interview with 
GAM negotiator Teuku Kamaruzman, held in Banda Aceh, March 2001). GAM argued 
that the GoI negotiators had interpreted the CoHA irrationally as a way to deadlock the 
dialogue and create the public opinion that the CoHA was ineffective. At the same time, 
they claimed that the GoI was unwilling to implement the agreement while closing their 
eyes to violations that were conducted by TNI and the police (Syahputra, 2000). GAM 
reported spoiler movements from the military side in various anti-CoHA demonstrations 
in Takengon that ended with the burning of the JSC office in March 2003, and other 
actions in Langsa, Sigli, and Meulaboh, which were instigated and supported by the 
military (Tiba, 2003). GAM was suspicious that the TNI hardliners had their own 
agenda and claimed in February 2003 that TNI was launching a massive covert 
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operation in Aceh that included mobilization of the militias, trained transmigrates and 
spreading provocateurs (Tiba, 2003).  
As a response to TNI‘s aggressiveness, GAM refused to store their weapons as 
was agreed in the CoHA before all the non-organic military withdrew from Aceh. When 
the last talk was conducted in Tokyo in May 2003, GAM reported that TNI and the 
police had become more aggressive and increased their operations in the field. At sea, 
there were 12 battleships and corvettes anchored, waiting for command. For GAM, the 
failure of the CoHA was a result of the GoI‘s policy to intensify TNI and the police 
operations in Aceh since Megawati started her presidency (Abdullah, 2010).  
Nonetheless, GAM‘s commitment to the peace negotiation process during 
critical times was most likely related to their political-military interests rather than 
peace concerns. As explained previously, GAM‘s leaders perceived that the peace talks 
gave political advantage to internationalizing its political struggle as well as provided 
opportunities for GAM‘s military and political consolidation (Syahputra, 2000). During 
the negotiation process hosted in Geneva, GAM‘s leaders, who were based in 
Scandinavian countries, utilized this moment to open direct communication and 
consolidation with their negotiators who came from Aceh; their ideas were then 
transmitted to the people in Aceh through GAM‘s negotiators. 
 
6.5.2 Managing the Realistic Option in the Helsinki Peace Process 
During the CoHA process, GAM had great confidence that they could reach 
independence outside of the negotiating table, and this perception had affected their 
position in the GoI‘s proposal for special autonomy. The situation then changed when 
GAM leaders realized that neither could they garner any support from international 
actors for independence nor trust Jakarta. However, the leaders perceived that they 
should be more realistic about their position at the negotiating table while understanding 
that they could not just drop independence and accept the GoI‘s proposal without losing 
dignity (Abdullah, 2010). The reasons for this were that it could make GAM look weak 
in front of the GoI and could weaken their positional bargaining. Secondly, it could 
make GAM leaders lose face in front of their followers and the Acehnese after so many 
years of propaganda for independence. Lastly, it could divide GAM‘s organization into 
at least two factions: the realists and the conservatives (interview with GAM leader, 
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Yusra Habib Abdulgani in Denmark, August 2010). The ripe moment for GAM to drop 
independence came when Yudhoyono sent out the signal for dialogue by referring to the 
tsunami, as stated by Malik Mahmud:    
 
―Well, we have to be realistic. We have to take into account the reality on the 
ground. If that (peace agreement) is a solution that‘s good for both parties, of 
course with dignity on both sides, why not! The policy of previous governments 
was that they didn‘t want Aceh to get independence and at the same time they 
imposed a system that was not acceptable to the Acehnese, and this caused 
many problems. Under the new government, we saw that this had changed. 
They were more flexible on that point and of course we have responded 
(accordingly). If Aceh can get what it wants peacefully without separating itself 
from Indonesia, why should we go to war? So, that is what I said at the time, 
that we had the right people at the right time and the right place to achieve peace 
… but with the tsunami (that killed more than 100,000 people) we saw that 
indeed the people in Aceh really needed peace. We took this opportunity to 
pursue peace negotiations. Also, at that time the international community came 
in throngs to Aceh to give humanitarian assistance and help reconstruct Aceh. 
There was a very strong voice in the international community that this was the 
time to continue negotiations‖. (The Jakarta Post, 28 May 2006) 
 
 Nevertheless, the GAM elites had to move smoothly in transmitting the change 
to reach their goals to their members. There were at least four main approaches taken by 
GAM to avoid bad reactions from the hawkish members inside their party. First, the 
GAM elites, as was agreed as the rule in peace talks, had kept the contents of the 
dialogue on the peace table confidential to avoid polemics or controversy, especially 
from the hawkish side. Most of the information was only distributed to the delegations 
at the Helsinki peace talks, and a few key persons in Aceh including Zakaria Saman, the 
Minister of Defence, and Muzakir Manaf, the commander of GAM‘s combatants. 
During the internal meeting preparation for the peace talks, GAM‘s leaders invited the 
members outside the negotiator team selectively; the figures who potentially refused the 
decision to drop the independence option (such as Yusra Habib Abdul Gani) were not 
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involved after the second peace round (Interview with Yusra Habib Abdul Gani in 
Denmark, held in 2010). Furthermore, to keep the chain of command among the 
combatants and to prevent the spoilers among them, the GAM elites instructed Karya 
Saman and Muzakir Manaf to fully control the information to the combatants in the 
field and instructed them that the only information about peace talks should come from 
the top leaders in Sweden (Abdullah, 2010). 
 GAM also proposed and insisted on using the self-government term to replace 
the term special autonomy. For GAM, the self-government term was crucial to mediate 
the two terms of special autonomy and independence, and they perceived that through 
self-government, they could explain to the Acehnese people that the peace talks had 
offered a solution beyond the GoI‘s proposal, and that GAM would not lose face in 
front of the people and the hawks (Abdullah, 2010). Third, in explaining the decision 
that GAM had dropped the option of independence, the negotiators invited the inner 
circle of GAM, and the Acehnese who lived abroad, to an Acehnese world forum 
conducted in Stockholm facilitated by the Olof Palme Centre. The forum then continued 
in Aalborg, Denmark, in June 2005. During the meeting that was attended by Hasan 
Tiro, the GAM negotiators, besides collecting input from the participants, familiarized 
themselves and the parties involved with the concept of self-government. With the same 
agenda, this forum was then continued in Kuala Lumpur. 
However, during the two peace processes, the GAM elites did not find any 
significant obstacle internally since most of their commanders were loyal to the 
―triumvirate‖, Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah, and Zakaria Saman, who were believed 
to be the representatives of Hasan Tiro (interview with Amir, GAM commander in 
North Aceh, 2005). The success of GAM in maintaining their cohesiveness – not an 
easy task for them – while reformulating their goals, had contributed to one of the key 
successes of the peace process in Helsinki. The domination of the dovish group in the 
central power of the GoI and the cohesiveness of GAM made communication between 
Jakarta, Helsinki and Stockholm more open, easier and more successful in building 
confidence among them. There were figures, such as Farid Husain and Juha 
Christensen, who actively mediated the communications with inter-dovish links and 
both built motivation for the GoI and GAM as well as transmitting the optimism to the 
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larger group outside of the doves that included the politicians in Jakarta, the civil 
society, and the GAM commanders or leaders in the jungle or in prisons (Husain, 2007).     
 
6.6 The Tsunami Effect on Peace-Building  
Based on many statements in the public space, most people commonly believed that the 
tsunami had pushed the conflict transformation in Aceh, however, some analysts 
(Waizenegger, 2007; Lindell & Prater, 2003; Hoffman & Oliver-Smith, 2002) found 
that pre-disaster political trends affected the conflict outcomes after the disaster. 
Yudhoyono had brought a new democratic environment to Aceh and Indonesia, which, 
in turn, supported the peace process. However, the research also found that the tsunami 
factor had contributed to the conflict transformation process in Aceh rather than 
affecting the peace process initiative or negotiation. The presence of hundreds of 
agencies in rebuilding Aceh with more than 4 billion USD of humanitarian aid 
supported by 34 countries had directly affected the peace building process.  
According to Mustafa Abubakar, Aceh‘s ad interim governor (2005–2006), the 
total funds needed for post-conflict recovery amounted to approximately 250–350 
million USD, and the provincial government only received 25 million USD in 2005 and 
65 million USD in 2006 (Kajian Mengenai Kebutuhan Reintegrasi GAM, 2006)). 
However, to fill the gap for the post-conflict program, the Head of BRR (Badan 
Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi for Aceh and Nias or the Aceh–Nias Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Agency) Kuntoro Mangkusubroto stated in the Coordination Forum for 
Aceh and Nias-3 (CFAN-3, 2007) that BRR would expand its programme to non-
tsunami affected areas and non-tsunami victims to support post-conflict development. 
This policy responded to the problem of post-conflict funds including support of the 
reintegration program in empowering conflict victims and former combatants in the 
social and economic sectors.  
The post-tsunami funds contributed significantly to the post-conflict 
development, especially in the socio-economic sector through livelihood programs. 
Compared to the post-tsunami response, the funds for the peace-building program 
consisted of a small amount. For example, the European Commission as the key player 
in the Aceh peace process granted less than 0.25% from the total amount of the tsunami 
funds. The post-conflict funds included provision for the program for reintegration of 
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former combatants, police training, election observation, technical support and 
assistance for the local government.
18
 According to the World Bank report, the total 
amount for the peace-building programme in Aceh was estimated to be as much as USD 
895.1 million, or one-seventh of the amount that was spent on the tsunami 
reconstruction efforts.
19
 
 
6.7 The Failure of the CoHA as the Ripe Moment for the Helsinki Process   
The Helsinki MoU was not an instantaneous kind of output. Instead, it was a long 
process that had started in 1999. We cannot simply understand the sustainability of 
peace by learning about the success of the peace process in Aceh based on the Helsinki 
process alone and disregard the failure of the CoHA. The unique and remarkable peace 
process between the GoI and GAM in Aceh had provided broader insights into the 
dynamics of a peace process: the success, the failure, and the factors and the condition 
influencing the results and the outcome. The Aceh peace process undoubtedly offers a 
useful lesson for policy makers, peace practitioners, analysts and those involved in 
peace process, conflict resolution and peace-building efforts to draw the strategies, and 
effective approaches to achieve a sustainable peace.  
The failure of the CoHA was the beginning of the ripeness process that made 
both parties ready for peace. From the CoHA, the GoI, GAM and CMI, one could learn 
the crucial points that enabled them to hold successful negotiations, as shown in Table 
6.6. 
Table 6.6 Lessons learnt from the CoHA 
CoHA Helsinki MoU 
Issue: 
-  Clear direction toward political settlement 
- Clear mechanism 
- Clear interpretation on the step of agreement implementation     
 
The negotiation started with the ceasefire 
approach. 
The negotiation process was based on the special 
autonomy, as consequences:  
                                                 
18
The total disbursement for rehabilitation and reconstruction by European Commission amounts to USD 
218,158,725 (BRR Data and Information Centre, in collaboration with UNORC). 
 
19
 See more details on Multi Stakeholder Review of Post Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the 
Foundation of Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh, 2008. 
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- The negotiation was focused on specific issue 
on the frame of special autonomy. 
- The negotiation process could be conducted 
effectively in six months. 
Some of provisions in the CoHA have been 
interpreted differently by both parties included 
the meaning of ―autonomy as starting 
point‖,―storage of GAM weapons‖,―peace zone‖, 
and ―election‖. 
The Helsinki MoU defines each provision strictly 
and clearly, including the number of GAM‘s 
weapons that need to be destroyed, the amount 
allocated for compensation to former combatants 
and conflict victims, the time frame for the 
reintegration process, and for local elections.      
Mediator position:  
- Clear mandate and support from both parties  
- Separation between mediator role and third-party guarantor 
- Mediator leverage 
 
The HDC was invited as the facilitator for 
humanitarian dialogue between the GoI and 
GAM. The GoI officially invited the CMI to mediate 
peace talks on the basis of the special autonomy. 
The HDC was involved as the third-party 
guarantor in implementing Humanitarian Pause 
and the CoHA. The CMI was not involved in monitoring of the 
agreement, but the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
took the role as the third-party guarantor. 
As a new NGO and without any strong figure in 
the mediator team, the HDC had less power to 
pressurize the GoI and GAM in terms of the 
negotiation process and implementation. 
With the leverage of Ahtisaari, the CMI was able 
to mediate the dialogue effectively and both 
parties respected on his role.   
The HDC actively approached international 
agencies, including the World Bank, USAID, and 
JICA, to participate in the post-conflict program. The CMI limited his role in the post-agreement 
activities. 
Media coverage:  
- Policy on media coverage  
- Public access to information  
 
During the CoHA process, both parties actively 
talked or made propaganda through the media, 
and sometimes the polemics in the media 
influenced the peace talk and affected the trust 
building. 
The CMI strongly suggested that the parties 
should not talk to the media; all information 
related to the peace talk was managed by the 
CMI.  
 
Even though the Helsinki agreements succeeded in bringing lasting peace for 
one decade now, some crucial provisions have still not been implemented, including 
ratifying the draft of Government Regulations (Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah) on 
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oil and gas. This condition is due to the fact that the Government of Aceh and the GoI 
have not yet reached a mutual understanding related to the sharing of oil and gas 
production. The economic factor, especially in revenue sharing between Aceh and the 
central government, was one of the key issues that had created the long and violent 
conflict in Aceh in the first place, since the exploration of oil and gas in Lhokseumawe 
in the early 1970s.    
In addition, the government has not passed legislation on establishing a 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) to formulate and determine 
reconciliation measures. Most of the conflict victims demanded the government to 
implement the TRC in Aceh so as to enable it to deliver justice and truth for the people 
(Interview with Zulfikar Muhammad, Director of Koalisi NGO HAM, held in Banda 
Aceh, 2012). During the author‘s involvement in the peace process, he did not find any 
comprehensive approach to the Komisi Kebenaran dan Reconciliation (Truth and 
Reconciliation Comission) as well as CMI conducted by both parties. There is a 
tendency to maintain the peace spirit today and in the future rather than to discuss the 
issues that could undermine the peace. As President Ahtisaari said, sometimes we have 
to choose between peace in the future or justice in the past (Personal interview with 
Ahtisaari in Banda Aceh, 2009). 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This section has examined the various factors that affected the durability of the Helsinki 
MoU. These factors form a continuous process that started at the very crucial stage of 
the DDR phase. The durability was most likely influenced by, first, how clearly the 
mechanism within the peace agreement arranged the DDR processes, and second, the 
strength of the position of the guarantor for acceptance by the conflicting parties. The 
success of the DDR process subsequently influenced the political transformation when 
in the Helsinki MoU there was a ratification of the Law on the Governing of Aceh and 
provincial elections to vote for the governor and heads of districts. In contrast, the 
CoHA failed from the beginning of the DDR process and lost the opportunity for 
political transformation.      
The achievement of democratic consolidation was an important factor that 
enabled the application of conflict transformation in 2005, in that the GoI was able to 
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compromise on political issues that included the permission for an independent 
candidate and later for local political parties to accommodate GAM‘s political interests. 
Without the achievement of democracy, it would not have been easy to fully implement 
the special autonomy as agreed in Helsinki, and make the peace durable.  
However, despite these factors, the political spectrum, such as the central 
coalition, civil military relationship and the cohesiveness of GAM had made an impact 
on the DDR processes and political transformation. In the case of the Helsinki MoU, 
Yudhoyono and Kalla were able to consolidate the central coalition of the dovish 
parties, whether from military or political actors in parliament, to support the 
implementation of the agreement. The central coalition became stronger after the 
tsunami had devastated Aceh and the presence of international actors as well as huge 
post-tsunami recovery funds contributed to the peace-building process. In contrast, the 
dynamics of the support for the CoHA process was also determined by the effectiveness 
of the peace agreement, and GAM‘s acceptance of the special autonomy as the 
permanent political solution. Based on the HDC review (2003), it stated that 
Megawati‘s cabinet was split on the decision of negotiation with GAM, and the decision 
to continue the peace talks could only be made if GAM accepted the special autonomy 
as the framework of dialogue. During the last meeting of the CoHA on 18 May 2003, it 
had become clear that in order to maintain support for the CoHA in Jakarta, GAM 
needed to declare publicly and explicitly their acceptance of the special autonomy and 
stop struggling for independence (HDC Internal Review, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
 
The road to achieving lasting peace is not easy. There are various conditions and factors 
in every step of a peace process that influence the durability of peace. The experience of 
Aceh represents a unique example of a peace process. This thesis has structured the 
peace process in Aceh to provide an understanding of the way the successful peace 
process was conducted. Based on the ―readiness‖ theory (used as the core theory), it can 
be concluded that the success of the peace process depends on the perception of the 
conflicting parties in the existing conditions. These perceptions then drive their 
motivation to achieve the peace process. However, the perceptions of the GoI and GAM 
were influenced by various conditions that were interconnected in several layers of 
circumstances, both domestically and internationally, and in different phases of the 
peace process: the pre-condition, the negotiation process, and the final outcome of the 
agreement. 
 
7.1 The Conditions 
As explained in the previous chapters, every step in the peace process has its own key 
factors and conditions that influence its success. For example, the global trends at the 
international level had made GAM take different bargaining positions during the first 
and the second peace processes. When the first peace process started (2000–2003), the 
post-Cold War agendas mainly focused on human rights and the strengthening of 
democratization. This international condition was interpreted by GAM as an 
opportunity to raise the issue of Aceh independence. Through the propaganda phrase 
―Aceh‘s independence is just a cigarette away‖, GAM showed the confidence that the 
international community would support their struggle. GAM believed that since Aceh 
had had similar experiences as East Timor, especially in the case of gross human rights 
violations during 1989–1998, and because of  the ‗disputes‘ on the legal status of Aceh, 
it would be easy to justify Aceh‘s right to independence.  
However, the situation changed during the Helsinki process when the global 
agenda switched focus to the war against terrorism. Whereas the people, society and 
minorities were the focus of global attention in the post-Cold War period, in the post 
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9/11 (2001) setting (especially in the Acehnese–Indonesian context) the position of a 
state or a nation became a more important issue than the people, community or ethnic 
minorities involved. This was reflected by the increased military and security 
cooperation between Indonesia and its US allies, while GAM was also being classified 
as a terrorist group by Megawati‘s presidency at the same time. The changes in 
international conditions brought GAM to the more realistic strategy: when they could 
not gain any significant political support for independence, changing its political goal to 
achieve the status of special autonomy for Aceh seemed more feasible. 
The international conditions and their influence were also seen from the inter-
connections made by the conflicting parties to the international actors. The case of Aceh 
and the change in international conditions may offer different results to other conflict 
areas such as Kosovo, where the US and its allies had supported the separation of 
Kosovo from Serbia, while a similar actor and mediator (Ahtisaari) had supported the 
unitary state of Indonesia, instead. Even though the dynamic relationship between 
international actors and parties in intrastate conflict is complicated, based on the lessons 
in the case of Aceh, this thesis concludes that the international conditions play an 
important role in forming the strategies of the conflicting parties. In other words, the 
influence of international conditions on the conflicting parties determines the 
relationship between the governments with foreign state actors. For example, the 
international condition for Aceh–Indonesia is different from Myanmar; whilst Aceh-
Indonesia is close to the US and its allies, Myanmar is close to China, which means that 
the change in global conditions after 9/11 could not change the conflict dynamic 
between the Union Government of Myanmar and the ethnic groups inside Myanmar, 
unless there was intervention from China.  
The research found that there were two aspects of international conditions that 
influenced the conflicting parties in the case of Aceh. First is the degree of dependence 
of the conflicting parties on international actors. The greater the dependence on 
international actors, the greater the effect of the international dynamics on the party‘s 
perception and actions. In the case of Aceh, both parties were very much dependent on 
the international conditions that affected their interests. For example, Indonesia‘s 
dependence on foreign economic aid after 1998 made the GoI commit to the 
democratization process and the respect for human rights, while GAM also perceived 
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that independence could only be obtained through international support. Second, the 
international condition effectively affected the conflict dynamic as long as it could 
affect the positional bargaining of the parties against one another. In this case, it was 
clearly perceived that the positions of the GoI and GAM in the negotiation processes 
had been weakened or strengthened according to the international condition after the 
independence of East Timor, the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the events of 9/11. 
 
7.2 Internal Dynamics 
As explained in the previous chapters, besides the perception of the parties, several 
identified factors affected the peace process. However, learning from the GoI‘s 
experience, the research concludes that when the new Presidents of Indonesia were 
willing to initiate the peace process, they also had to win the ‗battle of the three rings‘: 
international, parliament and military. At the international level, the government 
ensured that no support from international actors was given to GAM. Accordingly, as 
long as the foreign countries supported the unitary state, the international intervention in 
internal conflicts could be avoided and this made the GoI‘s position politically stronger.  
Furthermore, parliament is the institution through which the government 
obtained their political support from the political parties, especially after the agreement 
was signed because the substantial contents of the agreement need to be translated into 
the national law and ratified by the parliament. During the two peace processes in Aceh, 
the research examined how the support from the parliament to government policy had 
made an impact on the outcome of the agreement. Finally, the military was also crucial 
as the securitizing actor that effectively and directly influenced the peace processes. The 
role of the military in the case of Aceh is inseparable from its role in the national 
context, especially during Wahid‘s presidency when military reform was launched and 
its role in the Aceh conflict settlement was minimized. At the same time, Indonesia was 
facing potential disintegration that made the military become the key factor in 
protecting the unitariness of the nation. This condition had placed Wahid in a difficult 
position to run his peace agenda. However, effective civilian control over the military 
was shown during Yudhoyono‘s presidency. Yudhoyono had reduced the emergence of 
peace spoilers from ‗the security first generals‘, who previously had successfully 
destabilized the CoHA.                   
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At the local level, the author found that the consolidation of civil societies was 
an important step in the peace process, especially when the GoI and GAM did not have 
any plans to open peace negotiations. Specifically, civil societies had actively 
approached both parties and facilitated an informal dialogue between them. The first 
consolidation of civil societies that triggered a broader coalition started in February 
1999 through the Kongres Mahasiswa dan Pemuda Aceh Serantau (Regional Congress 
of Youth and Students) where the author of the present study was one of the initiators. 
This forum recommended a referendum as the ―democratic‖ solution, and then 
continued with a mass rally for a referendum in November 1999, which exploded the 
case of Aceh onto the national and international scene. At the same time, the public 
pressurized the GoI and GAM to open a peace dialogue. The role of civil societies was 
very important as a form of people‘s diplomacy. Strengthening the peace support from 
national and local actors had created what Pruitt termed ―the central coalition‖: the 
broad coalition between the GoI and GAM that supported the peace process.      
 
7.3 Trust, Back-Channel Dialogue, Media, and the Terminology  
The next important conclusion concerns trust-building as the basis for negotiation and 
implementation of peace. It was found that one of the reasons why the CoHA could not 
yield a successful outcome was because the HDC as the mediator failed to build trust 
between the two parties. However, as for the Helsinki MoU process, trust was built 
from the beginning and during the pre-negotiation process. This effort was crucial 
considering the distrust of the GoI and GAM in the past. 
According to Kalla, the success of the pre-negotiation process had contributed to 
the success of the peace talks. Pre-negotiation offered both sides the prospect to build 
trust and assurance since these factors were vital for successful negotiation. Cultivating 
trust and assurance leads to a change in the perception, image, and belief of both parties: 
from two violent opponents into two collaborating partners in building and 
implementing peace (Tomlin, 1989). 
Furthermore, this thesis found the important function of back-channel 
communication in addition to the formal peace talks held between the GoI and GAM. 
During the peace process, Husain and Christensen played an effective role in 
conducting this back-channel communication. They managed to solve a variety of 
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communication and negotiation deadlocks by building ‗heart-to-heart‘ communication 
through personal approaches. The back-channel communication had intensified the 
negotiation outside of the negotiating table and built a broader understanding 
concerning the interest and position of each party when they could not be solved in 
formal talks. The back-channel communication was not pursued in the CoHA, so the 
way in which both parties communicated was only limited to formal communications. 
The absence of back-channel communication at the CoHA was unfortunately replaced 
by the communication with the media in which the parties transmitted their positions 
and interests publicly. In contrast, the Helsinki peace talks gave very limited access to 
the media from the start, because the parties did not want the media to publish what was 
being negotiated until a final agreement was achieved. Accordingly, Kalla commented 
that ―if we negotiate and the result is out in the newspaper tomorrow, then it can be 
messy and cause suspicion. It is important that negotiations remain closed until the 
end‖, at the international Symposium of Peace in 2006 (Kompas, 30 September 2006).  
Kalla‘s statement was more than reasonable because certain sensitive issues 
negotiated during the talks could create a polemic if published by the media. In addition, 
the issue of GAM giving up their demand for independence and accepting the GoI‘s 
proposal of special autonomy would have given an impression of GAM being the loser. 
The term self-government enabled them to save face in the negotiation process, even 
though, substantially, GAM did not have a concrete proposal other than changing the 
term from that of special autonomy to self-government. Unfortunately, this term was 
never even written in the Helsinki MoU. However, the research argues that although 
there was no substantial difference in the contents, it was important to find an 
alternative term or concept for the two proposals so that no-one would be seen to have 
lost although they accepted the opponent‘s proposal.  
 
7.4 Tsunami Funds and post-Agreement Dialogue   
This thesis found that the tsunami had offered a great opportunity for peace settlement 
in Aceh, especially in the context of the implementation of the agreement.  The funds of 
the tsunami recovery project also covered the peace-building projects that include 
livelihood and social reintegration of the former combatants and conflict-affected 
victims. In 2007, the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Aceh (National Agency for 
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the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh) expanded their work coverage from the 
tsunami-affected areas to the whole of Aceh, which were classified as conflict-affected 
areas, such as the Gayo highlands in Central Aceh. The huge funds from the post-
tsunami recovery project accelerated the peace-building efforts in Aceh, which was only 
one-seventh of the fund for the post-tsunami project (Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-
Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the Foundations for Sustainable Peace and 
Development in Aceh, 2009). 
Other lessons learnt from Aceh concerning the successful implementation of 
agreement were the informal post-agreement dialogue mediated by Juha Christensen 
and Farid Husain. After the short mandate of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) 
ended, Christensen and Husain took the initiative to continue the dispute settlement 
forum supported by the Interpeace – International Peace-building Alliance. Their work 
mainly focused on facilitating communication between the GoI and former GAM on the 
implementation of several articles of the Helsinki MoU, including establishing local 
political parties. The post-agreement dialogue was very effective in harmonizing the 
interpretation of the Helsinki articles. In 2011, the post-agreement dialogue was 
continued by the representatives from the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in 
Indonesia. During the post-agreement dialogue, Ahtisaari frequently visited Jakarta and 
Banda Aceh to give support to the implementation of the agreement.    
 
7.5 The Special Autonomy and “Conditionality” 
Hamid Awaludin (2007) wrote that although what the GoI had offered to GAM in 
Helsinki was not a new proposal, as most of the points had been covered by Act 18/ 
2001 – the special autonomy for Aceh, GAM had rejected this law during the CoHA 
process. The substance of the law was then discussed during the negotiation process in 
Helsinki, and subsequently transferred to the Law on the Governing of Aceh, Act 
11/2006, as the outcome of the Helsinki MoU. This thesis argues that even though the 
substance of the special autonomy had been proposed in 2001 (Act 18/2001), the key 
factor in its implementation was the acceptance by GAM.  
Learning from Aceh, the permanent political solution (such as autonomy in 
separatist conflict areas) could not be fully implemented if it were still rejected by the 
rebel group. The autonomy or other political solutions must be negotiated by the rebel 
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group as the securitizing actor and not just implemented unilaterally by the government. 
Aceh‘s experience may serve as a reference to understand why in some conflict areas 
(such as West Papua, and other separatist conflicts) the special autonomy could not 
work effectively to solve the grievances, even though the central government had 
moved towards constructive changes. The answer is most likely because their policy 
was never negotiated with the rebel group.  
 
7.6 Epilogue 
The success or failure of the peace process is the output of interrelated factors. We 
cannot arrive at any clear understanding of this successful peace process without 
understanding the influencing conditions behind the motivations of both parties. Many 
peace activists have visited Aceh since 2005 to learn and to apply the Aceh model to 
other areas, including the study of the provision in the Helsinki agreement, the special 
autonomy model such as the division of authority and revenue sharing between the 
central government and Aceh. Nevertheless, attention or study devoted by scholars to 
the factors behind the Helsinki process is very rare, including the consolidation of 
democracy or the political dynamics, the military reform, the international context, and 
others. Most of peace activists even believe or perceive that the tsunami must have been 
the key factor behind the successful peace process. 
From the complexity of the peace process, the author found that the perception 
of readiness and motivation to end the conflict was essentially the starting point for the 
success of the peace process in Aceh. However, the perception and motivation itself 
could not explain why a peace process is successful or failing as this requires an in-
depth and comprehensive analysis that includes the analysis of the phases of peace 
processes, political conditions at the international, national and local level, intra-
organizational dynamics and the mechanism and constituents of the peace agreement. 
All of these components are inter-connected and linked with the perception and 
motivation of the decision-makers inside the party. The readiness theory that was 
developed by Dean Pruitt stresses the physiological approach concerning the way the 
leader perceives the condition that motivates the peace process. This study tried to 
complement this approach by offering several institutional, structural and historical 
elements to the explanation of preparedness.  
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The perception concerning the current condition is a subjective view that tends 
to be related to the position and interests of the parties, while at the same time, the other 
groups outside the conflicting parties have a different perception of how to solve the 
conflict. As long as the current condition was perceived to give an advantage to the 
interest or position, the conflicting parties would continue their current decision until 
they faced the stalemate, whether it be a negotiation stalemate (the CoHA case) or a 
military one (martial law 2003–2004). 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Memorandum of Understanding 
between 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
and 
the Free Aceh Movement 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their 
commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in 
Aceh with dignity for all. 
 
The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government of 
the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the 
unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will 
enable the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to 
progress and succeed. 
 
The parties to the conflict commit themselves to building mutual confidence and trust.  
 
This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) details the agreement and the principles 
that will guide the transformation process. 
 
To this end the GoI and GAM have agreed on the following: 
 
 
1  GOVERNING OF ACEH 
 
1.1       Law on the Governing of Aceh 
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1.1.1 A new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated and will enter into 
force as soon as possible and not later than 31 March 2006. 
 
1.1.2 The new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be based on the following 
principles: 
 
a) Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which 
will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial 
administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, 
national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of 
religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic 
of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.  
 
b) International agreements entered into by the Government of Indonesia 
which relate to matters of special interest to Aceh will be entered into in 
consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.  
 
c) Decisions with regard to Aceh by the legislature of the Republic of 
Indonesia will be taken in consultation with and with the consent of the 
legislature of Aceh. 
 
d) Administrative measures undertaken by the Government of Indonesia 
with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with 
the consent of the head of the Aceh administration. 
 
1.1.3 The name of Aceh and the titles of senior elected officials will be determined by 
the legislature of Aceh after the next elections. 
 
1.1.4 The borders of Aceh correspond to the borders as of 1 July 1956. 
 
1.1.5 Aceh has the right to use regional symbols including a flag, a crest and a hymn. 
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1.1.6 Kanun Aceh will be re-established for Aceh respecting the historical traditions 
and customs of the people of Aceh and reflecting contemporary legal 
requirements of Aceh. 
 
1.1.7 The institution of Wali Nanggroe with all its ceremonial attributes and 
entitlements will be established. 
 
 
1.2  Political participation 
 
1.2.1 As soon as possible and not later than one year from the signing of this MoU, 
the GoI agrees to and will facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political 
parties that meet national criteria. Understanding the aspirations of Acehnese 
people for local political parties, the GoI will create, within one year or at the 
latest 18 months from the signing of this MoU, the political and legal conditions 
for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with 
Parliament. The timely implementation of this MoU will contribute positively to 
this end. 
 
1.2.2 Upon the signature of this MoU, the people of Aceh will have the right to 
nominate candidates for the positions of all elected officials to contest the 
elections in Aceh in April 2006 and thereafter. 
 
1.2.3 Free and fair local elections will be organised under the new Law on the 
Governing of Aceh to elect the head of the Aceh administration and other 
elected officials in April 2006 as well as the legislature of Aceh in 2009.  
 
1.2.4 Until 2009 the legislature of Aceh will not be entitled to enact any laws without 
the consent of the head of the Aceh administration. 
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1.2.5 All Acehnese residents will be issued new conventional identity cards prior to 
the elections of April 2006. 
 
1.2.6 Full participation of all Acehnese people in local and national elections will be 
guaranteed in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.  
 
1.2.7 Outside monitors will be invited to monitor the elections in Aceh. Local 
elections may be undertaken with outside technical assistance. 
 
1.2.8 There will be full transparency in campaign funds. 
 
 
1.3 Economy 
 
1.3.1  Aceh has the right to raise funds with external loans. Aceh has the right to set 
interest rates beyond that set by the Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia.  
 
1.3.2  Aceh has the right to set and raise taxes to fund official internal activities. Aceh 
has the right to conduct trade and business internally and internationally and to 
seek foreign direct investment and tourism to Aceh. 
 
1.3.3 Aceh will have jurisdiction over living natural resources in the territorial sea 
surrounding Aceh. 
 
1.3.4  Aceh is entitled to retain seventy (70) % of the revenues from all current and 
future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources in the territory of Aceh 
as well as in the territorial sea surrounding Aceh. 
 
1.3.5 Aceh conducts the development and administration of all seaports and airports 
within the territory of Aceh. 
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1.3.6 Aceh will enjoy free trade with all other parts of the Republic of Indonesia 
unhindered by taxes, tariffs or other restrictions. 
 
1.3.7  Aceh will enjoy direct and unhindered access to foreign countries, by sea and 
air. 
 
1.3.8 The GoI commits to the transparency of the collection and allocation of revenues 
between the Central Government and Aceh by agreeing to outside auditors to 
verify this activity and to communicate the results to the head of the Aceh 
administration. 
 
1.3.9 GAM will nominate representatives to participate fully at all levels in the 
commission established to conduct the post-tsunami reconstruction (BRR). 
 
 
1.4 Rule of law 
 
1.4.1 The separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary 
will be recognised. 
 
1.4.2 The legislature of Aceh will redraft the legal code for Aceh on the basis of the 
universal principles of human rights as provided for in the United Nations 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
 
1.4.3 An independent and impartial court system, including a court of appeals, will be 
established for Aceh within the judicial system of the Republic of Indonesia. 
 
1.4.4 The appointment of the Chief of the organic police forces and the prosecutors 
shall be approved by the head of the Aceh administration. The recruitment and 
training of organic police forces and prosecutors will take place in consultation 
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with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration in compliance 
with the applicable national standards. 
 
1.4.5 All civilian crimes committed by military personnel in Aceh will be tried in civil 
courts in Aceh. 
 
 
2 HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
2.1 The GoI will adhere to the United Nations International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
 
2.2  A Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh. 
 
2.3 A Commission for Truth and Reconciliation will be established for Aceh by the 
Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of 
formulating and determining reconciliation measures. 
 
 
3 AMNESTY AND REINTEGRATION INTO SOCIETY 
 
3.1 Amnesty 
 
3.1.1 The GoI will, in accordance with constitutional procedures, grant amnesty to all 
persons who have participated in GAM activities as soon as possible and not 
later than within 15 days of the signature of this MoU. 
 
3.1.2 Political prisoners and detainees held due to the conflict will be released 
unconditionally as soon as possible and not later than within 15 days of the 
signature of this MoU. 
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3.1.3  The Head of the Monitoring Mission will decide on disputed cases based on 
advice from the legal advisor of the Monitoring Mission. 
 
3.1.4 Use of weapons by GAM personnel after the signature of this MoU will be 
regarded as a violation of the MoU and will disqualify the person from amnesty. 
 
3.2 Reintegration into society 
 
3.2.1  As citizens of the Republic of Indonesia, all persons having been granted 
amnesty or released from prison or detention will have all political, economic 
and social rights as well as the right to participate freely in the political process 
both in Aceh and on the national level. 
 
3.2.2 Persons who during the conflict have renounced their citizenship of the Republic 
of Indonesia will have the right to regain it. 
 
3.2.3  The GoI and the authorities of Aceh will take measures to assist persons who 
have participated in GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the  civil 
society. These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, 
pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. A Reintegration Fund under 
the administration of the authorities of Aceh will be established. 
 
3.2.4 The GoI will allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property 
destroyed or damaged as a consequence of the conflict to be administered by the 
authorities of Aceh. 
 
3.2.5 The GoI will allocate suitable farming land as well as funds to the authorities of 
Aceh for the purpose of facilitating the reintegration to society of the former 
combatants and the compensation for political prisoners and affected civilians. 
The authorities of Aceh will use the land and funds as follows: 
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a) All former combatants will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, 
employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security 
from the authorities of Aceh. 
 
b) All pardoned political prisoners will receive an allocation of suitable 
farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate 
social security from the authorities of Aceh. 
 
c) All civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict 
will receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the 
case of incapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of 
Aceh. 
 
3.2.6  The authorities of Aceh and the GoI will establish a joint Claims Settlement 
Commission to deal with unmet claims. 
 
3.2.7 GAM combatants will have the right to seek employment in the organic police 
and organic military forces in Aceh without discrimination and in conformity 
with national standards. 
 
 
4 _ SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
4.1 All acts of violence between the parties will end latest at the time of the signing 
of this MoU. 
 
4.2 GAM undertakes to demobilise all of its 3000 military troops. GAM  members 
will not wear uniforms or display military insignia or symbols after the signing 
of this MoU. 
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4.3 GAM undertakes the decommissioning of all arms, ammunition and explosives 
held by the participants in GAM activities with the assistance of the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (AMM). GAM commits to hand over 840 arms. 
 
4.4 The decommissioning of GAM armaments will begin on 15 September 2005 and 
will be executed in four stages and concluded by 31 December 2005. 
 
4.5 The GoI will withdraw all elements of non-organic military and non-organic 
police forces from Aceh. 
 
4.6 The relocation of non-organic military and non-organic police forces will begin 
on 15 September 2005 and will be executed in four stages in parallel with the 
GAM decommissioning immediately after each stage has been verified by the 
AMM, and concluded by 31 December 2005. 
 
4.7 The number of organic military forces to remain in Aceh after the relocation is 
14,700. The number of organic police forces to remain in Aceh after the 
relocation is 9,100. 
 
4.8 There will be no major movements of military forces after the signing of this 
MoU. All movements more than a platoon size will require prior notification to 
the Head of the Monitoring Mission. 
 
4.9 The GoI undertakes the decommissioning of all illegal arms, ammunition and 
explosives held by any possible illegal groups and parties. 
 
4.10 Organic police forces will be responsible for upholding internal law and order in 
Aceh. 
 
4.11 Military forces will be responsible for upholding external defence of Aceh. In 
normal peacetime circumstances, only organic military forces will be present in 
Aceh. 
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4.12 Members of the Aceh organic police force will receive special training in Aceh 
and overseas with emphasis on respect for human rights. 
 
 
5 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION 
 
5.1 An Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) will be established by the European 
Union and ASEAN contributing countries with the mandate to monitor the 
implementation of the commitments taken by the parties in this Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
 
5.2 The tasks of the AMM are to: 
a)  monitor the demobilisation of GAM and decommissioning of its 
armaments, 
 
b)  monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic 
police troops, 
 
c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members, 
 
d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field, 
 
e) monitor the process of legislation change, 
 
f)  rule on disputed amnesty cases, 
 
g)  investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU, 
 
h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties. 
 
204 
 
5.3  A Status of Mission Agreement (SoMA) between the GoI and the European 
Union will be signed after this MoU has been signed. The SoMA defines the 
status, privileges and immunities of the AMM and its members. ASEAN 
contributing countries which have been invited by the GoI will confirm in 
writing their acceptance of and compliance with the SoMA. 
 
5.4 The GoI will give all its support for the carrying out of the mandate of the 
AMM. To this end, the GoI will write a letter to the European Union and 
ASEAN contributing countries expressing its commitment and support to the 
AMM. 
 
5.5 GAM will give all its support for the carrying out of the mandate of the AMM. 
To this end, GAM will write a letter to the European Union and ASEAN 
contributing countries expressing its commitment and support to the AMM. 
 
5.6 The parties commit themselves to provide AMM with secure, safe and stable
 working conditions and pledge their full cooperation with the AMM. 
 
5.7 Monitors will have unrestricted freedom of movement in Aceh. Only those tasks 
which are within the provisions of the MoU will be accepted by the AMM. 
Parties do not have a veto over the actions or control of the AMM operations. 
 
5.8 The GoI is responsible for the security of all AMM personnel in Indonesia. The 
mission personnel do not carry arms. The Head of Monitoring Mission may 
however decide on an exceptional basis that a patrol will not be escorted by GoI 
security forces. In that case, the GoI will be informed and the GoI will not 
assume responsibility for the security of this patrol. 
 
5.9 The GoI will provide weapons collection points and support mobile weapons 
collection teams in collaboration with GAM. 
 
5.10 Immediate destruction will be carried out after the collection of weapons and 
205 
 
ammunitions. This process will be fully documented and publicised as 
appropriate. 
 
5.11 AMM reports to the Head of Monitoring Mission who will provide regular 
reports to the parties and to others as required, as well as to a designated person 
or office in the European Union and ASEAN contributing countries. 
 
5.12 Upon signature of this MoU each party will appoint a senior representative to 
deal with all matters related to the implementation of this MoU with the Head of 
the Monitoring Mission. 
 
5.13 The parties commit themselves to a notification responsibility procedure to the 
AMM, including military and reconstruction issues. 
 
5.14 The GoI will authorise appropriate measures regarding emergency medical 
service and hospitalisation for AMM personnel. 
 
5.15 In order to facilitate transparency, the GoI will allow full access for the 
representatives of national and international media to Aceh. 
 
 
6 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
6.1 In the event of disputes regarding the implementation of this MoU, these will be 
resolved promptly as follows: 
 
a) As a rule, eventual disputes concerning the implementation of this MoU 
will be resolved by the Head of the Monitoring Mission, in dialogue with 
the parties, with all parties providing required information immediately. 
The Head of the Monitoring Mission will make a ruling which will be 
binding on the parties. 
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b) If the Head of the Monitoring Mission concludes that a dispute cannot be 
resolved by the means described above, the dispute will be discussed 
together by the Head of the Monitoring Mission with the senior 
representative of each party. Following this, the Head of the Monitoring 
Mission will make a ruling which will be binding on the parties. 
 
c) In cases where disputes cannot be resolved by either of the means 
described above, the Head of the Monitoring Mission will report directly 
to the Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs of 
the Republic of Indonesia, the political leadership of GAM and the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis Management Initiative, 
with the EU Political and Security Committee informed. After 
consultation with the parties, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
the Crisis Management Initiative will make a ruling which will be 
binding on the parties. 
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The GoI and GAM will not undertake any action inconsistent with the letter or spirit of 
this Memorandum of Understanding. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 
Signed in triplicate in Helsinki, Finland on the 15 of August in the year 2005. 
 
On behalf of the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia, 
 
Hamid Awaludin  
 
Minister of Law and Human Rights  
 
On behalf of the Free Aceh Movement, 
 
 
Malik Mahmud 
 
Leadership 
 
 
207 
 
 
 
As witnessed by 
 
 
Martti Ahtisaari 
Former President of Finland 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis Management Initiative 
Facilitator of the negotiation process 
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APPENDIX 2 
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
AND THE FREE ACHEH MOVEMENT 
 Preamble 
        The Government of the Republic of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Acheh 
Movement (GAM) have been engaged in a process of dialogue since January 2000 and 
concur that the priority in Acheh is the security and welfare of the people and therefore 
agree on the need for finding an immediate peaceful solution to the conflict in Acheh. 
On 10 May 2002, the GOI and GAM issued a Joint Statement set out below: 
1.     On the basis of the acceptance of the NAD Law as a starting point, as discussed on 
2-3 February 2002, to a democratic all-inclusive dialogue involving all elements of 
Achehnese society that will be facilitated by HDC in Acheh. This process will seek to 
review elements of the NAD Law through the expression of the views of the Achehnese 
people in a free and safe manner. This will lead to the election of a democratic 
government in Acheh, Indonesia. 
2.     To enable this process to take place both parties agree to work with all speed on an 
agreement on cessation of hostilities with an adequate mechanism for accountability of 
the parties to such an agreement. This will also provide the opportunity and 
environment for much needed socio-economic and humanitarian assistance to the 
people of Acheh.  
        The GOI and GAM share the common objective to meet the aspirations of the 
people of Acheh to live in security with dignity, peace, prosperity, and justice. In order 
to meet the aspirations of the people of Acheh and permit them to administer themselves 
freely and democratically, the GOI and GAM agree to a process which leads to an 
election in 2004 and the subsequent establishment of a democratically elected 
209 
 
government in Acheh, Indonesia, in accordance with the review of the NAD Law, as 
provided for in point 1 of the 10 May 2002 Joint Statement.  
        To this end, the GOI will ensure and GAM will support the development of a free 
and fair electoral process in Acheh, which will be designed to ensure the broadest 
participation of all elements of Achehnese society.  
        In light of the delicate nature of the confidence building process, the GOI and 
GAM further appeal for the support of all elements of society and request that no party 
undertake any action which is inconsistent with this Agreement and may jeopardize the 
future security and welfare of the people of Acheh.  
        The immediate requirement is to ensure the cessation of hostilities and all acts of 
violence, including, intimidation, destruction of property and any offensive and criminal 
action. Offensive and criminal action is deemed to include violent actions such as 
attacking, shooting, engaging in torture, killing, abducting, bombing, burning, robbing, 
extorting, threatening, terrorising, harassing, illegally arresting people, raping, and 
conducting illegal searches. 
        Throughout the peace process the maintenance of law and order in Acheh will 
continue to be the responsibility of the Indonesian Police (Polri). In this context, the 
mandate and mission of Brimob will be reformulated to strictly conform to regular 
police activities and as such will no longer initiate offensive actions against members of 
GAM not in contravention of the Agreement. 
        The JSC will be the point of reference for all complaints regarding police functions 
and action that are deemed to be in contravention of the spirit and letter of the Cessation 
of Hostilities (COH) Agreement. As such, the JSC will be responsible for defining, 
identifying and investigating when and if the police have breached their mandate. 
        With this general understanding, and to bring the peace process forward to the next 
phase, both parties hereby agree on the following:  
Article 1: Objectives of the Cessation of Hostilities and All Acts of Violence 
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a)     Since both sides have thus agreed that, from now on, enmity between them should 
be considered a thing of the past, the peace process, which is continued by an agreement 
on this phase, will proceed by building further confidence and both sides will prove to 
each other that they are serious about achieving this ultimate common objective. 
b)     The objectives of the cessation of hostilities and all acts of violence between both 
parties are (i) to proceed to the next phase of the peace process, as mutually agreed on 
10 May 2002 in Switzerland; (ii) to continue the confidence building process with a 
view to eliminating all suspicions and creating a positive and co-operative atmosphere 
which will bring the conflict in Acheh to a peaceful conclusion; and, (iii) to enable, 
provided hostilities and all acts of violence cease, for the peace process to proceed to the 
next phases, i.e. the delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
assistance. 
Article 2: Commitment by Both Sides to Cease Hostilities and All Acts of Violence 
a)     Both sides explicitly express their commitment to meet the terms of this 
Agreement to cease hostilities and all forms of violence toward each other and toward 
the people in Acheh, by implementing the steps stipulated in this Agreement. In 
expressing such commitment, both sides guarantee that they are in full control of, 
respectively, TNI/Polri and GAM forces on the ground. The GOI and GAM commit to 
control those groups that do not share their objectives but claim to be part of their 
forces. 
b)     Both sides further commit themselves to immediately after the signing of this 
Agreement to thoroughly inform their respective forces on the ground of the terms of 
this Agreement, and to instruct them to cease hostilities immediately.  
c)     Both sides agree that, should there be other parties taking advantage of the 
situation and disturbing the peaceful atmosphere, they will endeavour to take joint 
action against them to restore the peace. 
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d)     During this confidence-building period, both sides agree that they will not increase 
their military strength, which includes re-deployment of forces, increase in military 
personnel or military equipment into Acheh.  
e)     HDC is requested to strictly facilitate the implementation of this Agreement. 
f)     Both parties will allow civil society to express without hindrance their democratic 
rights.  
Article 3: Joint Security Committee (JSC) 
a)     The senior leadership in charge of security from each side will meet, in order to 
establish the initial contact and understanding between both sides. They should also (i) 
reactivate the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which was established during the 
implementation of the Humanitarian Pause, and (ii) commence discussion, in order to 
reach agreement expeditiously, on a plan of action for the JSC in discharging its duties. 
b)     The functions of JSC are: (i) to formulate the process of implementation of this 
Agreement; (ii) to monitor the security situation in Acheh; (iii) to undertake full 
investigation of any security violations; (iv) in such cases, to take appropriate action to 
restore the security situation and to agree beforehand on the sanctions to be applied, 
should any party violate this Agreement; (v) to publish weekly reports on the security 
situation in Acheh; (vi) to ensure that no new paramilitary force is created to assume 
previous functions of Brimob, and (vii) to design and implement a mutually agreed 
upon process of demilitarisation. Regarding this last task, the JSC will designate what 
will be called Peace Zones (see Art. 4(a)). After peace zones have been identified, the 
GAM will designate placement sites for its weapons. Two months after the signing of 
the COH and as confidence grows, GAM will begin the phased placement of its 
weapons, arms and ordinance in the designated sites. The JSC will also decide on a 
simultaneous phased relocation of TNI forces which will reformulate their mandate 
from a strike force to a defensive force. The GOI has the right to request HDC to 
undertake no-notice verification of the designated sites. With the growth in confidence 
of both parties in the process the phased placement of GAM weapons will be completed 
within a period of five months (see attached note).  
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c)     The composition of JSC will be senior officials appointed as representatives of the 
GOI and the GAM and a senior third party personality of high standing agreed upon by 
both sides. Each senior official from the three parties are to be accompanied by up to 
four persons as members. The heads of delegations from both sides have to be senior 
and have the authority to be able to take decisions on the spot. 
The third party (HDC) personality needs to be able to command the respect and high 
regard of both sides in order to be able to assist in resolving problems, as they arise. 
d)     In order to perform these functions, the JSC is to be assisted by a monitoring team 
or monitoring teams, which would be provided security guarantees by both sides in 
monitoring the security situation and in investigating any violation. 
e)     The composition of each of the monitoring teams are appointed officials as 
representatives of the High Command of the security forces of the GOI and the High 
Command of the forces of the GAM in Acheh and a senior third party military officer 
agreed upon by both sides reporting to the senior third party personality of high standing 
in the JSC. 
f)     JSC and the monitoring team(s) would be provided with the necessary technical 
and administrative staff and logistical support. The HDC is requested to facilitate the 
establishment of these bodies by providing the necessary funds, logistical and 
administrative facilities. 
g)     It is agreed upon that the JSC and the monitoring team(s) will be established and 
be operational within one month of the signing of this Agreement. Civil society has the 
right to provide inputs to the JSC. 
Article 4: Establishment of "Peace Zones" 
a)     Following the signing of the COH Agreement, the JSC, with the direct 
participation of the senior leadership for security from both sides, will immediately 
identify and prepare locations of conflict to be designated as "Peace Zones". This would 
facilitate considerably the work of the JSC since it could focus its attention on these 
areas in establishing and maintaining security, and these zones, provided peace could be 
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established, will be the focus of the initial humanitarian, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction assistance. 
b)     For the first two months after the signing, both parties will relocate to defensive 
positions as agreed upon by the JSC. Adjustments to these locations could be made by 
the JSC in order to separate the forces of both parties with sufficient distance to avoid 
contact or confrontation. Forces of both parties will refrain from operations, 
movements, activities or any provocative acts that could lead to contact or confrontation 
with each other.  
c)     In order to build trust and confidence during these crucial months, these zones and 
surroundings will be monitored by the tripartite monitoring teams. The JSC will be 
informed by both parties of any significant movements or activities in these areas.  
d)     POLRI will be able to investigate criminal activities in these areas in consultation 
with the JSC.  
e)     The designation of identified areas of demilitarised zones such as schools, 
mosques, health institutions and public places, bazaars, Achehnese meunasahs, market-
places, food stalls, communication centres including bus-terminals, taxi-stations, ferry-
terminals, public roads, river transportation services, and fishing ports.  
Article 5: Time Frames 
a)     Both sides agree that hostilities and all acts of violence by both sides should cease 
forever in Acheh.  
b)     Both sides also agree that hostilities and all acts of violence during the first three 
months from the time when the JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational are 
very crucial as indicator of the seriousness of the commitment from both sides. If indeed 
hostilities and all acts of violence could decrease dramatically, or even cease altogether, 
during this first three month period, the Achehnese and other Indonesian people, and the 
international community, would consider that the peace process would most likely 
succeed. 
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c)     During the period between the signing of this Agreement and the time when the 
JSC and the monitoring team(s) become operational, both signatories to this Agreement 
commit themselves to exercise the utmost restraint by not making any public statement 
that would inflame the feeling and sentiment of the other side, including the people, and 
by ensuring that their forces will not initiate any hostile act toward the other.  
Article 6: All-Inclusive Dialogue 
        The parties agree to support the process of All-Inclusive Dialogue in Acheh as 
provided for in the Joint Statement of 10 May 2002. The parties agree to ensure, 
through this Agreement, the necessary security and freedom of movement for all 
participants in the All-Inclusive Dialogue to enable the process to be conducted in a safe 
and fair manner, reflecting the views of all elements of Achehnese society. The parties 
reconfirm their agreement that the process of All-Inclusive Dialogue be facilitated by 
the HDC.  
Article 7: Public Information and Communications 
a)     To ensure national and international support for the peace process in Acheh, the 
Agreement of 10 May 2002, and this Agreement and its implementation have to be 
publicised as widely as possible within one month of the signing of this Agreement. The 
process of implementation has to be as transparent as possible and the people have to be 
regularly informed of the progress made and difficulties encountered. 
b)     Communications to the public will be given priority, especially through the print 
and electronic media. Television and radio programmes have to be devised to enable 
obtaining inputs from the general public provided that they are conducted in a fair and 
balanced manner. The JSC remains the final reference on this matter. 
c)     Other media, such as community meetings, seminars, flyers, bumper stickers, T-
shirts, and others could also be considered, as appropriate.  
d)     The HDC is requested to look for sources of funding these public information and 
communication activities.  
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Article 8: Joint Council 
        A Joint Council will be established, composed of the most senior representatives of 
the GOI and the GAM, and of the third party (HDC). The function of this Joint Council 
will be to resolve all issues or disputes arising out of the implementation of this 
Agreement, which cannot be resolved by other Committees or Structures established 
under this Agreement. The Joint Council may amend the articles and provisions of this 
Agreement.  
Article 9: Amendment or Termination  
        This Agreement may only be amended by agreement between the two parties in the 
Joint Council. Should either party wish to unilaterally terminate the Agreement then 
they are obligated to first bring the issue to the Joint Council and engage in and support 
all efforts by the Joint Council to resolve the problem within a sufficient period of time 
(no less than 30 days). If the Joint Council is unable to resolve the matter, then either 
party has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the Agreement. 
 
For the Government of the  
Republic of Indonesia  
Amb. Mr. S. Wiryono 
For the Leadership of the  
Free Acheh Movement  
Dr. Zaini Abdullah 
Witnessed by 
Henry Dunant Centre  
for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) 
Mr. Martin Griffiths  
 
Explanatory Note for Article 3b  
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        This note is intended as HDC's interpretation of the clauses in the Framework 
Agreement relating to GAM weapons (Article 3) and provides guidance in the manner 
to carry out the responsibilities assigned to the HDC in that part of the Agreement. 
        By this Agreement the GAM has agreed to place its weapons in designated sites 
according to the time period outlined in Article 3b. These sites will be designated by 
GAM and their location communicated to HDC. 
        It is our interpretation that under the agreed upon system, GAM will not be able to 
move the weapons that have been placed in the designated sites without the consent of 
HDC. GAM has to comply with the request of HDC to conduct no-notice inspections at 
any time. 
        HDC will keep the JSC informed of the results of these visits i.e. that the sites 
visited contain the weapons placed there and whether they continue to remain in the 
designated sites. Any breach will be communicated to the JSC. 
Martin Griffiths 
Director 
Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
Geneva, Switzerland 
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